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ABSTRACT 
THE NATURE OF THE RELA TIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGIOUS 
COMMUNITIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF THE 
FETBULLAH GÜLEN COMMUNITY 
Filiz Başkan 
Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Fuat Keyman 
December 1998 
This thesis acidresses the question as to whether or not religious communities can 
be defined as part civil societal organization within the context of 
democratization efforts in Turkey. The Fethullah Gülen Community will be the 
case study of this thesis. Theoretical debate on civil society will be examined to 
provide an insight into the relations between religious communities and civil 
society and to clarify the basic definition of "civil society." The histarical 
background of modern Turkey, that is, the Ottoman Empire will be analyzed 
with the objective of shedding light on the question of civil society debate in 
modern Turkey. The thesis will also present the histarical context in which 
Bediuzzaman Said Nursi and Nurculuk emerged. The analysis of Said Nursi will 
provide important insights to understand the Fethullah Gülen Community, one 
branch of the Nurculuk. Finally, this thesis will dwell on the Fethullah Gülen 
Community in relation to the notion of civil society and conclude that it cannot 
be defined as part of civil society in the ideal sense of the term. 
Keywords: Civil Society, Religious Communities, Nurculuk, the Fethullah Gülen 
Community, Ottoman Empire 
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ÖZET 
TÜRKİYE'DE DİNİ CEMAATLER VE SİVİL TOPLUM ARASINDAKİ 
İLİŞKİNİN NİTELİGİ: FETHDLLAH GÜLEN CEMAATİ ÖRNEK OLA YI 
Filiz Başkan 
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Y oneticisi: Doç. Dr. Fuat Keyman 
Aralık 1998 
Bu çalışma dini cemaatlerin sivil toplum örgütü olup olmadıgı sorusunu 
Türkiye'deki demokratikleşme çabalan çerçevesinde araştırmıştır. Fethullah Gülen 
Cemaati bu tezin örnek çalışması olarak seçilmiştir. Sivil toplum hakkındaki teorik 
tartışma dini cemaatler ve sivil toplum arasındaki ilişkiyle ilgili bakış açısı 
sağlamak ve sivil toplum kavramını netleştirmek için incelenmiştir. Modem 
Türkiye'nin tarihsel çerçevesi olarak Osmanlı İmparatorluğu günümüz 
Türkiye'sinde ki sivil toplum tartışmalarına ışık tutması amacıyla ele alınmıştır. 
Ayrıca bu çalışmada Bediüzzaman Said Nursi ve Nurculuğun ortaya çıktığı tarihi 
çerçeve incelenmiştir. Said Nursi'yi incelemek Nurculuğun bir kolu olan Fethullah 
Gülen Cemaatini anlamak için önemli bir bakış açısı sağlayacaktır. Son olarak bu 
tez Fethullah Gülen Cemaatini sivil toplum kavramı ile ilişkili olarak incelemiş ve 
bu cemaatin ideal anlamda bir sivil toplum örgütü olmadığı sonucuna varınıştır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sivil Toplum, Dini Cemaatler, Nurculuk, Fethullah Gülen 
Cemaati, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu 
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CHAPTERI 
INTRODUCTION 
During the post-1980 period, the re has been a revival of the nations of ll civil 
societyll and "democracy" paraHel to the global trend of democratization both 
in developed and developing countries. Leading scholars in developed 
countries have begun to address the question of the ways of improving existing 
conditions of democracy. In developing countries, civil society has been 
credited as an important social vehicle to chaHenge authoritarian regimes. 
Democratization efforts, especiaHy in Eastern Europe during the last two 
decades, for instance, have been associated with the establishment of civil 
society as a precondition for democracy. For many East European inteHectuals, 
construction of ll civil society" appeared to be the only viable approach to 
finding a solution for the problems of democratization. Likewise, in the Middle 
East and South Asia, paraHel to the debate on the compatibility of Islam and 
democracy, scholars have begun to consider the notian of civil society in 
Muslim communities. They have attempted to address the question of whether 
civil society could flourish in Islamic countries and argued that Muslim 
religious groups can be defined as civil societal organizations. 
During the last two decades, these questions were also discussed in Turkey. In 
the literature on the question of democracy in the Middle East, leading social 
scientists treated Turkey as the only Muslim country with democratic 
credentials. For instance A. Richard Norton argues that in Turkey, there is "a 
functioning, participatory political system, in which people vote regularly and 
meaningfully, where the freedom to speak freely is protected and where the 
rights of individual enjoy significant respect."1 However, in Turkey this debate 
is mainly focused on the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Some scholars 
argued that Islam and democracy can coexist. Nevertheless, there is also 
suspicion among both the secularists in Turkey and some scholars in the 
Western world, about the use of democracy within Islamist movements. This 
suspicion is based on the idea that these movements use democracy, not 
because they have a normative commitment to democracy, but as an effective 
means for seeking power to establish a state based on sharia. For this reason, it 
is an urgent task to examine whether religious communities could be 
considered as civil societal organizations and whether they are functional for 
ı Augustus Richard Norton, "Introduction," in Civil Society in the Middle East, 
ed. Augustus Richard Norton (Netherlands: E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1995), 4. 
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the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. Academic circles have not acidressed 
these questions in detail. This is what this thesis aims at doing. This thesis will 
attempt to explore ina detailed fashion the relation of religious communities to 
civil society and democracy. 
A quick glance at the literature on civil society and democracy indicates that 
there is no consensus among scholars on the definition of civil society either in 
international academic circles or in public and academic discussions in Turkey. 
The second chapter will present various and different meanings of civil society 
in the literature. In Turkey, the notion of civil society has been introduced 
firstly into political debates by Turgut Özal in 1987.2 From then on, different 
influential groups in the political arena have agreed on the necessity of the 
establishment of civil society for the consolidation of democracy. In that 
respect, both the leftists and rightists, who were suppressed by military rule 
between 1980 and 1983, have become ardent supporters of the notion of civil 
society. However, they tended to restrict the notion of civil society to an 
oppositional space to "military society."3 
2 Ahmet Evin, "De-militarization and Civilianization of the Regime," in Politics 
in the Third Turkish Republic, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Boulder, San 
Fransisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994). 
3 Ali Yasar Saribay, "Türkiye'de Demokrasi ve Sivil Toplum," in Küresellesme, 
Sivil Toplum ve Islam, ed. Fuat Keyman and Ali Yasar Saribay (Ankara: Vadi 
Yayinlari, 1998), 95. 
3 
On the other hand, conservatives have identified civil society only with the 
market economy, but they did not dwell on "political and legal reforms that 
would further the democratization process."4 As a result, it can be proposed 
that the notion of civil society has been defined ina more restricted fashion in 
Turkey. For this reason, it is important to investigate whether religious 
communities are part of civil society, especially within the context of the 
relationship between civil society and democracy in Turkey. 
The basic aim of this thesis, in this sense, is to explore the relationship between 
religious communities and civil society. In doing so, the following questions are 
posed: To what extent do the activities of religious communities contribute to 
pluralism in civil society and democratization attempts of Turkey? And what is 
the nature of the relationship between the state and religious sects and 
communities in Turkey? The exploration of these questions is of utmost 
importance, in so far as they are internal to the question of democracy in 
Turkey. 
This thesis aims to contribute to the current debate on civil society by 
investigating the relationship between religious communities and civil society 
4 Levent Köker, "National Identity and State Legitimacy: Contradictions of 
Turkey' s Democratic Experience," in Civil Society, Democracy and the Muslim 
World, ed. Elizabeth Özdalga and Sune Persson (Istanbul: Swedish Research 
Institute in Istanbul Transactions, 1997), 71. 
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in Turkey. First, an attempt will be made to clarify the basic concept and 
definitions of "civil society," since there is no cansensus about the meaning of 
thistermin Turkish intellectual circles. Secondly, the nature of the relationship 
between religious communities and "civil society" in Turkey will be analyzed 
critically andina comprehensive manner. The test case is the Fethullah Gülen 
Community (Cemaat) for the purposes of this thesis. 
In exploring the relationship between religious communities and civil society, 
three levels of analysis are used. First, the theoretical debate on the notion of 
civil society is examined, so that the concept of civil society will be clarified. 
Second, the histarical background of modern Turkey, that is, the Ottoman 
Empire is appraised. Whether there were civil societal organizations in the 
Ottoman Empire is examined with a view to shedding light on the question of 
civil society debate in modern Turkey. Similarly, the histarical context in which 
Bediüzzaman Said Nursi and Nurculuk emerged and became an important 
social force is discussed. Because one can extrapolate important insights from 
the analysis of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi to understand the nature and 
development of the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat), which is one of the 
branches of Nurculuk and the case study of this thesis. Finally, the social and 
political context in which Fethullah Gülen emerged as an important figure in 
modern Turkey, and his views on issues relevant to the notion of civil society 
will be examined. 
5 
For content analysis the book written by Bediüzzaman Said Nursi and 
Fethullah Gülen and interviews with Fethullah Gülen by leading journalists 
will be used as primary sources. In addition, the archives of Zaman, a daily of 
the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat), consisting of news published in all 
the newspapers and journals on Fethullah Gülen will be reviewed to seek an 
answer to the questions such as of to what extent is Fethullah Gülen an 
influential figure in political arena?, and ho w has Fethullah Gülen and his 
community been perceived by leading journalists? 
However, the limited nature of the thesis should be mentioned. This thesis is 
limited in its objective and scope. As mentioned earlier, in this thesis the 
question of whether or not the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) may be 
considered as civil societal organization will be examined. In this context, an 
account of the varying characteristics of different tarikats, as well as the feature 
of the relationship between tarikats and the Ottoman state will be provided as a 
background necessary to understand the nature of the relationship between 
religious communities and the state in modern Turkey. Similarly, a 
biographical information about Bediüzzaman Said Nursi and his views on the 
issues related to the notion of civil society will be presented, in so far as this 
information is necessary to understand the nature and development of the 
Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat). Therefore, the objective of this thesis is 
not to make a comparison between different tarikats and the Fethullah Gülen 
6 
Community (Cemaat). Ina similar manner, this thesis is not concerned with a 
comparison of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi's views and Fethullah Gülen's views 
since this kind of a comparative research may be a topic of anather thesis. 
Instead, the thesis will make use of their views to the extent that they are 
related to the main objective of this thesis, that is, the exploration of the nature 
of the relationship between religious communities and civil society in relation 
to the state in modern Turkey. 
The thesis consists of six chapters. In the second chapter, theories of civil society 
will be examined. First, the Hegelian notian of civil society will be analyzed 
since the distinction of civil society and the state was made firstly by Hegel. 
Civil society and the state had been used synonymously until 1821, when 
Hegel' s book, Philosophy of Right, was published. In this book He gel 
distinguished between civil society and the state, thus making a major 
contribution to the study of civil society. 
Also included in the second chapter is a review of the Marxian and liberal 
views on civil society since those differing approaches have constituted an 
important component of the theoretical framework on this subject. The current 
debate on civil society, moreover, is expected to provide an insight into the 
relations between religious communities and civil society in Turkey. In this 
context, it becomes necessary to clarify current arguments and approaches 
7 
concerning civil society since there is no cansensus among scholars as to what 
the term "civil society" really means. Accordingly, the approaches to civil 
society are classified as "civil society versus state" approach and "pluralist 
approach to civil society." After introducing these various theories of civil 
society, one of the definitions will be adapted for use in this thesis and the 
reason for this choice stated. 
In the third chapter, the nature of the Ottoman state will be explored. First of 
all, a brief introduction on the establishment of the Ottoman state will be 
presented. In this context, the importance of the ideal of gaza, i.e., Holy War, 
during the period of establishment of Ottoman state will be underlined since 
the notion of gaza is an important determinant in analyzing the relationship 
between tarikats and the s ta te in the Ottoman-Turkish context. 
The patrimonial nature of the Ottoman state will also be discussed briefly in 
Chapter III, since Ottoman patrimonialism is a significant factor to gain proper 
understanding of whether or not civil societal elements existed in the Ottoman 
Empire. Then whether or not there were any kind of civil societal organizations 
in Ottoman Empire will be explored. In this regard, the nature of the guilds and 
the nature of the relationship between guilds and the Ottoman state will be 
explored. Ahilik will be examined in a similar fashion. Finally, characteristics of 
tarikats, and the features of the relationship between them and the Ottoman 
8 
state will be explained. This chapter is designed to provide a historical 
background for understanding the relationship between religious communities 
and the state in modern Turkey. In addition, this chapter will help us clarify the 
discussion of the concept of civil society in the Ottoman-Turkish context. 
The fourth chapter will begin with a brief introduction to Ottoman 
modernization in terms of the state elites' attempts to save the Empire from 
decline. Islamist movements that appeared in the nineteenth century are 
thought to be ones that developed as a reaction to the unsuccessful 
modernization attempts of Ottoman statesman to sa ve the Empire from decline. 
First, the nature of Islamist movements will be deseribed since Islamism 
constituted the background for the views that Bediüzzaman Said Nursi 
developed, the founder of Nurculuk. Second, biographical information about 
him will be presented, since that will give an idea of his educational formation 
and ideologkal appeal. After presenting his biography, Bediüzzaman Said 
Nursi's views on freedom, constitutionalism, secularism, the notion of state and 
opposition will be discussed because of their relevance to the main concern of 
this thesis. On the other hand, the vast amount of work Bediüzzaman Said 
Nursi wrote on the interpretation of the Qur'an and on belief will not be 
considered since this thesis is not concerned with the textual interpretation of 
his works. 
9 
At the end of the chapter, assessments of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi and 
Nurculuk by leading social scientists will be reviewed and the following 
questions will be addressed: How has Nurculuk been perceived by scholars? 
And in which terms has it been defined? 
The fifth chapter comprises a discussion of the life and views of Fethullah 
Gülen, the leader of one branch of Nurculuk. After the death of Bediüzzaman 
Said Nursi, Nurculuk has been dispersed and some independent groups such as 
"Group of New Asia," "Kirkinci Hoca and his supporters," and "Fethullah 
Gülen Community" were formed. The Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat), 
which is the most influential one will be the case study of this thesis. The reason 
is that Nurculuk, in general, and Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat), in 
particular, are the only communities which have been so far discussed within 
the cantext of the establishment of civil society and democratization of Turkish 
politics. 
The fifth chapter, then, includes a discussion of Fethullah Gülen and his life as 
well as his views on tolerance, democracy, consensus, consultation, 
compromise, the notion of the state, and education because these issues are 
related to the notion of civil society. Again, like Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, 
Fethullah Gülen' s views on the matter of belief will not be analyzed since this 
subject may be a topic of another thesis. 
10 
Then, opinions of leading social scientists regarding Fethullah Gülen and his 
community will be reassessed and the following questions will be addressed: 
How has Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) been perceived by scholars? 
And how do they define this community? After reviewing the evaluation of 
Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat), criticisms directed towards it will be 
considered. In the sixth chapter, the following questions will be answered: In 
which context has Fethullah Gülen emerged as an important figure? How has 
he increased his power to this large sc ale? 
There are several factors contributing to the emergence of Fethullah Gülen as an 
important figure of Turkish social and political life. One of them is the 
transformatian of state ideology. Another important factor is the globalization 
process in economic and cultural realms. A third factor contributing to the 
emergence of Fethullah Gülen is the debate on civil society in Turkey during 
the post-1980 period. These factors will be examined one by one in relation to 
their contribution to the rise of Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat). 
In the conclusion chapter, it is argued that a historical analysis anda discursive 
reading of Nurculuk and the views of Fethullah Gülen show that the Fethullah 
Gülen Community (Cemaat) tends to locate itself close to the state rather than 
civil society. 
ll 
CHAPTERII 
THEORIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
This chapter focuses on theories of civil society. In the first part, the Hegelian 
notion of civil society will be analyzed; in the second, current debates on the 
notion of civil society will be presented in a summary fashion. The chapter will 
serve to establish the theoretical framework of this thesis as well as to provide 
an insight for explaining how the notion of civil society might relate to the 
notion of "religious community" in Turkey. 
Until the eighteenth century "civil society" and "the state" had been used as 
synonymous terms. This traditional meaning of the concept of civil society can 
be traced back to Aristotle, "for whom civil society [koinonia politike] is that 
society, the polis, which contains and daminates all others."ı In this traditional 
meaning, civil society and the state were interchangeable terms. Being a 
1 John Keane, "Despotism and Democracy: The Origins and Development of 
the Distinction Between Civil Society and the State, 1750-1850," in Civil Society 
and the State, ed. John Keane (London, New York: Verso, 1988), 35. 
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member of a civil society meant being a citizen. Hegel was the first philosopher 
who distinguished between state and civil society. Accordingly we begin with a 
discussion of the Hegelian notion of civil society. 
2.1 The He gelian N otion of Ci vii Society 
In his Philosophy of Right, published in 1821, Hegel analyzes the relationship 
between civil society and the state by using a three-part framework consisting 
of the family, civil society, and the state. He divides the sphere of ethical life 
into family, civil society and the state. These three entities are deseribed as 
"moments" of the ethical order and they "are the ethical powers which regulate 
the life of individuals."2 In each of these three "moments," the norms of the 
ethical order are fulfilled in a different way by the actions of individuals and 
the way individuals relate to one another. In the family, for example, particular 
interests of individuals are transcended in a natural unity. The individual's 
ethical duties are defined according to his or her place, which is determined 
according to such natural factors as sex, and social, hierarchical ones as birth. 
The important ethical characteristics of the family are love, good will and 
z T. M. Knox, Hegel's Philosophy of Right (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1952), Seetion 145, 105. 
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devotion to the well-being of the who le family. 3 The crucial aspects of one' s 
ethical relationship with the family is that "one' s frame of mind is to have self 
consciousness of one' s individuality within this unity as the absolute essence of 
oneself, with the result that one is in it not as an independent person but as a 
member."4 Hegel's antipathy to individualism can be easily seen in this 
definition of the family. He treats the family as an organic whole that cannot be 
reduced to individuals within the family.s 
Civil society, according to Hegel, is composed of propertied individuals who 
are also members of a family. The family as an institution provides a continuing 
source of capital which forms the necessary economic basis for civil society.6 
The transmission of property from one generation to another, for example, is 
mediated through the family. Hegel, therefore, is opposed to having property 
rights secured by the state. For him, the very stability of the state depends on 
property rights vested in individuals? 
3 Z. A. Pelczynski, "Introduction: The Significance of Hegel's Separation of the 
State and Civil Society," in The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's Political 
Philosophy, ed. Z. A. Pelczynski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 
9. 
4 Knox, Hegel's Philosophy of Right. seetion 158, 110, my emphasis. 
5 Harry Brod, Hegel's Philosophy of Politics: Idealism, Identity and Modernity 
(Boulder, San Fransisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), 64. 
6 Ibid., 65-66 
7 Ibid. 
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Within his three-part framework, Hegel defines civil society as "the [stage of] 
difference which intervenes between family and the state ... "s The discourse of 
civil society develops when relations between individuals gain importance 
beyond their roles within the family unit. Civil society comprises the market 
economy, social classes, corporations, and institutions related to the 
administration of "welfare" and civil law. It is, therefore, a mosaic of private 
individuals, social classes, groups, and institutions whose transactions are 
arranged by civil law.9 Hegel uses the concept of civil society asa realm which 
includes both the private activity of individuals, and actions of public 
authorities such as courts of law, welfare and regulatory agencies, which are, in 
turn, considered as organs of the state. Public authorities intervene in the 
operation of the market to ensure the safety of person and property and to 
secure every single person' s livelihood and welfare.ıo For He gel, civil society is 
a product of a long historical process. "The creation of civil society is the 
achievement of the modern world."11 
With the formation of civil society, the family ceased to be the singular ethical 
unity. Individuals' main concerns became the satisfaction of their private needs 
8 Knox, Hegel's Philosophy of Right. seetion 182A, 266. 
9 Keane, "Despotism and Democracy," 50. 
ıo z. A. Pelczynski, "Introduction," 10. 
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by working, producing, and exehanging the product of their labor in the 
market. So the dialectic of civil society begins when many members of different 
families enter into relations with one anather as independent persons and when 
these relations produce a system of complete interdependence. The 
individuality in the family which is tied to the community is "released into self-
subsistent objective reality."12 
Civil society is differentiated from the state, in which, according to Hegel, 
"universality is institutionalized as the highest form of ethical life."13 In contrast 
to the state, civil society is the domain of the particular, that is the domain of 
individuals concerned with the fulfillment of their private needs. In this 
context, civil society is an important stage in the transition from the family to 
the state, since it is the locus where the two principles of modern society -
particularity and universality- are negotiated, and where the tension between 
them is reconciled.ı4 
Contrary to the classkal liberal thinkers, Hegel does not define civil society in 
terms of negative freedam and does not consider civil society to be an arena of 
11 Knox, Hegel's Philosophy of Right. seetion 182A, p.266. 
ı2 Ibid., seetion 181, p.122. 
13 Neera Chandhoke, State and Civil Society: Explorations in Political Theory (New 
Delhi, Thousand Oaks, London: Sage Publications, 1995), 118. 
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freedom and rights with which the state should not interfere. Rather, civil 
society is the active moment where the dialectic between particularity and 
universality is worked out,ıs 
Hegel proposes that the difference between civil society and state is that the 
objective of the activities in civil society is related to the particular interests or 
private rights of individuals or groups. On the contrary, the objective of the 
activities of the state is related to the general interests of the whole 
community.16 
According to Hegel, there is no necessary harmony among the various elements 
of civil society. The interaction among the various elements of civil society is 
generally fragile and subject to serious antagonisms. Modern civil society is like 
a field of battle where private interests of someone encounter private interests 
of others. Hence, the vigorous development of one part of civil society may 
obstruct other parts. 17 Moreover, he called attention to the danger that 
unconstrained form of individualism, and thus particularism, might lead to the 
breakdown of society although both individualism and particularism are often 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 z. A. Pelczynski, "Introduction," ll. 
17 Keane, "Despotism and Democracy," 51. 
17 
taken as hallmarks of modern society and evidence of progress. Therefore, civil 
society must be organized both pedagocially and institutionally. "It is the 
historical space where the individual can be socialized into realizing that an 
ethical community is the only way in which his sense of freedom is 
actualized. "18 
Hegel emphasizes the constraint that modern society could not overcome its 
own particularity and resolve its conflicts by itself. Modern society, that is civil 
society, would therefore need to have control by the higher authority of state. 
He argues that state intervention is legitimate under the following two 
conditions: first, the state may interfere to rectify injustices or inequalities 
within civil society, such as the domination of one class by another; secondly, it 
may intervene to protect the universal interest of the people, which is defined 
by the state itself. 19 In this context, John Keane argues that these two conditions 
provide a higher authority for state regulation and dominance of sociallife.2° 
For Hegel, the most important threat to modernity is not excessive 
politicization from above, that is from the state, since the aim of the state is to 
18 Chandhoke, State and Civil Society. 120. 
19 Keane, "Despotism and Democracy," 52-53. 
20 John Keane, Demokrasi ve Sivil Toplum (Democracy and Civil Society), 
translated by Necmi Erdogan (Istanbul: Ayrinti Yayinlari, 1994), 78. 
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secure individuality by establishing a stable mediating structure. On the 
contrary, the chief threat is excessive politicization from below, which is no 
other than an attempt to directly politicize the individual wm.zı 
A stable ethical community, in Hegelian formulation, depends on the 
establishment of a social whole, that is a culmination of a series of intermediate 
social groupings. A mere assembly of individuals would not constitute an 
ethical community. The individualism of civil society must therefore lead to the 
collective consciousness of the state.22 
In this sense, corporations, Hegel argues, are the key mediating structures that 
enable the transition from civil society to the state by leading individuals from 
particularistic to a universal consciousness.23 "As the family was the first," 
wrote Hegel, "so the corporation is the second ethical root of the state, the one 
planted in society."24 The corporation is differentiated from the family since it is 
planted in civil society. The primary function of the corporation as an organ of 
civil society is an economic one. It can assume its political functions only after it 
has attained its primary function. The corporations are seen asa second family 
2ı Brod, Hegel's Philosophy of Politics. 98. 
22 Ibid., 102. 
23 Ibid., 110. 
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for its members. Hegel views these as voluntary organizations representing 
particular areas of industry and commerce, even of cultural life. The functions 
of the corporation can be listed as follows: 1) looking after the interests of its 
members, 2) regulating the size of membership, 3) protecting its members 
against contingent misfortunes, and 4) providing the education to train new 
members.2s Corporations depend on the state in two ways to carry out these 
functions: for the explicit public sanction which would give them legitimacy, 
and for the state's control on regulation of their interaction so that they would 
become an integrating factor in political life.26 
Because the corporations are located simultaneously between the particular 
interests of civil society and the universal interests of the state, they have a key 
integrating function in political life. Since all citizens in the modern world 
cannot directly participate in the affairs of the state, corporations play an 
important role in providing the foundations of social cohesion by giving a 
public character to the private interests of their members.27 
24 Knox, Hegel's Philosophy of Right. seetion 255, 154. 
2s Ibid., seetion 252, 152-153. 
26 B ro d, Hegel' s Philosophy of Politics. 113. 
27 Ibid., 113-114. 
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As the foregoing discussion reflects, Hegel, the first philosopher to define the 
concept of civil society, has nevertheless conceived it to function under the 
tutelage of the state. Later thinkers have increasingly separated the notion of 
civil society from the state and in fact showed it to be an arena not only 
separate in from but one in contradistinction to the state. The following seetion 
will attempt to show how and in which ways civil society is considered as an 
antithesis of the state in two diametrically opposite approaches to civil society. 
Although these two approaches are different from each other in several ways, 
they have similar grounds in being different from Hegel' s approach. 
2.2 Contemporary Debates on Civil society 
Contemporary debates on civil society are centered chiefly around two 
distinctive approaches. Because these two approaches rest on diametrically 
opposite ideologkal premises as well as having their roots in different 
traditions of political theory, there is no consensus obtained in this debate on 
the definition of civil society. The first approach is called "civil society versus 
state" approach. The origins of this approach can be traced back to the 
nineteenth century, to Karl Marx and other sodalist thinkers. Now it is 
crystallized around the democratization efforts in Central Eastern Europe 
during the last two decades which has brought the concept of civil society back 
into social and political inquiry. The second approach is called "pluralist 
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approaeh to civil society." This approaeh is ehiefly taken by social scientists 
who ehiefly address the problems of Western demoeracies. More specifieally, 
the eontributions of Michael Walzer, Edward Shils, Gordon White, Larry 
Diamond, Augustus Richard Norton, and Jean Cohen and Andrew Aratoto this 
approaeh appear to be significant. 
2.2.1 Civil Society versus State Approach 
The origins of the "eivil soeiety versus state" approaeh lie in Karl Marx' s view 
on the nature of the relationship between eivil society and the state. Marx, like 
Hegel, saw civil soeiety as an arena distinguished by egoism, self-interest and 
eonfliet, and henee it is in need of restraint and improvement. Hegel, as 
deseribed earlier, identified the state not only as a positive mediating ageney 
over and above eivil soeiety, but also as an entity that developed at a la ter, more 
progressive stage in history. Marx, on the eontrary, sa w civil society as an arena 
ideally eapable of self improvement and henee posited that eonflicting interests 
ineivil soeiety had to be moderated within the sphere of eivil society itself. 
Marx insisted that civil society must find its own solutions to the problems of 
egoism, self-interest, exploitation and oppression beeause he did not believe 
that existing political institutions were eapable of resolving the eonflieting 
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interests in civil society; he therefore "reversed the primacy given by Hegel to 
the state and made civil society the theater of history."28 
Marx, like Hegel, gave primacy to civil society but, unlike Hegel, he 
subordinated the state to civil society. For Marx, civil society is a dialectical 
stage where the dialectic between the social and the political, between 
domination and resistance, between oppression and emancipation is played 
out. Since civil society is the theater of history, it must find its own solutions to 
its contradictions, it cannot be emancipated by an imposed system of 
mediations.29 
Marx rejects the Hegelian premises that the state represents universal interests 
and that it is a neutral institution capable of resolving the contradictions within 
civil society. Because state is a class-bound institution and represents the 
interests of the dominant classes, it needs to resolve the contradictions of civil 
society, but by acting as a partialarbiter itmerely delays their resolutions.30 
The most im portant source of the contemporary "civil society versus s ta te" 
approach was Antonio Gramsci, the Halian sodalist thinker. Although Gramsci 
28 Chandhoke, State and C ivil Society. 134. 
29 Ibid., 136. 
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was an ardent Marxist, he was nevertheless inspired by Hegel's concept of civil 
society. Like Hegel, Gramsci also used a three-part conceptual framework to 
achieve a definition of civil society. Unlike both Marx and Hegel, however, he 
separated economy from civil society as well as the state from it, and 
considered all three as separate components in his conceptual framework. 
Economy, he took to indicate the dominant mode of production ina territory at 
a particular time. This mode of production comprised both the technical means 
of production and the social relations the process of production entailed. The 
mode of production, then, is strongly associated with ownership of different 
dasses of the means of production.3ı 
The "state," on the other hand, included the means of coercion such as the 
police and armed forces in a given territory. It also included state-funded 
bureaucracies such as civil service, as well as legal, welfare and educational 
institutions.32 In addition to the governmental apparatus, the state was also 
taken to comprise, sornewhat confusingly, the "private" apparatus of 
"hegemony" or civil society.33 It was the latter that provided legitimacy to the 
30 Ibid., 137. 
31 Robert Bocock, Hegemony (London and New York: Tavistock Publications, 
1986), 33. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Antonio Gramsci, Selections From the Prison Notebooks (New York: 
International Publishers, 1971), 261. 
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state. In this sense, Gramsci expanded the Marxist notion of the state, while 
differing significantly from Marx in distinguishing between "economy" and 
ci vii society in his conceptual paradigm.34 
For Gramsci, the term "civil society" implies organizations ina social formation 
that belong neither to the economy nor to the state. Gramsci imagines these 
organizations to be those which are supported and run by persons who operate 
outside the realms of the economy and state. Civil society, for him, includes 
mainly those religious institutions and organizations that are different from the 
ones that are entirely state-funded and state-controlled. Some other 
organizations, such as women' s organizations, youth groups, sports du bs, 
environmental organizations, many arts and entertainment organizations, 
which are not supported and controlled by the state can be considered as part 
of civil society. In addition, some means of communication which are not 
controlled by the state can also be seen as part of civil society.35 
Contrary to Hegel, Gramsci located both the family and political culture within 
civil society. However, unlike Hegel, he did not include the capitalist economy 
within it.36 As Cohen and Arato state "one might say that Gramsci developed 
34 Chandhoke, State and Civil Society. 148. 
35 Bocock, Hegemony. 33-34. 
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his doctrine of civil society in terms of two 'declarations of independence', one 
from the economy and the other from the state."37 
Gramsci' s notion of civil society is broader than that of Marx. Orthodox Marxist 
tradition defined civil society in terms only of the material aspects, chiefly the 
economic organization of society. For Gramsci, however, civil society 
comprised not only the material sphere, but also cultural and ideologkal 
spheres;38 civil society encompassed the whole of spiritual and intellectual life 
in addition to the whole of commercial and industrial life.39 Yet, civil society, 
according to Gramsci, did not protect the individual; to the contrary it served to 
protect the state. Protection of the individual by civil society as well as the state 
required the transformatian of both these entities.4° 
Civil society is the place in which consent is produced but also it is the place 
where this consent can be withdrawn, and consent for a new form of political 
36 Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (London: 
The MIT Press, 1992), 143. 
37 Ibid., 145. 
38 Chandhoke, State and Civil Society. 151. 
39 Norberto Bobbio, "Gramsci and the Concept of Civil Society," in Civil Society 
and the Statt:ö ed. John Keane (London, New York: Verso, 1988), 83. 
40 Chandhoke, State and Civil Society. 151. 
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organization can be produced and perpetuated.41 However, the individual must 
actively register his or her consent; the passive acceptance of the power of the 
state does not mean an agreement regarding the legitimacy of the state. 
Gramsci conceptualizes the production of consent by means of the concept of 
hegemony. For him, hegemony means the leadership of all people from all 
classes, and the power exercised bynota small group representing the state.42 
Contrary to Hegel, Gramsci argues that particular interests of civil society are 
not mediated by the state, but civil society must find its own solutions. 
Although Gramsci's conceptualization of civil society is Hegelian, his solution 
to the problems of civil society is Marxian.43 
For Gramsci, hegemony is a process by which the state creates a base for its 
domination. While doing so, the state constantly refers to eventsin civil society. 
So the constant reterence point of the state is civil society. Therefore, hegemony 
is not a constant phenomena which can be established permanently and then 
left alone. It has to be perpetually reformulated. In this respect, hegemony 
creates a continuos relationship between the state and society.44 
41 Ibid., 149. 
42 Bocock, Hegemony. 35. 
43 Chandhoke, State and Civil Society. 152-153. 
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Like Heget Gramsci claims that civil society is a conflictual sphere. Hegemony 
of the dominant class can be overthrown by the subaltern dasses in the sphere 
of civil society. Civil society does not have an unchanging essence but its 
essence is defined by the practices of i ts members. Hegemony can be created by 
the dominant dasses but it can also be created by the subaltern classes. Gramsci 
proposes that before seizing state power, every class must create its hegemony 
in civil society so that the ethical basis of the state can be established.45 
Hegemony, therefore, is a condition for obtaining moral and intellectual 
leadership in the plural sphere of civil society; in this plural and conflictual 
sphere, it also helps to achieve unity. Hegemony as the moral, intellectual and 
philosophical leadership of the dominant class represents the basis for the 
consent for the state power. However, state power cannot be exercised only by 
means of coercion, acceptance of the dominant class power by the society is 
necessary. Hegemonic leadership encompasses also an emotional dimension: 
the people of the dominant class are expected to appeal to the sentiments of 
society.46 Civil society is in a sense a dispersed society is held together by the 
44 Ibid., 153. 
4s Ibid., 154. 
46 Bocock, Hegemony. 37. 
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moral visian of the dominant class, provided that the legitimacy of its rule is 
actively supported by the whole social spectrum.47 
Some people argue that Gramsci is a theorist of superstructure contrary to 
Marx. For example, Norberto Bobbio claims that Marx places civil society 
within the sphere of structure or base, and that Gramsci identifies it with the 
superstructural rather than structural sphere. 
What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural 
'levels': the one that can be called 'civil society', that is the ensemble of 
organisms commonly called 'private', and that of 'political society' or 'the 
State'. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of 
'hegemony' which the dominant group exercises throughout society, and 
on the other hand to that of 'direct domination' or rule exercised through 
the State and the juridical government.48 
In quoting the above passage, Bobbio argues that there are two main 
differences between Marx and Gramsci in their conceptions of the relationships 
between base and superstructure. One is that, for Marx, the base is always 
primary and subordinating while superstructure is always secondary and 
subordinate. However, for Gramsci, it is completely the opposite. The other 
difference is that Gramsci adds to the distinction between base and 
superstructure a secondary one which takes place within the superstructural 
47 Chandhoke, State and Civil Society. 152. 
48 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: 
International Publishers, 1971), 12, quoted in Bobbio, "Gramsci and the Concept 
of Ci vii Society," 82-83. 
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sp here, that is, between civil society and the state. For Gramsci, the level of civil 
society is always the positive one and the state is always the negative one.49 
Bobbio insists that both fo~ Marx and Gramsci, contrary to Hegel, civil society is 
the active and positive stage of histarical development. Nonetheless, Marx 
argues that this positive stage is a structural phenomenon while for Gramsci it 
isa superstructural phenomenon. That is to say both of themassert the primacy 
of civil society, contrary to Hegel, who gave primacy to the state. Nonetheless, 
there is a difference between them on the point that Marx's emphasis shifts 
from the superstructural sp here to the structural sp here, Gramsci' s emphasis 
shifts within the superstructural sphere. 
Nevertheless, many social scientists such as Anne Showstack Sassoon oppose 
Bobbio's argument. Sassoon, for example, argues that Gramsci, in fact, relates 
the superstructure to an economic base rather than locating civil society in the 
superstructure, thus separating it from the base. She supports her thesis by 
demonstrating the stages of the establishment of hegemony. The basis of the 
hegemony of a class lies in the economic base. The first stage of hegemony is the 
economic-corporate one in which "members of the same category feel a certain 
solidarity toward each other but not with other categories of the same class."50 
49 Bobbio, "Gramsci and the Concept of Civil Society," 85-86. 
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At the second stage, solidarity is achieved among all the members of the same 
class. "Already at this juncture the problem of the state is posed-but only in 
terms of winning politico-juridical equality with the ruling groups: the right is 
claimed to participate in legislation and administration, even to reform these-
but within the existing fundamental structures."Sl The third stage is the political 
one in which one becomes aware that his/her interests go beyond the corporate 
limits of the economic class and become the interests of also other subordinate 
groups. In this phase, there is a transition from the structure to the 
superstructure.sz Thus, there ıs no obvious separation of base and 
superstructure in Gramsci' s formula tion. 
Finally, Gramsci' s concept of regulated society must be mentioned. In this 
connection, it may be recalled that: 
Gramsci's main concern was proletarian revolution and the creation of a 
sodalist society. Accordingly, his entire analysis is framed within the 
general paradigm of the Marxian class theory and geared to the strategic 
questions flowing from the revolutionary project, namely how to develop 
working-class consciousness, a sodalist counterhegemony, and, ultimately 
working-class power.s3 
50 Anne Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci' s Politics (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987- Second Edition), 117. 
51 Antonio Gramsci, Selections From the Prison Notebooks (New York: 
International Publishers, 1971), 181 quoted in ibid. 
52 Sassoon, Gramsci' s Politics. 117-118. 
53 Cohen and Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory. footnote 82, 641. 
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For Gramsci regulated society is a stateless society. The disappearance of the 
state can be achieved by means of the "re-absorption of political society into 
civil society."54 This reabsorption process, which involves the expansion of civil 
society, thus of hegemony, continues until that space occupied by political 
society has been totally eliminated. When a social class becomes successful in 
making its hegemony universal, then coercion becomes unnecessary and the 
conditions to make transition to a regulated society will be fulfilled. 55 
Regulated society, which is seen asa version of civil society, is defined by two 
premises: A premise of equality, and a premise of the replacement of law by 
morality. That is to say, "the new society is to be characterized by a 
spontaneous acceptance of law by free and equal individuals without any 
coercion or sanctions whatsoever."56 
As a result, Marx and Gramsci like liberal theorists insist on the primacy of 
civil society. However, opposed to the liberal thinkers, these two theorists did 
not consider civil society to be a sphere of rights, liberties, individualism, 
freedom, property and the market. According to Marx and Gramsci, these are 
superficial aspects of civil society. Civil society, for them, is a sphere 
distinguished by self-interest, egoism and inhumanity. Although Hegel 
54 Gramsci, Selections From the Prison Notebooks. 253. 
55 Bobbio, "Gramsci and the Concept of Civil Society," 94. 
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proposed that the problems could be resolved by means of the state, for Marx 
and Gramsci these problems could only be resolved within the sphere of civil 
society itself. 
2.2.2 Pluralist Approach to Civil Society 
After delineating the first approach, the second approach is "pluralist approach 
to civil society." A starting point might be Michael Walzer's view on civil 
society. In his article, entitled "The Civil Society Argument", Walzer acidresses 
the fallawing question that was posed by political theorists two centuries ago in 
a different way: "What is the preferred setting, the most supportive 
environment, for the good life?"57 Walzer, at first, summarizes the four answers 
-two of them leftist answers, one capitalist, and one nationalist, all of which, 
asserts Walzer, ignore the necessary pluralism of any civil society.58 He then 
proposes a fifth answer. Accordingly, the preferred setting for the good life is 
civil society. He defines the civil society as "the realm of fragmentation and 
struggle but alsa of concrete and authentic solidarihes where we fulfill E. M. 
56 Cohen and Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory. 156. 
57 Micahel Walzer, "The Civil Society Argument," in Dimensions of Radical 
Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London: 
Verso, 1992), 90. 
58 Ibid. 
33 
' "'c>j~t'j 
" -'/ 
Forster's injunction 'only connect', and become sociable or communal men and 
women."59 
In Walzer' s civil society, people organize voluntarily and communicate with 
each other, form voluntary associations not for on behalf of any group, buton 
behalf of sociability itself, since human beings are social beings by nature before 
becoming political and economic beings.60 He deseribes "social being" as "men 
and women who are citizens, producers, consumers, members of the nation and 
much else besides- and none of these by nature because it is the best thing to 
be."61 
According to Walzer, in modern democracies citizens do not have an active role 
but a passive role: they only vote in elections, and they have no means of 
controlling politicians. However, these citizens join the decision-making 
process in associations of civil society, such as unions, parties, movements, and 
interest groups. 62 
59 Ibid., 97. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., 97-98. 
62 Ibid., 99. 
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Civil society, for Walzer, is an arena where there isa low level of polarization, 
where pressure is used to achieve peace among associations, and where all 
associations are treated equally before the law. Also he perceives civil society as 
a setback for the problems of ideologkal single-mindedness such as the 
intolerant universalism of most religions, and the exclusivity of most nations.63 
Walzer is against the view that regards civil society in opposition to the state 
and argues that no state can endure for a long time if it is opposed to civil 
society. The basis of loyalty, civility, political competence and trust of authority 
lies not only in the state but also in civil society.64 
He then, delineates the paradox of civil society as follows: the state is also an 
assodation among various associations of civil society. The state, however, 
both determines the boundaries of civil society, and at the same time acquires a 
space within civil society. It sets the basic rules by which all associations are 
expected to abide. It has a greater control on associational life of civil society.65 
Unless it is controlled by the state, civil society creates an unequal power 
relationship among various types of associations. 
63 Ibid., 101-102. 
64 Ibid., 102. 
6s Ibid., 103. 
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Asa result, Walzer proposes that civil society needs a political ageney and the 
state is the most appropriate one for this purpose.66 There is a two-way 
relationship between the s ta te and civil society. He says that "only a democratic 
state can create a democratic civil society; only a democratic civil society can 
sustain a democratic state. " The civility which is characteristic of democratic 
politics can be experienced in the associational life of civil society; equally this 
associational life has to be favored by the democratic state.67 Hence Walzer 
places much emphasis to the state in his analysis of civil society. 
Edward Shils, on the other hand, argues that "the idea of civil society is the 
idea of a part of society which has a life of its own, which is distinctly different 
from the state, and which is largely in autonomy from it. Civil society lies 
beyond the boundaries of the family and the dan and beyond the locality; it lies 
short of the state."68 
Shils' idea of civil society can be deseribed in terms of three main components: 
The first is that it is a part of society encompassing various autonomous 
organizations and economic, religious, intellectual and political ones which are 
66 Ibid., 104. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Edward Shils, "The Virtue of Civil Society." Government and Opposition 26 
(1991): 3. 
36 
distinguished from the family, dan, locality and state. The second is that this 
part of society enters into relationships with the state as well as other particular 
institutions which protect the separation of the state and civil society. The third 
is that civil society embraces a broad pattern of civil manners. Shils proposes 
that among these components only the first one is mainly associated with civil 
society.69 
Like Walzer, Shils opposes the view that separates civil society totally from the 
state. He argues that the state and civil society are not separated since they are 
connected by the constitution and judicial traditions by means of which both 
rights and obligations toward each other are specified.7° The state determines 
the boundaries of civil society by means of law and civil society fulfills its 
function within the framework set by law. Laws necessitate that rights must be 
appreciated and duties must be performed in the civil societal arena.71 Contrary 
to Walzer, then, Shils believes that the state does not occupy a space within civil 
society but civil society assumes the existence of a state that has limited powers. 
First of all, the state has to gain power in order to enact laws that protect the 
market. Civil society needs a state that is limited in its sphere and is bound by 
law. However, the state must be capable of executing the laws which safeguard 
69 Ibid., 4. 
70 Ibid. 
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the pluralism of civil society. Civil society comprises some institutions which 
restrict the scope of state's activities and powers and maintain it.72 
Both the state and citizens are bound by the rule of law in civil society. Law 
protects the citizens from the arbitrary action of state officials including those 
representing political authority, bureaucracy, the police, and military. The 
efficiency of the system of justice both in the state and civil society depends on 
the degree of civility among individuals.73 Shils conceives "civility" as a main 
component of civil society and defines it as "an appreciation of or attachment to 
the institutions which constitute civil society. It is an attitude of attachment to 
the whole society, to all its strata and sections. It is an attitude of concern for the 
good of the entire society."74 For Shils, civility can become individualistic and 
"holistic" concurrently. Civility is an attitude of a person whose collective self-
consciousness dominates his individual self-consciousness.75 That means 
community's interests are important than his individual interests. 
n Ibid., 16. 
n Ibid., 9-10. 
73 Ibid., 16 
74 Ibid., ll. 
75 Ibid., 12. 
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With respect to the relationship between civility and civil society, Shils takes 
civility as a characteristic of civil society that features equal treatment of all 
persons in terms of their rights and obligations. Civility means that a person 
regards all other individuals as members of the same civil society regardless of 
the fact that they may be affiliated with different parties, different religious 
groups or to different ethnic groups.76 Given that Shils takes loyalty to the 
entire society more important than individuals' pursuing their own interests, 
his definition of civil behaviour is presented as a means of reconciling 
conflicting interests in society. Therefore, civility encourages the functioning of 
civil societal institutions in a peaceful manner by reducing the intensity of 
conflict. 
Not all people have a high level of civility in any society, asserts Shils. 
However, for the proper functioning of civil society, at least some persons who 
are in authoritative positions must have a high degree of civility. Here Shils 
manifests an elitist approach that the higher judiciary, senior civil servants, 
leading legislators, academicians, businessmen, journalists should have high 
level of civility.77 
76 Ibid., 12-13. 
77 Ibid., 18. 
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For Shils market economy is necessary, but not a determining factor to achieve 
civil society. The essential requirement for civil society is the autonomy of 
private organizations and institutions, as well as the autonomy of business 
firms.78 In addition to the markets, civil society, according to Shils, encompasses 
two types of institutions: primary institutions and supporting institutions. 
Primary institutions are competing political parties, independent judiciary, and 
so me others such as free press, which inform the public about the government' s 
activities. These primary institutions help distinguish between civil society and 
the state.79 
The supporting institutions include voluntary associations. Civil society, in 
addition, embodies freedom of religious belief, assodation and education, 
freedom of academic study, freedom of research and publication.8D 
Civil society presumes the pluralism of different autonomous spheres and also 
pluralism of different autonomous institutions in these spheres. Civil society 
approves the representation of diverse interests and approves the struggle for 
these diverse interests. 81 
78 Ibid., 9. 
79 Ibid., 10. 
80 Ibid. 
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Shils, then, insists on the pluralism of civil society that operates in two 
interrelated connections. First, pluralism includes the interaction with one 
another of autonomous spheres of economy, religion, culture, intellectual 
activity, political activity. These are not totally autonomous but are related to 
each other; their boundaries are not clearly determined. However, since they 
represent different interests, they are different from each other. Secondly, 
pluralism of civil society also consists of many partially autonomous 
organizations and institutions within each sphere. For example, there are many 
industries and business firms in the economic sphere; there are many churches 
and sects in the religious sphere; there are many universities, newspapers, 
journals in the intellectual sphere; and there are many political parties in the 
political sphere. In addition, there exists many voluntary civic associations.82 
Gordon White, on the other hand, focuses on those characteristics of civil 
society which were not mentioned by Walzer and Shils. He argues that civil 
societal organizations do not necessarily facilitate democratization. They also 
can impede it. White accepts the widely used definition of civil society as "an 
intermediate associational realm between the state and family, populated by 
organizations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid., 9. 
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the state and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend 
their interests or values."83 
White emphasizes the plurality of civil societal organizations by proposing that 
it is necessary to make distinctions between various types of civil society: There 
are "traditional" ascriptive organizations, which are related to kinship, 
ethnicity, culture or region as well as "modern" interest groups such as trade 
unions and professional associations; there are informal social networks which 
are based on patrimonial or clientelistic relationships as well as formal 
organizations; there are non-political institutions as well as political institutions 
like pressure groups; there are illegal organizations like the Mafia as well as 
legal organizations; there are some associations which try to change the existing 
political regime as well as associations which accept the existing political 
regime.84 
According to White, some civil societal elements, depending on conjuncture, 
would be non-political; some of them would encourage authoritarian regimes; 
some of them would propose a different definition of democracy; and some of 
them would facilitate liberal democracy. Therefore, the idea of a "strong" civil 
83 Gordon White, "Civil Society, Democratization and Development (I): 
Clearing the Analytical Ground." in Democratization l(Autumn 1994): 379. 
84 Ibid., 379-380. 
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society is likely to produce democratization is an illusion. Also the idea that a 
"weak" civil society is not contributory to democratization isa vague idea. ss 
White refuses the dichotomy of the state and civil society, and he proposes a 
distinction between civil society as an ideal type concept and the empirical 
world of civil society. The former is mainly based on the notion of division, 
autonomy and voluntary associations intheir perfect form. The latter comprises 
associations among which there is no clear-cut division. In this empirical world 
of civil society, for instance, the distinction of the state and civil society is 
generally obscure; state and civil society can shape each other, these two 
spheres may overlap, people can take roles both in civil society and in the 
state.86 
In addition to the distinction between civil society and the state, White makes a 
further distinction between civil society, political society and the state. He 
defines political society as "a range of institutions and actors which mediate 
and channel the relationship between civil society and the state."87 For White 
two main components of political society are political parties and political 
leaders. These two components are the ones which determine whether civil 
ııs Ibid., 380. 
86 Ibid., 380-381. 
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societal elements would be potentially more democratic or authoritarian.88 He 
deseribes the state as "the apparatus of administrative, judicial, legislative and 
mili tary organiza tions."89 
According to White, it can be argued that each sector of civil society can form 
its own norms about the relationship between state and society and the nature 
of democracy is related to the interaction between these sectors.90 Therefore, the 
nature of the relationship between different sectors of civil society is a crucially 
important determinant of the nature of democracy in a country. Also, the 
nature of democratic participation within civil societal organizations as well as 
the relationship between them is a determining factor for the consolidation of 
democracy.91 Finally, he argues that societies which pass from a successful 
process of industrialization are more likely to produce democratization.92 
Similar to White, Larry Diamond also deals with those features of civil society 
that are most likely to serve the development and consolidation of democracy. 
87 Ibid., 381. 
88 Ibid., 382. 
89 Ibid., 381. 
9o Ibid., 385. 
91 Ibid., 388. 
92 Ibid. 
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He conceives civil society as "the realm of organized social life that is 
voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the 
state, and bound by a legal order or a set of shared rules."93 For Diamond, 
individuals in civil society come together in a public sphere and express their 
ideas and interests, they exchange information, demand something from the 
state, and hold state officials accountable.94 
In Diamond's view, civil society is an intermediary structure between state and 
the private sphere. It does not contain in itself the family, inward-looking group 
activity, business firms, and political activities which are trying to get control of 
the state. Civil society embodies different types of organizations, including 
economic organizations such as productive and commercial associations; 
cultural organizations such as religious, ethnic, and communal associations; 
informational and educational organizations; interest-based organizations; 
developmental organizations attracting resources for activities to increase the 
quality of the community life; issue-oriented movements such as 
environmentalist and feminist movements; civic organizations devoted to 
improving the political system and consolidating democracy.95 Particularly 
93 Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic 
Consolidation," Journal of Democracy 5 (July 1994): 5. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid., 6. 
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important are the organizations devoted to dissemination of information. This 
embodies independent mass media, universities, think-tanks, publishing 
houses, theaters, film production companies, and artistic networks.96 
As emphasized in his definition of civil society, Diamond views the protection 
of legal order as necessary for safeguarding individuals autonomy and freedom 
of action. Therefore, civil society both restricts and makes legitimate state 
power which is based on the rule of law.97 For Diamond, civil society is distinct 
from the state, but it is also bound by the legal order which is provided by the 
state. Moreover, it is distinct and autonomous not only from the state but also 
from other social groups in some points. First, civil society does not deal with 
private interests but with public ones. Secondly, although civil society has a 
relationship with the state, it does not aim to gain state power or state office. 
Thirdly, it embodies pluralism. Finally, since different groups in civil society 
represent different interests, no single group could represent the will of the 
community.98 
Diamond distinguishes civil society not only from the state and other social 
groups but also from the political society, that is the political party system. Civil 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid., 5. 
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societal organizations can cooperate with political parties, but when political 
parties dominate these organizations, they cannot perform their democratic 
functions. He, then, identifies ten democratic functions of civil society.99 
The first significant democratic function of civil society. is to limit state power 
which leads to the control of state by society easily. As a result, democratic 
political institutions will be the most effective means in practicing this control. 
Second, political participation can be increased and people can be aware of their 
obligations as well as their rights by taking place in different associations. 
Third, in pluralistic civil society some democratic characteristics like tolerance, 
moderation, respect for different views, and desire for cansensus can be 
developed. 
Fourth, civil society creates channels different from the political parties for 
expressian of interests. So some unprivileged and excluded groups such as 
women, racial or ethnic minorities can have access to power. Fifthly, pluralistic 
civil society can lessen political polarization by generating a wide range of 
interests. Sixth, democratic function of civil societal organizations is to recruit 
98 Ibid., 6-7. 
99 Ibid., 7-11. 
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and train new political leaders. Seventh, other than training new political 
leaders, many civil societal organizations contribute to the consolidation of 
democracy by non-partisan election monitoring which is significant for 
providing voter canfidence and maintaining legitimacy of the election results. 
Eighth, one democratic function of civil society is to disseminate information, 
helping citizens to safeguard their interests. Ninth, the function of civil society 
is to spread new information which is very important for the success of the 
economic reform. 
Finally, by increasing political participation of citizens, and accountability 
responsiveness of political leaders, civil society provides citizens' respect to the 
state. This will help to increase state's ability to govern people. 
Like White, Diamond argues that not all civil societal organizations facilitate 
democratization and fulfill the above-mentioned democratic functions. In order 
to develop a stable democracy civil society must not contain maximalist, 
uncompromising groups; civil societal organizations must be institutionalized; 
civil societal organizations themselves must be democratic; civil society must be 
pluralistic without fragmentation; civil society must provide opportunities to 
individuals to participate in different associations.100 
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Civil society may play an important role in consolidating democracy. Although 
its role is not certain initially, for Diamond "the more active, pluralistic, 
resourceful, institutionalized, and democratic is civil society, and the more 
effectively it balances the tensions in its relations with the state -between 
autonomy and cooperation, vigilance and loyalty, skepticism and trust, 
assertiveness and civility- the more likely it is that democracy will emerge and 
en d ure. "101 
Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato understood "civil society asa sphere of social 
interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate 
sphere (including family) the sphere of associations (especially voluntary 
associations), social movements, and forms of public communication."102Cohen 
and Arato use a tripartite model while analyzing the concept of civil society. 
They distinguish civil society from both political society and economic society. 
Political society includes political parties, political organizations, and 
parliaments. Economic society consists of organizations related to production 
and distribution such as firms and cooperatives.103 Civil society comprises "the 
structures of socialization, association, and organized forms of communication 
100 Ibid., 11-12. 
101 Ibid., 16. 
ıoı Cohen and Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory. ix. 
103 Ibid. 
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of the lifeworld to the extent that these are institutionalized or are in the process 
of being institutionalized."104 Moreover, they are against the view that treats 
civil society as an opposition to the economy and the state.1os 
Cohen and Arato perceive their model as a society-centered model unlike Hegel 
whose model is state-centered and unlike Marx whose model is economy-
centered model.1°6 They argue that our conception of civil society is itself 
"decentered". They define civil society notasa unified social structure which is 
integrating the entire society but as a plural, differentiated and institutionalized 
social structure,l07 
Although the private sphere is considered as an important element of civil 
society, Cohen and Arato give much emphasis topublic spheres and voluntary 
associations.1os In this respect they conceive social movements as important 
elements of a modern civil society and a significant form of citizen participation 
in the public sphere. For them social movements are important for the 
104 Ibid., X. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid., 411. 
107 Ibid., 697, footnote 135. 
108 Ibid., 411. 
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expansion of rights, for the autonomy of civil society, and for further 
democratization of civil society.ıo9 
In respect to political society and civil society they argue that political society, 
in the form of representative democracy and civil society both politically and 
juridically, presuppose one another. Both political society and civil society 
share two key institutions: the public sphere and voluntary associations. Public 
discussion of political issues and parliamentary discussion of the same cannot 
be considered to fall into separate frameworks from one another. For Cohen 
and Arato, political society in the form of representative democracy not only 
presumes civil society but it must also be open to the influence of civil 
society .110 
On the other hand, civil society cannot be institutionalized without the support 
of positive law, according to Cohen and Arato. The boundaries of modern civil 
society must be determined by the legal order. Also the modern state does and 
ought to intervene in society within the limits provided by law.111 As a result, 
109 Ibid., 19-20. 
no Ibid., 412-413. 
ın Ibid., 414. 
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modern civil society and representative democracy are not only interlaced but 
civil society also helps representative democracy to develop.ıız 
Cohen and Arato's main thesis is that democracy can best be developed on the 
level of civil society rather than political society or economic society, since the 
coordinating mechanism of communicative interaction is very significant. "It is 
inductively certain that the functioning of societal associations, public 
communication, cultural institutions, and families allows for potentially high 
degrees of egalitarian, direct participation and collegial decision-making higher 
than is possible for political parties or labor unions."113 
Cohen and Arato identify three sets of rights within the institutional sphere of 
civil society: One set of rights is related to cultural reproduction which includes 
freedom of thought, press, speech, and communication. The second is related to 
social integration that comprises freedom of assodation and assembly. The 
third set of rights is concerned with securing socialization which consists of 
protection of privacy, intimacy, and the inviolability of the people. 114 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid., 417. 
114 Ibid., 441. 
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Although the state maintains these rights by means of legal order, it is not the 
source. These rights, Cohen and Arato maintain, should be provided by groups 
and individuals inthepublic spheres of civil society. 115 For them, these rights 
are the organizing principle of civil society. 
They perceive civil society "as the locus of both democratic legitimacy and 
rights, composed of private but also of politically relevant public and social 
spheres in which individuals speak, assemble, associate, and reason together on 
matters of public concern and act in concert in order to influence political 
society, and indirectly, decision-making."116 
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan deseribe civil society as "that arena of the polity 
where self-organizing and relatively autonomous groups, movements, and 
individuals attempt to articulate values, to create associations and solidarities, 
and to advance their interests."117 Civil society embraces trade unıons, 
entrepreneurial group s, professional associations, women' s group s, 
neighborhood associations, religious groups, and intellectual organizations.118 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid., 567. 
117 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies." Journal 
of Democracy 7 (April1996): 17. 
118 Ibid. 
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For Linz and Stepan civil society is a necessary condition for the consolidation 
of democracy. However, the existence of civil society is not sufficient. There 
must also be an autonomous political society, rule of law, state bureaucracy, 
and an institutionalized economic society.ıı9 
John Hall proposes that "civil society is a particular form of society, 
appreciating social diversity and able to limit the depredations of political 
power, that was bornin Europe; it may with luck, skill and imagination, spread 
to some other regions of the world."120 Hall has an Euro-centric approach of the 
notion of civil society. 
Contrary to Hall, Augustus Richard Norton deals with the concept of civil 
society in relation to Middle Eastern countries. According to him, "civil society 
is a melange of associations, clubs, guilds, syndicates, federations, unions, 
parties and groups come together to provide a buffer between state and 
citizen. "121 
119 Ibid. 
12o John Hall, "In Search of Civil Society," in Civil Society: Theory, History, 
Comparison, ed. John Hall (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 25. 
121 Augustus Richard Norton, "Introduction," in Civil Society in the Middle East, 
Vol.1 ed. Augustus Richard Norton (Netherlands: E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1995), 7. 
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Norton agrees with Shils on the point that civility is a significant quality of civil 
society; without civility there would be factions and cliques which are 
dangerous for the proper functioning of civil society. He also borrows 
definition of civility from Shils, that civility means tolerance, the desire of 
individuals to accept diverse political views, to accept the views that there is no 
one answer. For Norton there must be civility within associations as well as 
among associations.122 He nevertheless observed that civility is absent in 
Middle Eastern countries. He states that, however, if the art of assodation can 
be learned, there is a possibility of establishing a vibrant civil society in those 
countries.123 
With respect to the relationship between civil society and the state, Norton's 
views are similar to those of other scholars who subscribe to the "pluralist 
approach to civil society." He claims that the individual has rights provided by 
the state, but also duties to the state in return of these rights. When the state 
loses its legitimacy, civil society also tends towards fragmentation. For this 
reason, it is meaningless to talk about civil society without the existence of the 
state.124 Although civil society seems to be in an opposition to the government, 
government should still regulate civil society and determine its boundaries. For 
122 lbid., 11-12. 
123 Ibid., 12. 
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Norton, it must be emphasized, that civil society does not aim at substituting 
government and overthrowing the state. The relationship between government 
and civil society will be illustrated by cooperation rather than conflict.125 
The debate on civil society in Turkey can be grouped under the heading of 
"pluralist approach to civil society," because civil society is not defined in 
opposition to the state rather it is defined in conjunction with the state. For this 
reason, a definition of civil society among the definitions presented as "pluralist 
approach to civil society" will be adopted for use in this thesis. Larry 
Diamond's definition suits this purpose since his definition is the 
comprehensive one and consists of all the elements of civil society indicated by 
"pluralist approach to civil society." He defines civil society as "the realm of 
organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, 
autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or a set of shared 
rules."126 The Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) will be assessed by using 
this definition of civil society in answering the question of whether the 
Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) can be considered to be civil societal 
organization. 
124 Ibid.,11. 
12s Ibid., 12-13. 
126 Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation," 5. 
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When w e make a comparison of "civil society versus state" approach, and 
"pluralist approach to civil society," we can propose that contrary to "civil 
society versus state" approach, civil society in "pluralist approach to civil 
society" is not in opposition to the state but rather it is in conjunction with the 
state. The state is seen as necessary for the survival of the civil society and for 
the determination of boundaries of both the state and civil society. 
As a consequence it can be proposed that civil society in "civil society versus 
state" approach is used as a strategy either to reach a sodalist state and then 
stateless society or to liberate society from the oppression of totalitarian state of 
communism. In "pluralist approach to civil society," it is used as an analytical 
to ol. 
During the last two decades, we have witnessed the revival of the notions of 
democracy and civil society both in developed and developing countries. In 
developed countries, the ways of improving the existing conditions of 
democracy have been discussed while the transition from absolutist to 
democratic regimes has been argued in developing countries. For instance, in 
Eastern Europe after the collapse of sodalist regimes, both social scientists and 
politicians began to discuss the ways of establishment of civil society and 
consolidation of democracy in their countries. In Southeast Asian countries, 
after the rapid economic development under undemocratic regimes, leading 
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social scientists and politicians began to discuss the matter of transition to 
democracy. 
Also in the Middle Eastern countries the debate is about the issue of transition 
to democracy. In this context, social scientists have investigated the 
compatibility of Islam and democracy. They have also tried to answer whether 
civil society can exist in Muslim countries. In this context, some people argued 
that Islamic religious groups can be defined as civil societal organizations. 
During the last two decades, answers to these questions have been also 
discussed frequently in Turkey.127 In many sources, Turkey has been treated by 
leading social scientists as the only Muslim country which has democratic rule. 
Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether religious communities can be 
considered as civil societal organization and whether they are functional in the 
consolidation of democracy in Turkey. These questions have not been answered 
properly in academic circles. In addition, there is confusion on the definition of 
civil society in Turkey. That is why, it is necessary to investigate whether 
religious communities are part of civil society in Turkey and to eliminate the 
confusion on the matter of civil society. 
127 The debate on civil society and democracy in Turkey will be examined in the 
sixth chapter. 
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In this chapter, we have examined firstly the Hegelian notion of civil society 
and then contemporary debates on civil society. In this sense, different 
definitions of civil societal organizations have been introduced. Asa result, we 
have noticed that in all definitions religious groups are considered as civil 
societal organizations. The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether 
religious communities in Turkey can be considered as part of civil society by 
examining the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) which is the one branch 
of Nurculuk and the most influential community of modern Turkey. In doing so, 
first of alt we should inquire the histarical background of civil society in 
modern Turkey. In this respect, in the following chapter, we will explore 
whether or not civil societal organizations existed in the Ottoman Empire. In 
addition, we will explore the place of tarikats, which are examples of religious 
groups in social structure of the Ottoman Empire and the features of the 
relationship between tarikats and the Ottoman state. 
59 
CHAPTERIII 
THE NATURE OF THE OTTOMAN STATE 
In this chapter, we will explain the nature of the Ottoman state, particularly its 
patrimonial nature. The examination of Ottoman patrimonialism is necessary to 
shed light on the question of whether civil societal elements existed in the 
Ottoman Empire. Secondly, we examined how and to which degree certain 
organizations that existed within the Ottoman system resembled civil societal 
ones. In this context, the nature of the guilds and Ahilik will be explained as will 
the characteristics of tarikats and the nature of the relationship between tarikats 
and the Ottoman state. A brief description of the establishment of the Ottoman 
state will serve to provide information on the origins and background of social 
organization in the Ottoman Empire. 
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3.1 The Establishment of the Ottoman State 
The Ottoman state was founded as a gazil state at the beginning of the 
fourteenth century. At that. time it was a small principality on the border of the 
Byzantine Empire. This small principality, however, was to conquer the 
Byzantine territories in Anatolia and the Balkans, then expand into the Arab 
lands, and become a great empire.2 
The main event, which led to the establishment of the Ottoman Empire, was the 
Mongol conquests of the Middle East during the 1220s. In 1243 the Mongols 
defeated the Seljuk sultanate.3 As a consequence of the Mongol invasions, the 
Turcomans (nomadic Turkish tribes) migrated to the West. They came from 
Central Asia to Iran and eastern Anatolia and then moved towards the 
Byzantine border in western Anatolia.4 In 1277 there was a revolt in Anatolia 
against the Mongols. Although it was suppressed, there were several further 
uprisings followed by Mongol suppression in the following years. As a result, 
people escaping from the Mongol rule moved to the frontier area. The frontier 
1 This concept will be defined below. 
2 Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600 (Great Britain: 
Phoenix, 1994, first published in 1973), 3. 
3 Ibid., 5. See also Stanford Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern 
Turkey, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), Empire of the 
Gazis-The Rise and decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808, 8. 
61 
nomads urged the population escaping from Mongol suppression to take up 
gaza, Holy war against the infidel. Warriors banded together around gazi 
leaders and regularly carried out attacks on Byzantine territories.s 
As the Byzantine Empire weakened the Turcoman gazi leaders were ab le to set 
up their independent principalities in western Anatolia between 1260 and 
1320.6 Osman Gazi, the founder of the Ottoman Empire, was also a gazi leader. 
He founded the Ottoman principality in 1299. 
What were the factors that contributed to the establishment of the Ottoman 
Empire? The most important factor was the ideal of gaza. 7 As ınalcik notes 
'society in the frontier principalities conformed to a particular cultural pattern, 
imbued with the ideal of continuous holy war and continuous expansion of the 
Darulislam- the realms of Islam- until they covered the whole world. Gaza was a 
religious duty, inspiring every kinci of enterprise and sacrifice. In frontier 
society all social virtues conformed to the ideal of gaza'.s However, the aim of 
4 Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire. 5. 
5 lbid., 6. 
6 Ibid. 
7 For detail information on the notion of gaza see Sinasi Tekin, "XIV. Yüzyilda 
Yazilmis Gazilik Tarikasi 'Gaziligin Yollari' Adli Bir Eski Anadolu Türkçesi 
Metni ve Gaza/Cihad Kavramlarİ Hakkinda," International Turkish Studies 13 
(1989). 
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Holy War was not the destruction but the control of the non-Muslim world, 
Darulharb. The Ottomans united Muslims, Christians, and Jews undertheir rule. 
Even though Holy War was the main principle of the Ottoman state, the 
Ottoman Empire protected also the Orthodox Church and millions of 
Christians.9 
Paul Wittek, like Inalcik, argues that the struggle against Christian neighbors 
had been the main component of Ottoman political tradition from the very 
beginning, and this struggle was always of vital significance to the Ottoman 
Empire.1o According to Wittek, the establishment and development of the state 
depended upon the gazis. Because of the continuous state of war between 
Byzantium and Islam, there emerged peculiar military organizations on both 
sides of the frontier. 11 At the beginning of the eleventh century, the gazis who 
were fighting the Byzantines became powerful on the Muslim side of the 
frontier.12 Since both sides had a similar way of life, lifestyle brought by the 
8 Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire. 6. 
9 Ibid., 7. 
1o Paul Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire (London: The Royal Asiatic 
Society, 1938), 2. 
ıı Ibid., 17. 
12 Ibid., 19. 
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gazis to conquered territories was easily accepted by the people there. A mixed 
borderiand civilization was created after the conquest of the eleventh century.13 
In the second half of the thirteenth century, many gazi emirates were founded 
in the conquered territory. The emirate of Osman was one of them. Wittek 
ascribed the success of the Ottoman emirate to gazi tradition. The main feature 
of the gazi tradition, according to Wittek, was that the gazis adapted the 
futuwwa, "a canon of rules by means of which the virtuous life, as understood 
by Islam with its mystical inclination, might be lived."14 He proposed that 
Islamic corporations took futuwwa as their moral guide. In addition to gaza, 
Ahilik,15 a brotherhood consisting of merchants and artisans, was also based on 
futuwwa. 
Another important factor contributing to the establishment of the Ottoman 
Empire was the influence of dervishes on the frontier population. Many shaikhs 
and dervishes had escaped from Iran to Anatolia because of Mongol 
suppression. As religious as well as political leaders, they gave moral support 
to their people in their resistance to the Mongol rule. Being mostly heteredox 
Muslims, they were seen as disseminators of heretical doctrines, and for that 
13 Ibid., 20. 
14 Ibid., 38. 
64 
reason the conservative population of the Seljuk towns in Anatolia did not 
tolerate them. However, they were accepted by the people in frontier areas 
where they themselves felt more secure and at home. They carried their 
religious enthusiasm into these frontier areas where people were receptive to it 
and adapted it intheir enthusiastic struggle against the infidel.16 In addition the 
dervishes played an important role in the Islamizatian of conquered areas. 
Suraiya Faroqhi argues, in this context, that the dervishes were more successful 
than the ulema (the doctors of Muslim canon law, tradition and theology)P 
Remembering Wittek's emphasis on the important role played by ahis in the 
establishment of the Ottoman state,18 it could be said that the origins of 
Ottoman political power lies ina sense in mysticism.19 
While Wittek emphasized one element of the frontier society, the gaza tradition, 
M. Fuad Koprulu viewed the frontier society as having a broad composition of 
several factors such as tribesfolk, warriors, dervishes, ahis, emigre scholar-
ıs Ahilik will be discussed in detail in la ter parts of this chapter. 
16 Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire. 31. 
17 Suraiya Faroqhi, Osmanli Kültürü ve Gündelik Yasam: Ortaçagdan Yirminci 
Yüzyila (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayinlari, 1997), 30. 
ıs Ibid. Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire. 42. See also M. Fuad Köprülü, 
Osmanli Imparatorlugu'nun Kurulusu (Ankara: Basnur Matbaasi, 1972), 158. 
19 Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire. 55. 
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bureaucrats. All of these factors, according to Koprulu, made notable 
contribution to the foundation and development of the Ottoman state.2o 
According to Koprulu, it is necessary to learn the social rather than political 
conditions of thirteenth-century Anatolia in order to explain the establishment 
of the Ottoman Empire. He deseribed in detail the ethnic formation, social 
organization, economic order, and cultural development of the thirteenth-
century Anatolia,21 and he argued that the Ottoman state was not a new ethnic 
and political organization totally different from the Seljuk Sultanate and its 
successor Anatolian emirates. Instead, he claimed, it was a new synthesis born 
out of the Seljuk sultanate and Anatolian emirates.22 
Cemal Kafadar concurs with Wittek on the point that the founders of the 
Ottoman Empire were gazis motivated by the same commitment to the spirit of 
gaza. However, for Kafadar, being a gazi did not mean the same thing to 
everybody. Instead, the meaning of being a gazi changed over time:23 "the social 
and political configuration as a whole kept changing while power, shared and 
2° Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1995), 37-
38. 
ıı Köprülü, Osmanli Imparatorlugu'nun Kurulusu. 67-121. 
22 Ibid., 183. 
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contested in varying degrees at any given moment, was gradually concentrated 
in the hands of an administration serving a dynasty."24 The establishment of 
bureaucracy led to changes in the nature of the Ottoman polity. As a result of 
these changes, some aspects of the earlier conceptions of gaza seemed 
dangerous to the Ottoman ruling elite. For instance, the Ottoman ruler as a 
defender of Sunni orthodoxy, would not welcome the dervishes of the Seyyid 
Battal Gazi shrine because of their deviation from "the purity of the faith."25 
According to Kafadar, although the Ottoman drive toward centralization led to 
the expansion of the Empire, centralization itself was ironically carried out by 
eliminating those forces which had a very important role in the very process of 
expansion.26 The history of the Ottoman state, for him, was a history of 
"shifting alliances and conflicts among various social forces which themselves 
were undergoing rapid transformatian while constantly negotiating their 
position within the polity."27 
23 Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds. 91. 
24 Ibid., 120. 
25 Ibid., 92. 
26 Ibid., 121. 
27Jbid., 140. 
67 
Having briefly explained the construction of the Ottoman Empire, we can now 
delineate the dynamics of Ottoman society and administration. The basis of the 
legitimacy of the Ottoman rule lies in the concept of the "circle of justice." 
According to this concept, a ruler can have no power without soldiers, no 
soldiers without money, no money without the well-being of his subjects, and 
no popular well-being without justice.28 Therefore Stanford Shaw proposes that 
"the production and the exploitation of wealth for purposes of supporting the 
ruler and the state and securing justice for the subjects were expressed as the 
basis of political organization and practice."29 This concept of state was also 
apparent in the gazi tradition; Inalcik shows this by citing a dialogue between 
the dervish Sari Saltuk and Osman Gazi. "The dervish Sari Saltuk advises 
Osman Gazi; be just and equitable; do not provoke the curses of the poor; do 
not mistreat your subjects ... keep watch over your kadis (a judge administering 
both sharia and laws issued by the sultan) and governors. Act justly, so that you 
may stay in power and retain the obedience of your subjects."30 
Under the Ottoman state, society was classified into two major groups. The first 
one, called the military, included officers of the court and the army, civil 
28 Inalcik, "The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey," in Political Modernization 
in Japan and Turkey, ed. R. E. W ard and D. A. Rustow (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1964), 43. 
29 Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire. 112. 
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servants and ulema. The Sultan delegated religious or executive power to 
members of this group by means of an imperial diploma.3ı Shaw calls this 
group the Ruling Class. The Ruling Class did not produce wealth and did not 
pay taxes, but they were the instruments for collecting revenues for the 
Sultan.32 The second group was called reaya. It consisted of all Muslim and non-
Muslim subjects whose primary purpose was to pay taxes to the ruler.33 Shaw 
called this group the Subject Class.34 
There were some conditions for being a member of the Ottoman Ruling Class. 
Shaw lists these conditions as follows: first of all an individual had to accept 
and practice the religion of Islam. Secondly, he had to be loyal to the Sultan. 
Thirdly, he had to know and practice the system of customs, behavior and 
language that formed the Ottoman way of life.35 
Those persons who did not have these attributes were considered to belong to 
the Subject Class or reaya. However, the members of the Subject Class could rise 
30 Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire. 66. 
31 Inalcik, "The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey," 44. 
32 Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire. 112. 
33 Inalcik, "The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey," 44. 
34 Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire. 112. 
35 Ibid., 113. 
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into the Ruling Class on condition of acquiring and practicing those attributes. 
At the same time, members of the Ruling Class could be deported to the ranks 
of the reaya when they lost those attributes. Thus, there was a system of social 
mobility;36 Mardin calls this system of social mobility Aladdin's lamp effect 
because of the speed in which it could occur. For Mardin, this Aladdin's lamp 
effect reflected the lack of intermediate structures, that is civil society, in the 
Ottoman Empire.37 
The assignment of status by the state to its subjects was related to the Ottoman 
legal system in a fundamental way. Ottoman law was influenced by three 
sources: the legal and administrative systems of the Persian and Turkish 
empires, and the Islamic tradition.38 The idea "that the ruler was absolute and 
that all acts of law and justice were favors emanating from his absolute power" 
was derived from the Persian empires.39 The idea of a supreme law "that the 
ruler had to enforce with justice regardless of his personal wishes" came from 
the Turkish empires.40 
36 Ibid. 
37 Serif Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Period." 
Comparative Studies in Society and History. ll(June 1969), 272-273. 
38 Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire. 134. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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Two paraHel systems of law existed in the Ottoman Empire: the Sultank Law 
(kanun) and the Religious Law (sharia). The religious law was enforced by ulema 
throughout the empire. The ulema had the authority to validate the Sultank law 
and thus annul those Sultank orders whkh they would see as being 
contradktory to sharia. However, they did not usually contradkt Sultank 
decrees because as members of the Ruling Class they were appointed by the 
Sultan.41After briefly describing the establishment process of the Ottoman 
Empire and defining the nature of Ottoman society and administration, we will 
turn our attention to the patrimonial nature of the Ottoman state. 
3.2 Patrimonialism 
Patrimonialism is a form of traditional authority. In Weber's terms "authority 
will be called traditional if legitimacy is claimed for it and believed in by virtue 
of the sanctity of age-old rules and powers. The masters are designated 
according to traditional rules and are obeyed because of their traditional 
status."42 
41 Ibid. 
42 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. 
Guether Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1978), 226. 
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Patrimonial states needed an administrative and military organization that 
operated as personal instruments of the ruler. They constituted an apparatus of 
the state necessary and were used to widen the arbitrary power of the ruler.43 
An administration and a military force in the possession of the ruler constituted 
the main feature of patrimonialism.44 
Weber distinguished between sultanism, extreme case of patrimonialism, and 
patrimonial authority. When damination is based on tradition, and not on 
personal discretion of the ruler, it is called patrimonial authority; when 
damination is based on the personal discretion of the ruler, it is called 
sultanism.45 Sultanism, for Inalcik, completely depended on military force and 
arbitrary power. He defines sultanism as "the differentiation between military 
and civil subjects," and a professional army. The Janissary corps, for Inalcik was 
a perfect example of such kind of a professional army. They were part of the 
sultan's household, and were loyal to the sultan only.46 The relationship 
between the master and his subjects is based on personal loyalty. The subjects 
donotobey "enacted rules but the person who occupies a position of authority 
43 Ibid., 232. 
44 Inalcik, "Comments on "Sultanism"," 49. 
45 W eber, Economy and Society. 232. 
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by tradition or who has been chosen for it by the traditional master."47 The 
origin of patrimonialism was related to the satisfaction of personal material 
needs of the master. Accordingly, the main obligation of the subjects in the 
patrimonial state is the material maintenance of the ruler.48 
What are then the main characteristics of the patrimonial offices? For one, there 
is no specialization and differentiation of roles. There is no defined official duty 
in patrimonial offices. Ad hoc officials are common, their powers are defined 
for specific purposes.49 Recruitment of officials was made on the basis of 
subjects' personal dependence and obedience to the ruler.5o So "the position of 
the patrimonial official derives from his purely personal submission to the 
ruler."51 
Weber defined the position of an official in a patrimonial system as follows: 
"because of its very nature patrimonialism was the specific locus for the rise of 
46 Halil Inalcik, "Comments on "Sultanism": Max Weber's Typification of the 
Ottoman Polity," Near Eastern Studies, an offprint from Princeton Papers, no.1, 
1992, 49-50. 
47 W eber, Economy and Society. 227. 
48 Ibid., 1014. 
49 Ibid., 1030. 
50 Ibid., 1026. 
51 Ibid. 
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favoritism- of men close to the ruler who had tremendous power, but always 
were in danger of sudden, dramatic downfall for purely personal reasons."52 In 
a patrimonial system, the ruler's favor instead of the legal order determines the 
distribution of honor in a society. And this social honor was the basis of 
damination in any group. "Honor as social estimation depends on the ruler's 
distribution of power. Stratification by status is based on honorific and material 
monopolies."53There is no separation of the "private" and the "official" sphere 
in patrimonial office. Each office has some tasks but their boundaries are not 
determined. 54 
The situation of the Ottoman Empire resembled to a great extent W eber' s 
description of the distribution of social honor. According to Inalcik, 
... status groups were organized and legitimized exclusively through the 
sultan' s favor. Such favor was rendered in an elaborate ri tual that included 
the grant of a magnificently decorated imperial berat (diploma). No exercise 
of power, no rank, and no title deed was legitimate without the possession 
of a berat, which, with the ruler's seal, showed his favor. The sultan's 
taking back the berat, or his death, annulled all kinds of authority and 
dispositian in the society ... The status of social groups, immunities, and 
privileges existed only through the regulations or firmans accorded directly 
by the ruler.55 
52 Ibid., 1088. 
53 Inalcik, "Comments on "Sultanism"," 52. 
54 W eber, Economy and Society. 1029. 
55 Inalcik, "Comments on "Sultanism"," 53. 
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Another characteristic of the Ottoman Empire, which is one of the main features 
of patrimonialism, is that the Ottoman ruler held judicial authority. His judicial 
authority was exercised on his behalf either by the imperial council or kadis who 
were appointed by the sultan. 56 
Moreover, the Ottoman sultan seized political and spiritual power at the same 
time. For Inalcik, the administration concurrently of political and spiritual 
power can be considered as absolute patrimonialism.57 
In the classkal period of the Ottoman Empire, when the power of patrimonial 
state was at its peak, the ulema could not exercise power. At that time the sultan 
legislated urfi (state) laws in addition to the sharia (Islamic religious law). 
However, when the power of sultans began to decline at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, the ulema, forming alliances with other traditional groups, 
obtained greater influence on the affairs of the state.58 
Although Ottoman patrimonialism had some special features, it cannot be 
considered as a type of pure patrimonialism. There were some checks on the 
arbitrary power of the sultan by the ulema whose authority was embedded in 
56 Ibid., 50. 
57 Ibid. 
75 
Islamic tradition. The ulema had a significant role as a traditional and legitimate 
group of opposition. Sometimes the ulema formed an alliance with other 
traditional groups to resist the sultan.59 Moreover, the guilds in towns and cities 
formed another series of partially autonomous traditional group. The control of 
the Ottoman state was only related to the legitimating process of the leaders of 
guilds who were elected by guild members. This process was the responsibility 
of the local kadi.60 
Metin Heper defines the characteristics of Ottoman society which led to the rise 
of patrimonialism in terms of the traditional nature of authority, a sharp center-
periphery cleavage, and presence of a ruler as the owner of the realm.61 During 
the Classkal period of the Ottoman Empire (1300-1600), the Sultan was 
identified with the state when sultans both ruled and reigned.62 Political 
authority belonged to the Sultan himself; there was no extensive delegation of 
authority. Although the Grand Vizier was seen as the representative of the 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., 60. 
6o Ibid., 62. 
61 Metin Heper, "Patrimonialism in the Ottoman Turkish Public Bureaucracy." 
Asian and African Studies 13 (1979): 6. 
62 Metin Heper, "Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire with Special 
Reference to the Nineteenth Century." International Political Science Review 
1(January 1980), 85 
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Sultan, he was not autonomous from the Sultan.63 Indeed, for Heper, 
"according to the Ottoman-Turkish view, the Sultan w as appointed by God to 
hold together the 'es tates' of the society."64 
As another characteristic aspect of patrimonialism, personalism was apparent 
in the Ottoman bureaucracy. Heper deseribes the importance of personalismin 
Ottoman bureaucracy as follows: "the fact that personalism played an 
important role in the bureaucratic institutionalization pattern was evident in 
the qualifications sought in administrators as well as in superordinate-
subordinate relations. Each higher civil servant had to show complete loyalty to 
the Sultan."65 The officials were subject to the Sultan's will. They could be 
executed and their properties could be confiscated without any justification.66 
The Ottoman land regime also had some patrimonial characteristics. After the 
establishment of the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia, the state became the owner 
of all agricultural landP Fifteenth century kanunnames (a code of laws) stated 
"the reaya and the land belong to the Sultan." Nobody could exercise authority 
63 Heper, "Patrimonialism," 8. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., ll. 
66 Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire. 135. 
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on the peasantry and land without the permission of the Sultan. The Sultan 
guaranteed his absolu te sovereignty by means of this principle.68 
As a result, it could be said that this patrimonial nature of the Ottoman state 
prevented the formation of civil societal organizations in the Ottoman Empire. 
Yet, although there were some organizations such as guilds, Ahilik, and tarikats, 
between state and society, they could not be defined as civil societal 
organizations in the ideal sense. We shall now turn to these organizations and 
examine each briefly. 
3.3 Guilds 
According to Gabriel Baer, guilds had not come into existence as professional 
organization in the Ottoman Empire until the fifteenth century.69 He divided 
guilds into two groups: those in the first group were not mentioned in other 
sources in the context of their functions; the second group was cited in several 
sources. For him, although the second group had vital importance, the first 
group had no significance for public life.7ü 
67 Heper, "Center and Periphery," 83. 
68 Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire. 73. 
69 Gabriel Baer, "The Administrative, Economic and Social Functions of Turkish 
Guilds," International Journal of Middle East Studies 1 (1970): 28. 
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The first group involved four occupational groups of people: it included the 
ulema and many other religious functionaries such as mystics, students of the 
medreses; second, it involved the workers in state factories and day-laborers; 
third, it contained farmers and peasants; and it involved members of the so-
called "immoral guilds," such as prostitutes.71 
The second group, which Baer thought had vital importance, involved four 
occupational groups of people. First, it included artisans and craftsmen of all 
the branches of industry. Secondly, it contained all merchants. Thirdly, it 
involved persons employed in transport and services. Finally, this second 
group included all those in the medical practices such as physicians, oculists, 
surgeons, pharmacists.72 
For Baer, the maın function of the guilds was their assistance as an 
administrative link between the government and urban population. He argues 
that "as long as the state was unable to create a bureaucracy ona large scale, it 
was compelled to use intermediate units in order to carry out censuses and 
establish institutions necessary for direct relations between the government and 
70 Ibid., 31. 
71 Ibid., 30-31. 
n Ibid., 31-32. 
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the individual."73 In the Ottoman Empire, the guilds performed the functions of 
intermediary institutions. 
First of all, since people engaged in each craft and profession were registered by 
the guilds, guilds were essenhal for regulating the urban population. The 
government orders and announcements were transmitted to guild members by 
the kethudas74 and they had to make sure all guild members complied and acted 
upon the instructions of the government.75 In addition, the guilds were 
responsible for the behavior of their members. Thus, town people throughout 
the Ottoman Empire were controlled indirectly by means of guilds.76 
The kethuda represented the guild to the government as well as the government 
to the guild members, although he more often acted as the representative of the 
government rather than the guild. Baer concluded that there were few 
examples of the kethuda who represented the guild before the government.77 
73 Ibid., 33. 
74 Kethuda is 'steward, agent, representative of an organization to the 
government.' Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire. 223. 
75 Baer, "The Administrative," 33-34. 
76 Ibid., 34. 
77 Ibid., 35. 
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Contrary to Baer, Haim Gerber proposes that the guilds of Istanbul, unlike the 
guilds of Bursa, did not function as an administrative link between the 
government and the urban population. He argues that in Bursa the government 
used the guilds to collect taxes, but this was not the case for Istanbul. In this 
sense the guilds of Istanbul were more autonomous than the guilds of Bursa.78 
Another function of the guild, for Baer, was its fiscal function of collecting tax. 
However, he argues that the guilds in Ottoman Empire did not have fiscal 
functions. In Istanbul taxes were not collected by guilds, contrary to Egypt, but 
by the ihtisab agasi (chief officer who was adınİnistering the laws regulating 
public morals and, especially commercial transactions).79 
Another important function of the guild was the quality control of products 
made or sold by artisans and merchants. However, the guild was not the only 
agent to exercise this control; rather this responsibility belonged to the 
government authorities who used the guild system as an instrument exercising 
quality control of products.so Nevertheless, guilds had limited power in 
controlling the quality of products made or sold by their members. The guild 
78 Haim Gerber, State, Society, and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in Comparative 
Perspective (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 119. 
79 Baer, "The Administrative," 35. 
80 Ibid., 36. 
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was responsible only for identHying products of inferior quality. After that it 
was allawed merely to inform the authorities about the infleetion and leave the 
punishment of the culprit to the state authority. As a result, in the last instance 
the kadi rather than the guild was responsible for the implementation of the 
regulations concerning the quality of products made or sold by the guild 
members.81 
Moreover, prices of goods were fixed alsa by the government. Those people 
who sold any item higher than maximum retail price set for that item were 
punished by the government. In relation to fixing maximum of prices of goods, 
the guilds had limited power.82 Governmental authorities were responsible for 
the fixing of maximum prices and then the list of these prices was conveyed to 
the guild as an order.83 At this point Baer gives the example of the Ahi Baba of 
the Istanbul tanners who was expelled from the guild because he had violated 
governmental decree canceming prices. 84 
In addition to the instructions related to the quality and prices of goods, 
regulations concerning wage scales of the guild members were alsa issued by 
81 Ibid., 37-38. 
82 Ibid., 38. 
83 Ibid. 
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the government. Again, it was the guild's duty to carry out the government's 
commands concerning wages as was the case in implementing instructions 
related to the quality and prices of goods.ss 
In contrast to Baer, Halil Inalcik argues that the regulations on the quality of 
products and fixing maximum prices were decided in cooperation with the 
guild members and representatives of the government. State interference on 
production process was due to the need for guaranteeing tax revenues.s6 
Gerber also argues that even in Istanbul production standards were not handed 
down frequently by the government. The government, he thought, was not 
concerned with the full details of production processes of most products. He 
assumed that the government cared a great deal more about certain basic goods 
such as foodstuffs. According to many documents, it was the guilds rather than 
the government that complained about violations of production standards.87 
84Jbid., 39. 
ss Ibid., 39-40. 
86 Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire. 153. 
87 Gerber, State, Society, and Law in Islam. 119. 
83 
Another important function of the guilds was to provide services and labor to 
meet government needs. For instance, the guild members were recruited for 
the army at time of war.88 
Moreover, the guilds had performed certain functions related to the supply and 
distribution of goods to the authorities. Baer refers to an early document to 
prove this type of function of the guild: "in a firman, dated 23 October 1573, 
according to which a kethuda anda yigitbasi (a senior officer of a guild, directing 
its internal affairs) were especially appointed for the guild of varakcilar in order 
to guarantee the regular supply of gold and silver leaf of standard quality to the 
Sultan' s courts at reasonable prices."89 
The guilds helped to regulate the relations among their members. Disputes 
among the members of a particular guild were mediated by the guild itself.90 In 
addition, each guild had a mutual fund for assisting its members. Money from 
this fund was lent to guild members when in need, for example when they 
attempted to enlarge their business, they could rely on this fund. 91 
88 Baer, "The Administrative," 40. 
89 Ibid., 41. 
9o Ibid., 42. 
91 Ibid., 44-45. 
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As a result Baer, argued that the raison d'etre of guilds was to serve as 
intermediary institutions between the ruling institutions and the urban 
population. In addition, guilds served as a means of supervision and control of 
urban population by the rulers. However, he underlined the fact that guilds 
differed from each other in respect to their relative autonomy. For instance, the 
shoemakers and tanners had judicial privileges that other guilds did not have. 
Also there were differences between guilds of Istanbul and the provincial 
guilds which had greater autonomy than those in the capital city.92 However, 
Inalcik does not agree with Baer about the lack of autonomy of the Ottoman 
guilds; he thinks Baer' s view that the Ottoman guilds were controlled by the 
state is an exaggeration.93 
Although Gerber agrees with Baer on the heterogeneity of the Ottoman guild 
system in respect to varying degrees of autonomy among the guilds, he argues 
that there was no strong governmental control over the process of guild 
creation and functioning.94 He posits that when the available documentation 
was investigated, it could be seen that even in Istanbul guilds had a wide 
measure of autonomy.9s Gerber maintains that in Bursa the head of the guild, 
92 Ibid., 49. 
93 Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire. 152. 
94 Gerber, State, Society, and Law in Islam. 114. 
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kethuda, was elected by the guild members; he only received a formal approval 
from the kadi. In Istanbul government control was greater, but even so there 
was room for autonomy. According to Gerber, even though the government 
could interfere with kethuda nominations, the guilds enjoyed substantial 
freedam in naminating their members.96 
Inalcik and Gerber had similar vıews on the election process of the guild 
kethuda. Inalcik claims that it was the guild members who elected the kethuda, 
who was responsible for the implementation of the guild rules and 
representation of the guild to the state. This election, for Inalcik, was significant 
because a guild which did not have a kethuda could not become an independent 
entity. The guild members could discharge their kethuda from his duties and 
they were able to oppose government intervention in the election of a new 
kethuda. He offers several documents as proof for demonstrating the guilds' 
rejection of a kethuda nominated by the government; and in most cases the 
government respected the choice of the guilds.97 
95 Ibid., 119. 
96 Ibid., 120. 
97 Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire. 152. See also Halil Inalcik, "The Appointment 
Procedure of a Guild Warden (Kethuda)," The Middle East and the Balkans Under 
the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Turkish Studies and Turkish Ministry of Culture Joint Series, 1993). 
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Although the guild kethuda received a diplama from the sultan as token of his 
acceptance, that diplama was important also for kethuda himself since it gave 
him legitimacy and affirmed his authority within the guild.98 The Ottoman state 
almost always supported the senior masters of the guilds, with a view to 
maintaining the traditional guild organization. The reason of this policy lay in 
the view that new ideas could lead to confusion and anarchy resulting in loss of 
revenues.99 
In this context, Gerber examines the reasons why the Ottoman government 
gave such great autonomy to the guilds. One reason was indiHerence of the 
Ottoman state to the affairs of ordinary people under normal conditions. 
Gerber feels that the Ottoman state was indifferent to the affairs of the civil 
societal elements as long as there was no threat to social order and the 
calleetion of state revenues.100 Anather factor was the absence of m unicipalities 
and the lack of urban services. These services were provided by the guilds. The 
Ottoman state dealt mainly with matters related to the affairs and servants of 
the state. Gerber goes on far as to propose that since the urban population did 
not constitute a threat to the Ottoman dynasty, so the Ottoman state was not 
interested in regulating the life of the urban population thus rejecting Baer' s 
98 Ibid., 155. 
99 Ibid. 
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opinion that guilds were, ın effect, instruments of state control of urban 
popula tion. 1o1 
Consequently, it could be suggested that, although the guilds functioned as an 
intermediary structure between government and society, it could not be said 
that they had absolute autonomy and were subject to the interference of 
government. Therefore, the guilds cannot be defined as civil societal 
organizations. 
3.4 Ahilik 
Ahilik is the name given to corporations of merchants and craftsmen that 
existed from the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries. The meaning of the 
word ahi, " my brother,"102 reflects the strong sense of solidarity that 
characterized these organizations. Ahilik had a dual function: it operated as 
corporations of merchants and craftsmen until the Ottoman Empire organized 
its military and administrative structure at the beginning of the thirteenth 
century; secondly, it helped the Ottoman army at times of war.1°3 As we 
ıoo Gerber, State, Society, and Law in Islam. 125. 
1o1 Ibid., 125-126. 
102 Neset Çagatay, Bir Turk Kurumu Olarak Ahilik (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 
Basimevi, 1989), 1. 
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mentioned earlier Ahilik played a vital role in the establishment of the Ottoman 
Empire. 
The philosophical basis of the Ahilik lies in the notion of futuwwa, which itself is 
based on mysticism. Futuwwa, literally, means generosity, chivalry, strength 
and magnanimity. Asa technical term, it means helping everybody, preventing 
injustice, not speaking badly of others, or defaming them.l04 Because of its 
strong sense of community derived from futuwwa, Ahilik opposed domination 
by any class, any group or person of others; it always advocated equality 
among people.ıos 
However, there is a difference between Ahilik and futuwwatism. Ahilik meant 
being a member of an ahi organization and it was necessary to have a skill 
except for having the characteristics of futuwwa to be member of an ahi 
organization. However, futuwwatism lacked organizational basis, it was only a 
value determining one's world-viewJ06 
103 Ibid., 2. 
104 Ibid., 187. 
1os Adnan Gülerman and Sevda Tastekil, Ahi Teskilatinin Türk Toplumunun 
Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapisi Üzerindeki Etkileri (Ankara: Kültür Bakanligi Yayini, 
1993), 5. 
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During Turkish migration to Anatolia in the wake of the Mongol invasions, one 
of the functions of ahi organization was to train the Turcoman migrants in a 
skill, and to settle them.107 These Turcomans had to organize themselves on the 
one hand against the indigenous Byzantine population and on the other hand 
against the Mongols. They could compete with the rival Byzantine merchants 
and craftsmen by improving their own craft and commercial organization, and 
at the same time protect themselves from the Mongols by preparing themselves 
to wage war. Ahilik thus established as an organization of merchants and 
craftsmen derived its spiritual support fromjutuwwa.1os 
Another distinctive feature of the Anatolian ahi organizations was then their 
goal of placing emphasis on scientific instructions in skills and thus achieve 
greater effectiveness for public benefit. For example, Ahi Evren, who was the 
founder of Ahilik, advocated in various books he wrote the use of science in 
educating people in arts and crafts.1°9 He advised the sultan on the necessity of 
providing education and instruction in artisanal skills to people, and for him 
this was the main responsibility of the state.110 Those merchants and craftsmen 
107 Mikail Bayram, Ahi Evren ve Ahi Teskilati'nin Kurulusu (Konya: Damla 
Matbaacilik ve Ticaret, 1991), 133. 
1os Çagatay, Bir Türk Kurumu Olarak Ahilik. 48. 
ıo9 Bayram, Ahi Evren. 136. 
ııo Ibid., 138. 
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entering into an ahi organization received occupational, religious, and ethical 
education. They also received military training like members of an army in 
order to be able to fight the enemy.m 
The ahi organization was established towards the middle of the thirteenth 
century by Ahi Evren to improve the economic life of the Turkish people, by 
making them capable and virtuous members of their community. First, he 
organized the shoemakers, and leather manufacturers. And the number of the 
ahi organizations reached thirty-two branches as he gained fame and esteem.ıı2 
An ahi organization was set up independently in each town and village, but 
they kept in contact with one another. Ahi Baba, who was the leader of 
merchants and craftsmen in the same region, unified his ah is in his zawiya ( a 
dervish hospice, accommodating travellers) which he had built and furnished. 
He educated hisahisin artisanal crafts, social, military or sports activities. 113 For 
example, after dinner, ahis would read religious and ethical books and danced. 
ııı Çagatay, Bir Türk Kurumu Olarak Ahilik. 84. See also Gülerman and Tastekil, 
Ahi Teskilatinin. 6. 
112 Ibid., 84, 201. 
113 Ibid. 
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Their education encompassed both religious and worldly matters at the same 
time. 114 
Ahi Babas were elected by the members of the ahi organizations. His commands 
were obeyed by all the members where the sultan was absent. They were 
responsible for carrying out all administrative functions.ııs However, they 
never attempted to capture power from the sultan even when the Sultan was 
weak. Instead they would organize and carry out the administration of the state 
properly so as toprevent disharmony and anarchy,116 
Although at first the leaders of the local ahi organizations were elected by their 
members, later their autonomy was weakened and thus leaders came to be 
appointed by the shaikh of Ahi Evren zawiya, located in Kirsehir. In addition, 
these appointed leaders were approved by the government.117 
The grand assembly of ahi organizations was composed of all the leaders of ahi 
organizations in a region. This grand assembly formed a link between ahi 
organizations and the government, and it was responsible for resolving 
114 Ibid., 92-93. 
11s Ibid., 93. 
116 Ibid., 246. Gülerman and Tastekil, Ahi Teskilatinin. 64. 
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conflicts between these organizations and the state. It also examined how 
governmental decrees would affect its members, and make demands on the 
government for the benefit of its members.ııs Neset Cagatay argues that the 
most distinct feature of the Ahilik was that neither religious authorities, nor 
state authorities could have any influence on Ahilik. Thisisa distinctive feature 
that distinguishes Ahilik from similar eastern and western organizations.ıı9 
Islamic states did not provide educational facilities and health services to 
people, nor were they concerned with ameliarating the socio-economic 
conditions of the general population until the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. The state's responsibility was to defend its borders against enemies, 
and to provide internal security. However, the state could not provide the 
internal security most of the time. Ahilik, which tried to fulfill these functions of 
the state, was established and spread as an organization having multiple 
functions,l20 Although Ahilik fulfilled certain functions of the state, it was 
directly under the domination of state authority.121 
117 Gülerman and Tastekil, Ahi Teskilatinin. 12-13. 
11s Ibid., 14-15. 
119 Çagatay, Bir Türk Kurumu Olarak Ahilik. 239. 
120 Ibid., 243. 
121 Gülerman and Tastekil, Ahi Teskilatinin. 30. 
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Ahilik affected the development of Turkish society in Anatolia in three different 
ways. First, it helped to accelerate urbanization by helping the transition from 
nomadic to sedentary life through educating and organizing the population in 
skills and crafts. Secondly, it helped the Turkish population to participate in 
economic life which was controlled by the indigenous population under 
Byzantine. Thirdly, the Turkish merchants and craftsmen became powerful and 
influential in economic lifeasa result of solidarityJ22 
Ahilik thus had a significant role in shaping of the Ottoman political life. Ahi 
Evren gave a berat of Ahilik to Osman Gazi, and then he supported his son, 
Orhan Gazi, by forming an army of ahi organizations at times of war. So Ahi 
Evren tried to disseminate Ahilik among the higher authorities of the Ottoman 
state.123 
Similar to the case of the guilds, even though Ahi organizations had relative 
autonomy from state authority, they did not have full autonomy. For instance, 
their elected leaders had to be approved by the state. Therefore, Ahi 
organizations could not be considered as civil societal organizations in the ideal 
s ense. 
122 Çagatay, Bir Türk Kurumu Olarak Ahilik. 209. 
123 Gülerman and Tastekil, Ahi Teskilatinin. 29. 
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3.5 The Nature of the Relationship between the Ottoman State and the 
Religious Orders (Tarikats) 
In this section, we will consider the nature of the relationship between the 
Ottoman state and tarikats. In this context, we shall first take up the questions of 
what tarikat is and how and under which circumstance it emerged. 
Tarikat, a word of Arabic origin, which is defined as "a method of moral 
psychology for the guidance of individuals directing their lives toward a 
knowledge of God."124 As Islam spread and came to be differentiated along 
legal schools, new converts, particularly nomads, could not adapt themselves to 
its diverse forms. They sought accommodation outside Orthodox Islam, within 
mysticism that is open to individual interpretation and within Sufism which is 
the institutionalized form of mysticism.12s The institutionalization of Sufism 
gave rise to the establishment of tarikats.126 
Central Asian Turks could not easily accept the tenets of Orthodox Islam, since 
they were not compatible with their nomadic structures. They did not adapt 
easily especially to the separation of men and women and the prohibition of 
ı24 The Encyclopedia of Religion, 1987 
12s Serif Mardin, Din ve Ideoloji, Sth ed. (Istanbul, Iletisim Yayinlari, 1992), 94. 
126 Ibid. 
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wine. This disharmony between the traditional Turkish structure and Islam was 
institutionalized after the Turks settled in cities. The urban elites accepted the 
Orthodox Islam on their own terms, but Turkish tribes, outside the cities, 
preferred heterodox Islam and Sufism_127 
Sufism was slowly institutionalized in the Ottoman Empire. After the 
establishment of the Ottoman state there was a period of coexistence and 
accommodation between Orthodox Islam and heterodox Islam. And over time 
both Orthodox and heterodox Islam continued to influence Ottoman society. 
While the ulema concentrated in diffusing Sunni Islam, the official religion, a 
broad variety of social groups became members of tarikats. Notably, Janissaries 
and craftsmen came to be members of tarikats,128 which functioned as a channel 
of social mobility because they had among their members officials.I29 
We may now turn to the relationship between tarikats and what may be called 
civil societal elements in the Ottoman Empire. An important feature of Islam, 
Serif Mardin argued, was its rejection of some forms of intermediary structures 
within society. Durkheim called these structures secondary structures, that is, 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid., 95. 
129 Ibid. 
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associations and groups placed between the individual and the state.130 These 
structures were exempt from the ruler's obligations. By means of these 
privileges those individuals and groups "could use the state authority within 
the domains where their authority prevail."131 These privileges were first given, 
in accordance with the tradition of the delegation of authority coming from the 
Roman Empire, first to the Church, then to feudal lords and finally to towns 
and municipalities.132 These secondary structures, approved by the state, had 
the right to organize themselves, to have their laws and to prevent state 
intervention on market mechanisms.133 
These type of secondary structures was absent in the social structure of the 
Ottoman Empire,ı34 and this absence created a problem. When these secondary 
structures were not available to stand as a buffer between the state and the 
individual, individuals tried to find an alternative shelter to stand between 
them and the state. This function of the secondary structures in the West came 
to be performed by the "ummet"(community) structure and "tarikats" in the 
130 Ibid., 73. 
m Ibid., 73-74. Reinhard Bendix, "Social Stratification and the Political 
Community," in Class, Status and Power: Social Stratification in Comparative 
Perspectives (New York: Free Press, Macmillan, 1966), quoted in ibid., 78. 
132 Mardin, Din ve Ideoloji. 7 4. 
133 Ibid. 
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East.ı35 Collective movements in Islam, for example, reflect the importance of a 
community feeling among Muslims. This community feeling was a structural 
element that replaced Western secondary structuresJ36 
In the Seljuk Empire, the elites living in cities of Central Anatolia had adopted 
high Persian culture but Turkish popular culture of the gazis and dervishes, 
mixed with some elements of mysticism, prevailed on the frontiers.ı37 These 
dervishes were called baba, abdal, or ahi and they had intimate connections with 
the early Ottoman beys. They came to Anatolia in eleventh century with 
migrating Turcomans. Inalcik explains the reason for the namadie Turcomans' 
appeal to these babas as follows: 
In the mountains and high summer pastures of Anatolia, and especially in 
the frontier regions, it was difficult to compel the semi-nomadic Turcomans 
to observe the Orthodox forms of Muslim life and worship. The abdals and 
babas inculcated heretical forms of Islam derived from Shamanist beliefs 
and canforming to a tribal social structure. At the same time, the 
government attempted to protect its true source of revenue- the peasantry 
and the cultivated lands- by taking measures against the nomads, who 
therefore became bitterly opposed to the central administration and its 
policy of religious orthodoxy. They became fanatically devoted to the babas, 
who represented the ideals of their own forms of society and culture.ı3s 
134 Ibid., 73. 
135 Ibid., 76. 
136 Ibid., 76-77. 
137 Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire. 186. 
138 Ibid., 186-187. 
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In these groups a different culture from that of the Palace flourished. 
According to H. J. Kissling tarilcats represented the low "popular religion" 
rather than high Islam because high Islam with its rationality did not appeal to 
the sentiment of the masses.139 Inalcik divided the tarilcats in the Ottoman 
Empire into two main groups. The first group included established tarilcats 
(orders) which had their tekkes (dervish lodges) supported economically by 
vakifs (pious foundations) set up for that purpose. They had a definite 
organization, fixed rites and ceremonies. The most important among these 
tarilcats were the Naksibendilik (Naksabandiya), the Mevlevilik (Mawlawiya) 
and the Halvetilik (Khalwatiya). They mainly had an urban membership from 
the upper ranks of societyJ40 The second group consisted of the seeret tarilcats. 
They had no visible organization and symbols. They met and worshipped in 
secret, and had no ties with the state. They were usually opposed to official 
authority and refused to accept financial support from any external source. The 
most famous of these tarilcats were Melamilik (Malamatiya) and 
139 H.J. Kissling, "Osmanli Imparatorlugun' da Tarikatlarİn Sosyoloji ve Pedagoji 
Açisindan Rolleri." Toplum ve Tarih (Agustos 1985), 59. 
140 Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire. 190-191. 
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Kalenderilik(Kalandariya).141Kissling called first group docile tarikats and he 
called second group suspicious tarikats. 142 
Now let us consider the relationship between some of these tarikats and the 
Ottoman state, starting with Mevlevelik. Mevlevilik was founded by Mevlana 
Celaleddin Rumi' s son Sultan Veled in the thirteenth century during the Seljuk 
period.143 In Mevlana' s lifetime, Mevlevilik was not established asa tarikat. His 
philosophy appealed to both to the Ruling Class and to the Subject Class as well 
as Christians and Jews many among whom were also impressed by Mevlana's 
thought.144 After Mevlana's death, his disciples sent representatives throughout 
Muslim lands where they established lodges and spread Mevlana's fame. 145 
Mevlana's disciples established good relationships with local governors to 
secure patronage and financial support for their lodges. Like Mevlana, his 
disciples had close ties with the Ruling Class and were against the heterodox 
tarikats. Mevlevis tried to conserve the existing social and political system. 146 All 
141 Ibid., 191. 
142 H.J. Kissling, "Osmanli Imparatorlugun' da," 61. 
143 Enver Behnan Sapolyo, Mezhepler ve Tarikatlar Tarihi (lstanbul:Türkiye 
Yayinevi, 1964), 84-85. 
144 Köprülü, Osmanli Imparatorlugu'nun Kurulusu. 162. 
145 lbid. 
146 Ibid. Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire. 201. 
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the Ottoman sultansin general, and Murad II, Beyazid II, Selim I and Murad III 
in particular, were interested in Mevlevis. ınalcik deseribes Mevlevilik as "a 
tarikat with adherents among the Ottoman Ruling Classes and with an 
increasingly Sunni character."147 
Mevlevis' leaders, called Celebis, were chosen from among Mevlana's 
descendants and the Sultan was informed about the choice.148 All Mevlevi 
lodges were controlled by the Celebis who lived in Konya. Because Celebis were 
influential, local governors in Konya had to cooperate with them to enforce 
their own rule. The Ottoman sultans supported Mevlevis financially to make 
them obedient. As mentioned above, there was a competition among Mevlana' s 
descendants to choose the Celebi; this competition made the control of the 
Mevlevis by the government easier.149 
It can be argued in this sense that there was a close connection between the 
Ottoman state and Mevlevilik. As long as Mevlevis tried to preserve the status 
quo, the Ottoman state did not suppress them. Sapolyo proposed that some 
Ottoman sultans such as Selim III, and Mahmut II were Mevlevis. 
147 Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire. 201. 
148 Sapolyo, Mezhepler ve Tarikatlar Tarihi. 89. 
149 Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire. 201. 
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The second important established tarikat, Halvetilik, associated with Sufism, 
appeared in Anatolia in the fifteenth century. At the beginning its base was in 
Amasya, but after Bayezid II's accessian to the throne in 1481, Halvetis moved 
from Amasya to Istanbul. Mehmet II sent his son Bayezid to Amasya as local 
governor as part of his training as Prince.ıso Then, Bayezid II established close 
links with Halvetis when there was disagreement between the father and son 
and the Sultan interfered in Bayezid' s activities in Amasya, Bayezid, in turn, 
sought support of the Halvetis. Halvetis also supported Bayezid' s accessian to 
the throne, after which they moved their headquarters to Istanbuı.ısı Bayezid 
II's thirty years reign (1481-1511) was the heyday of Halvetilik Bayezid II 
participated in Halveti activities which led many members of the elite to join 
this tarikat. Martin argues that "it may be that the tradition of Khalwati 
(Halveti) membership among certain urban dasses of the Ottoman military, the 
upper ranks of the civil service, and aristocratic persons generally began in this 
era."1S2Jn this context Kissling proposes that Halvetis played an important role 
ıso B.G. Martin, "A Short History of the Khalwati Order of Dervishes," in 
Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions Since 1500, ed. Nekki 
Keddie (Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1978), 279-280. 
ısı Ibid., 280-281. 
ıs2 Ibid., 282. 
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in state affairs by means of nepotism without risking their tarikat until the mid-
seventeenth century.153 
During the reign of Selim I, there were serious attacks on Halvetis by the Sultan 
himself and the orthodox ulema. The attacks of the orthodox ulema were more 
serious. Their criticism was based on three points. The first was a political one: 
the orthodox ulema proposed that Halvetis were not loyal to the Ottoman state 
because of their ties to Shi'ism. The second was a doctrinal one: Sufis were 
regarded by the orthodox ulema as being close to folk Islam and thus distanced 
from the sharia. The third was a cultural one: according to the orthodox ulema, 
Halvetis were in fact a branch of the Sufis and Sufis introduced undesirable 
innovations.ı54 The orthodox ulema who saw themselves as the protectors of 
"true" Islam, criticized Halvetis because they were threatened by the rise of 
Halveti influence in the Palace.155 
After the reign of Selim I, who was adverse to Halvetis, the reigns of Suleyman 
the Magnificent (1520-1566) and Selim II (1566-1574) provided a favorable 
atmosphere for Halvetis. During this period, Halvetis built many lodges both in 
153 Kissling, "Osmanli Imparatorlugun' da," 60. 
154 Martin, "A Short History," 283. 
155 Ibid. 
103 
Istanbul and other Ottoman towns. Many branches of Halvetilik appeared in 
newly conquered areas. 
Although Halvetilik is defined as an established tarikat, its relation with the 
state was not a stable as that of Mevlevilik. The nature of the relationship 
between the state and Halvetilik varied according to how the sultan viewed 
Sufism. 
Thirdly, the most significant one among the seeret tarikats, Melamilik, will be 
analyzed. Melamilik established itself as an influential order in Istanbul, and 
especially in Rumelia. The Ottomans could not control Melamis, whose 
members were mainly drawn from the guilds. Some intellectuals and scientists 
also practiced Me lamilik 156 The word Melami w as used to refer to those 
dervishes who were modest, benevolent, faithful and teaching other peoples.157 
In the sixteenth century, the Ottoman state suppressed Melamis because of their 
Safavid inclinations.158 As a result of their opposition to the state, a Melami, 
Isınail Masuki, and his twelve disciples were executed in accordance with the 
156 Sapolyo, Mezhepler ve Tarikatlar Tarihi. 137. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire. 192. 
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Seyhulislam'sl59 fetva (a written answer to a legal question issued by 
Seyhulislam) in 1539. In 1561 anather Melami, Hamza Bali was condemned and 
executed in Bosnia by a fetva which stated that he was an atheist,160 Hamza' s 
followers were also suppressed in the seventeenth century. 
Due to these executions and suspicion of the Ottoman state toward Melamis, 
they hid themselves. Because of their secrecy, people treated Melamis as 
mysterious persons.161 So there had always been hostility between the Ottoman 
state and Melamis. Sapolyo argued that the reason of this hostility was the 
jealousy of the orthodox ulema toward Melamis. That is why the ulema were 
instrumental in the execution of many Melamis, exercising their influence on 
sultans.162 Despite their efforts, the orthodox ulema were not able toprevent the 
spread of the Melamilik; even as Iate as the turn of this century some members 
of the Committee of Union and Progress were members of the Melami order.163 
ıs9 Seyhulislam was the head of the hierachy of ulema. 
160 Ibid. 
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Another seeret order, Kalenderilik appeared in Central Asia during the ninth 
century as a movement of social opposition.164 It was in the first half of the 
thirteenth century that Kalenderilik arrived in Anatolia as a result of the 
Mongol invasion. Kalenderilik was inspired by two sources: one of them was 
Indian and Iranian mysticism, the other one was Melamilik. 165 
Between the eighth and tenth centuries there were social erisis that were caused 
by political struggles in the Muslim world. Those Sufis who tried to escape 
from these troubles, adapted a protest mystical philosophy like the Buddhists 
and Zerdust,l66 
Although Kalenderis were inspired by Melamis, they were more active than 
Melamis in carrying out acts of social opposition. They displayed a strikingly 
different lifestyle which included drinking wine and appearing in public 
sparcely dressed. According to one scholar, Kalenderilik is a different form of 
Melamilik.167 Sincerity for Kalenderis was crucially important. For that reason, 
164 Ahmet Yasar Ocak, Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Marjinal Sufilik: Kalenderiler 
(XIV-XVII. Yüzyillar (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1992), 18. 
165 Ibid., 6-16. 
166 Ibid., ll. 
167 Ibid. 
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they did not worship secretly like Melamis; in fact, they did not worship at all 
instead of doing so in secret.168 
Briefly, Kalenderilik is a form of Sufism which actively opposes established 
social custom and calls for a way of life consistent with its own precepts, no 
matter how unacceptable that lifestyle may seem to the general public.169 
There were two types of KalenderisPO One of them comprised lower dasses 
who did not care about religious and social rules. According to Fuad Koprulu, 
they neither had a philosophical basis for their creed nor a coherent form of 
religious practice.171 The second type included educated Kalenderis from the 
ruling dasses who developed a philosophical outlook and refined religious 
practices. 172 
There was a close relationship between Kalenderis and the Ottoman 
administration during the period the Empire's establishment. Some Kalencieri 
dervishes participated in the conquest of new areas during the reign of Osman, 
168 Ibid., 15. 
169 Ibid., 5. 
170 Ibid., 62. 
171 Köprülü, Osmanli Imparatorlugu'nun Kurulusu. 168. 
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Orhan and Murad Gazi. In returnfor the services of Kalencieri dervishes, those 
early Ottoman sultans allowed them to establish Kalencieri lodges and 
supported them financially. 173 Yet, Ottoman sultans kept the Kalenderis under 
close surveillance. For example, Orhan Gazi demanded the investigation of 
Kalenderis because of their unorthodox religious activities and the 
dissemination of their beliefs.174 
This type of relationship between the Kalenderis and the Ottoman state 
continued until the reign of Mehmed the Conqueror. Since Kalenderis 
participated in the conquest of Istanbul, Mehmed II allocated a lodge to 
Kalenderis in Istanbul.175 This moderate attitude of the Ottoman state toward 
Kalenderis continued until the reign of Bayezid II. As a result of the 
assassination of Bayezid II, some Kalencieri dervishes were executed and some 
of them were exiled from Rumelia to Anatolia.I76 
172 Ocak, Kalenderiler. 62. 
173 Ibid., 121. 
174 Ibid., 122. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Ibid., 124-125. 
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During the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent and later sultans, Kalenderis 
were suppressed because of their sympathy to the Safavids.177 As was 
mentioned above, Kalenderilik emerged as an opposition to orthodox 
mysticism and established social order. For this reason, Kalenderilik became a 
marginal mavement whose members nevertheless participated in popular 
protest movements against the central authorityPS 
As a result of these investigations it can be proposed that there were no civil 
societal organizations in the real sense of the word in the Ottoman Empire. As 
we have attempted to demonstrate throughout this chapter neither the guilds 
nor Ahi organizations nor even tarikats had full autonomy from the state 
authority. The elected leaders of both the guilds and Ahi organizations had to 
be approved by the Ottoman state. On the other hand, we have demonstrated 
that the relationship between tarikats and the Ottoman state was not stable and 
static, but a dynamic one. W e have indicated that attitudes of the Ottoman state 
towards tarikats changed in accordance with changing social and political 
conditions. The Ottoman statesmen did not even refrain from executing tarikat 
leaders when they thought these leaders acted in contradiction to the interests 
of the state. Consequently, it can be proposed that although there existed some 
177 Ibid., 126-127. 
178 Ibid., 129-130. 
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organizations between state and society in the Ottoman Empire, they could not 
be defined as civil societal organizations in the ideal sense. 
After determining the absence of civil societal elementsin Ottoman Empire, we 
will examine whether religious communities can be considered civil societal 
organizations in modern Turkey in the rest of the thesis. In this sense, the 
Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat), one branch of Nurculuk, will be our case 
study. However, before going into details of the Fethullah Gülen Community 
(Cemaat), it is necessary to examine Nurculuk in general. Therefore, in the 
following chapter, we will examine the circumstances under which Nurculuk 
was established, and dwell on the ideas of its founder, that is Bediuzzaman Said 
Nursi, regarding some critica! issues that are relevant to the notion of civil 
society. However, before going into details of Said Nursi's views, we will 
examine the social and political context in which Nurculuk and Bediuzzaman 
Said Nursi flourished. 
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CHAPTERIV 
THE VIEWS OF BEDIÜZZAMAN SAID NURSI 
In this chapter, first of all, we will deal with the modernization attempts of 
Ottoman statesman to save the Ottoman Empire from decline. Then the 
emergence of Islamist movements as a reaction to the unsuccessful 
modernization attempts of Ottoman statesman will be considered. Islamist 
movements of the Iate nineteenth century formed the background of Nurculuk, 
a community that came to be organized around the teachings of Bediüzzaman 
Said Nursi. In the second seetion of this chapter, then, we shall present 
Bediüzzaman Said Nursi's biography with a view to shedding light on the 
social and educational context in which he developed his ideas of freedom, 
constitutionalism, secularism, the notion of state and opposition. These topics 
have been chosen because they are relevant to our subject matter, that is civil 
society. 
lll 
In the third seetion of this chapter, assessments by leading social scientists of 
Bediüzzaman Said Nursi and Nurculuk will be reviewed and two questions will 
be addressed: How has Nurculuk been perceived by scholars? And, in which 
terms has it been defined? 
4.1 The Modernization Attempts 
The modernization attempts in Ottoman-Turkey began two hundredyears ago 
during the reign of Selim III (1789-1807). Ottoman statesman and historians 
discussed the causes of the decline of the Ottoman state and the army following 
the military defeats during the eighteenth century. Selim III started the reform 
movement in order to renew the military power of the Ottoman Empire.1 He 
began with the modernization of the army, and set up new military and naval 
schoolsin which foreign instructors, particularly Frenchmen, taught.2 
Nevertheless, the modernization of the existing military corps, the Janissaries, 
was not possible because of resistance from within the system. That is why the 
Sultan decided to create a new army. So there were many enemies of Sultan 
Selim III because of his policies. First of all, the Janissary corps opposed the 
1 Halil Inalcik, "The Nature of Traditional Society," in Political Modernization in 
!apan and Turkey, ed. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (Princeton, N. J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1964), 49. 
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sultan since their dominant position was threatened as a result of the creation of 
the new army. In addition, the ulema, who represented traditional groups, 
opposed the sultan since "despite his personal conservatism, Selim III created in 
Ottoman society a trend toward Westernization and a sense of necessity for 
rapid and progressive change."3 A coalition of conservative ulema and Janissary 
officers rose against the sultan. They deposed Selim III in 1807 and brought to 
the throne Mustafa IV. After a brief rule, Mustafa IV was replaced by Mahmud 
II in 1808. 
Mahmud II continued the modernization process. He created new legal and 
administrative systems. He recognized that, in addition to a modern army, an 
effective bureaucracy was necessary to rule the country and collect taxes 
necessary for the implementation of his reforms.4 Thus, from 1830 onward, the 
modernization process was extended to administrative and legal systems. And 
on 3 November 1839 with the promulgation of an imperial edict at Gülhane, the 
Tanzimat (reorganization) era began. This Tanzimat edict, proposed that the 
reason of the decline of the Ottoman Empire was the neglect of religious and 
2 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, znd ed. (London, Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 39. 
3 Inalcik, "The Nature of Traditional Society," 49-50. 
4 Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876 (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), 25-36. 
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imperiallaws and that new legislation was necessary to save the Empire.s The 
imperial edict comprised four basic reforms: "the establishment of guarantees 
for the life, honor and property of the sultan's subjects; an orderly system of 
taxation to replace the system of tax-farming; a system of conscription for the 
army; and equality before the law of all subjects, whatever their religion."6 
The reform movement in Ottoman Empire was a top-to-bottom process. It was 
initiated by the state and then internalized by intellectuals. According to Serif 
Mardin, the Ottoman society had a dichotomous cultural structure: there were 
in fact two cultures, that of Palace and that of the provinces, which were alien to 
each other.7 During the Tanzimat the distance between these two cultures could 
not be reduced and "the dichotomy between the ruling and the ruled-over now 
took a more clearly cultural form: on the one hand were the smooth, Paris-
oriented statesmen, on the other country bumpkins. The difference was the 
difference between French culture and Islamic culture."8 Because of this 
dichotomous cultural structure of the Ottoman society, this reform movement 
s Ibid., 56. 
6 Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London, New York: I. B. Tauris and 
Co Ltd Publishers, 1993), 53. 
7 Serif Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire." 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 12 (June 1969): 270. 
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did not gain popular support. There was a wide gap between intellectuals and 
society, and the intellectuals of the Tanzimat period were criticized for being 
unaware of the sociallife surrounding them.9 Since the reform movement was 
not based on social reality of the Ottoman Empire, it could not become 
successful and could not save the Empire from decline. In addition, the 
Ottoman state did not have the trained manpower to carry these reforms all 
over the Empire.ıo 
As a reaction to this unsuccessful reform movement, during the nineteenth 
century there appeared among the intellectuals some opposition groups such as 
the Young Turks and Islamists. While the former added new impetus and a 
new discussion to the initial Westernizing reforms, the latter, relevant to our 
subject matter, sought salvation in the restmation of Islamic values in the 
Empire. 
8 Ibid., 274. See also, Serif Mardin, "Tanzimat'tan Sonra Asiri Batililasma," in 
Serif Mardin: Türk Modernlesmesi, ed. Mümtaz' er Türköne ve Tuncay Önder 
(Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 1991). 
9 Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Millet ve Tarih Suuru (Istanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaasi, 1976), 
36. 
10 Niyazi Berkes, Türkiye'de Çagdaslasma (Istanbul: Dogu-Bati Yayinlari, 1978), 
241. 
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4.2 Islamism 
Islamism (Islamcilik) is defined as a movement, which comprised of activist, 
modernist, and eclectic political, intellectual, scientific studies, search, proposals 
and solutions to the problems of the Muslim world. The aim of this movement 
was to "revitalize" Islam as a whole; to unite Muslims; and to save the Muslim 
world from exploitation by the Western world, from despotic rulers, slavery, 
imitation, and superstition; and to civilize, unite, and develop the Muslim 
world. ll 
The reasons for the rise of Islamism may be summarized as follows: 1) There 
was a wide gap between the Muslim world and Western world in terms of 
technologkal superiority; 2) There was political and social confusion in the 
Muslim world due to military defeats in the Western front; 3) Most of the 
Muslim countries were being ruled by despotic rulers; 4) There appeared a 
sense of adıniration to the West anda sense of inferiority among Muslims asa 
result of exposure to Western civilization through writings of ambassadors and 
Muslim intellectuals educated in the Western countries. This psychological 
mode led many Muslim thinkers to believe that their outlook, life style, and 
ideas were insufficient or invalid to address the needs of the modern world; 
11 Isınail Kara, Türkiye' de Islamcil ik Düsüncesi: Metinler ve Kisiler, Vol. 1 (Istanbul: 
Risale Yayinlari, 1986), XV. 
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they felt insecure. This insecurity led to political, intellectual, and spiritual 
erises in the Muslim world in the Iate nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.ı2 
Islamists proposed that both the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim world were 
declining. They listed the reasons for the decline of Ottoman Empire and 
Muslim World separately. The decline of the Muslim world was not related to 
Islam but to idleness and imprudence of Muslim people. Their alienation from 
the original principles of Islam led them to be hostile towards reform.ı3 
Secondly, the decline of the Muslim world also resulted from its colonization by 
the West.14 
The d eeline of the Ottoman Empire for Islamists, on the other hand, was a result 
of imitating the West. They argued that Ottomans sacrificed their own culture 
and were estranged from their national pride and traditions by imitating the 
West. Furthermore, because of their ignorance and idleness the Ottomans came 
to be dependent on the West economically and accepted capitulations.15 For 
12 Ibid., XIX. 
13 Tarik Z. Tunaya, Islamcilik Akimi. (Istanbul: Simavi Yayinlari, 1991), 19. 
14 Ibid., 20. 
ıs Ibid., 21-24. 
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Islamists, Islamization was the way to save both the Ottoman Empire and 
Muslim world from decline.16 
Islamism drew a substantial number of influential supporters, among whom 
were Grand Viziers, Seyhulislams, and minİsters among its supporters. For this 
reason ithada chance to affect state policyPIn the Ottoman Empire Islamism 
was adopted as a state policy during the reign of Abdülhamid II: Caliph came 
to replace sultan as the monarch's title; the level of religious education was 
increased, members of tarilcats were sent to Africa to spread Islam, the dervish 
lodges were supported officially.18 Even though Islamism was adopted as state 
policy in 1870, it became an intellectual movement only after the proclamation 
of the Second Constitution in 1908. It was the dominant intellectual movement 
during the period of the Second Constitution.19 Most of the intellectuals known 
as Islamists could not express their opinions during the rule of Abdulhamid II, 
they formed an opposition group by themselves as well as joining the other 
opposition groups. For this reason, after the proclamation of the Second 
16 Islamlasmak means to accept Islam as a social religion embracing religion and 
the world, moral and material things, to interpret Islamic belief, ethics, social 
and political system according to changing conditions of the time, and to obey 
these principles. Said Halim Pasa, Islamlasmak (Darülhilafe 1337-1919), 5, quoted 
in ibid., 25, 
17 Tunaya, Islamcilik Akimi. 16. 
ıs Kara, Türkiye' de Islamcil ik Düsüncesi. XXVIII. 
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Constitution, Islamists supported the Committee of Union and Progress in their 
publications.20 During the period of the Second Constitution, Islamists 
expressed their ideas freely but at that time the base of the idea of unity of Islam 
(Ittihad-I Islam) had disappeared.2ı 
The main objective of Islamism was the unity of Islam. According to Islamists, 
all Muslims should come together either politically or intellectually and form a 
common state. All obstacles in the way of achieving this unity should be 
elimina te d. 22 
Islam, according to Islamists, was a social religion. That is why, it had principles 
of organization that applied to this world as well as the next. All states should 
accept the Islamic religion in order to ensure a prosperous future. Islamic 
principles were necessary for the continuation of a state.23 However, in respect 
to the form of government, Islamists proposed that neither in the Qur' an nor in 
hadiths (the Traditions of the Prophet) a specific form of government was 
delineated, there were only certain principles that would govern every form of 
19 Tunaya, Islamcilik Akimi. 15. 
2o Kara, Türkiye'de Islamcilik Düsüncesi. XXIX-XXX. 
21 Ibid., XXX. 
22 Ibid., XLI. 
23 Tunaya, Islamcilik Akimi. 34-35. 
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government, adopting those principles could be considered appropriate and 
consistent with the sharia.24 The religion of Islam would accept and 
accommodate any form of government based on respect for the Qur' an, justice 
and consultation. In this sense, Islam did not distinguish between Republic, 
Kingdom, or any form of sovereignty.25 However, it did not approve of 
despotism.26 The principle of consultation in the Qur' an and in hadiths w as 
emphasized by the Islamists. They based constitutionalism on this principle of 
consultation.27 
Islamists were opposed to Sufism and tarikats. For them Sufism and tarikats 
were responsible for the underdevelopment of the Muslim world and posed an 
obstacle to progress, since they impelled people to isoiate themselves from 
social life. The dervish lodges, they thought, became places of indolence due to 
the principle of tevekkül as exemplified in the saying "bir lokma bir hirka." In 
addition, Islamists viewed Sufism and tarikats as sources of superstition. 28 
24 Kara, Türkiye'de Islamcilik Düsüncesi. LIV. 
2s Tunaya, Islamcilik Akimi. 45. 
26 Ibid., 41. 
27 Kara, Türkiye' de Islamcil ik Düsüncesi. LIV. 
28 Ibid., LIX. 
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They proposed the following measures in order to realize political and 
intellectual reforms: 1) To give Muslims a pure belief, 2) to reform the 
educational system and to struggle with ignorance, 3) to reform Sufism, 4) to 
change the notion of ethics common in the Muslim world, 5) to give a wide 
meaning to holy war.29 
Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, who was the founder of the Nurculuk, was a 
supporter of the Islamİst ideology. For this reason, we have examined the social 
and political climate which encouraged the emergence of Islamism. After 
delineating the social and ideologkal background of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, 
now we will firstly introduce his biography and then analyze his ideas on some 
critical matters in relation to our subject matter. 
4.3 The Biography of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi 
Nurculuk30 was based on the ideas of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi who was bornin 
a village of Bitlis in the Eastern part of Turkey in 1876.31 He was from a family 
29 Ibid., LXIV-LXV. 
30 Nurculuk means membership of the mavement started by Bediüzzaman Said 
Nursi. 
31 Although there are different views on the birth date of Bediüzzaman Said 
Nursi, the most mentioned date is 1876. For this reason, we accept 1876 as his 
birth date. 
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of Kurdish origin. He lived during the years of significant transformatian from 
the Ottoman to the Turkish state. In the last years of the Ottoman Empire, he 
witnessed the absolutist reign of Sultan Abdulhamid, the Second Constitutional 
period, and the rule of the Committee of Union and Progress. He also 
witnessed World W ar I, the W ar of Independence, and the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic. He experienced the single party regime as well as the 
transition to multi-party politics. 
Bediüzzaman Said Nursi' s life can be considered in terms of three significant 
periods. He calls that part of his life from his birth until his exile to Barla that of 
the "Old Said," but the period between the end of World W ar I and 1926, he 
considers to be a transition period to "New Said." This second period between 
1926 and 1950 followed by what he calls the "Third Said,"32 spanning the last 
ten years of his life. 
4.3.1 The Old Said 
Said Nursi was nine years old when he started his education. He attended 
several medreses (Muslim theological schools), first one being that of Seyh 
Mehmed Emin Efendi, a Naksibendi, in the adjacent village. However, Said 
32 Necmeddin Sahiner, Bilinmeyen Taraflariyle Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, 12th ed. 
(Istanbul: Yeni Asya Yayinlari, 1996), 374. 
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Nursi did not get along well with other students, and ceased his education and 
returned to his village. 33 
In 1885 he had a powerful dream which compelled him to continue his studies. 
In this dream he saw the Prophet Muhammed who told him that "knowledge 
of Qur' an will be given to you on condition you ask no questions of any of my 
community." He felt great excitement and happiness, and decided to return to 
Islamic studies.34 He left his village, and went first to Seyh Emin Efendi's 
medrese in Bitlis and from there on to several other medreses. He attended Seyh 
• 
Mehmed Celali' s medrese in Bayezit in eastern Anatolia for three months. This 
period of his study formed the basis of his later works.3s At the end of three 
months, Said Nursi obtained his diploma in religious studies from Seyh 
Mehmed Celali in 1888.36 He visited several medreses, participated in discussion 
with Islamic scholars and became successful and popular. 
33 Serif Mardin, "Bediüzzaman Said Nursi(1873-1960): The Shaping of 
Vocation," in Religious Organization and Religious Experience, ed. Davis Crudra 
(USA: Academic Press, 1982), 67. 
34 Sahiner, Bilinmeyen Taraflariyle Bediüzzaman Said Nursi. 58. 
3s Sükran Vahide, The Author of Risale-I Nur: Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (Istanbul: 
Sözler Publications, 1992), 9. 
36 Ibid., ll. And Sahiner, Bilinmeyen Taraflariyle Bediüzzaman Said Nursi. 61. 
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In 1892 Said Nursi visited Mardin and stayed in the house of Seyh Eyyub 
Ensari, and began to teach in the Sehide Mosque, where he would take 
questions from visitors.37 During his stay in Mardin, "Said was, in his own 
words, 'awakened' politically, and became aware of the wider issues facing the 
Islamic world."38Said Nursi met two students of Islamic sciences who 
influenced him in a significant way. One of them was a follower of Cemaleddin 
Afgani (1839-1897).39 The other one was a member of the Sanusi tarikat, and he 
informed Said Nursi about the situation in the Islamic world in general.4° From 
Mardin Said Nursi went to Bitlis, where he stayed for two years in the residence 
of the governor, Ömer Pasa. He studied Islamic sciences and memorized the 
Qur'an there.4ı He received an invitation from the Governor of Van, Hasan 
Pasa; and went to Van in 1892 and stayed for about a year and a half in the 
governor' s residence. 
37 Sahiner, Bilinmeyen Taraflariyle Bediüzzaman Said Nursi. 72. 
38 Vahide, The Author ofRisale-I Nur. 18. 
39 He was one of the first important leaders to try to reinterpret traditional 
Islamic ideas so as to meet the organizing problems brought by the increasing 
incursions by the West into the Middle East. He was known primarily as an 
ideologist of Pan-Islam. 
40 Mardin, "Bediüzzaman Said Nursi," 69-70. 
41 Sahiner, Bilinmeyen Taraflariyle Bediüzzaman Said Nursi. 75. 
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At the governor's residence, hestayedin the facilities provided to government 
officials and read newspapers and journals available in the governor' s office. As 
he became acquainted with the problems of the Ottoman Empire and the 
Islamic world, he recognized that "the traditional form of Islamic theology was 
inadequate for answering the doubts that had been raised concerning Islam and 
that study of modern science was also necessary."42 He, therefore, turned to the 
study of sciences other than Islamic ones such as history, geography, 
mathematics, geology, physics, chemistry, astronomy, and philosophy. He 
carried out his studies alone, without any help from a teacher. Because he 
acquired an enormous amount of knowledge, he came to be called 
Bediüzzaman, that is "Wonder of the Age."43 
During his stay in Van, Said Nursi invented his own method of teaching: the 
basis of his method was the combination of religious and modern sciences so as 
to have science reinforce the teaching of religion.44 At that time Said Nursi's 
most important aim was to found a university in each of Bitlis and V an in 
42 Vahide, The Author ofRisale-I Nur. 23. 
43 Risale-I Nur Müellifi Bediüzzaman Said Nursi Tarihçe-I Hayat (Istanbul: Yeni 
Asya Nesriyat, 1996), 41. 
44 Ibid. 
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which his method of teaching would be practiced. He called this university 
Medresetu'z Zehra.4s 
Said Nursi went to Istanbul in 1907 to persuade Abdülhamit II to open a 
university in Van and its branches in Bitlis. He intended to meet the Sultan and 
propose to him that religious courses be taught in new secular schools (mektebs) 
and that positive sciences be taught in the religious schools (medreses). This way, 
he strongly believed, the students of secular schools would be saved from 
irreligiousity and the students of religious schools would be protected from 
fanaticism.46 Nevertheless, his proposal was refused. He was sent to a hospital 
for the mentally diseased but w as released upon the doctor' s report. 
Then, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi went to Salonica to support the Committee of 
Union and Progress (CUP) against Abdülhamit II. Following the proclamation 
of the Second Constitution in July 1908, he ma dea speech, entitled "Address to 
Freedom"47 in the Freedam Square in Salonica. Although the CUP came to 
power by its rhetoric based on freedom, it began to use force to hold the 
45 Ibid., 42. 
46 Sahiner, Bilinmeyen Taraflariyle Bediüzzaman Said Nursi. 88. 
47 This speech is very significant in analyzing his ideas on freedam and 
constitution and will be examined below. 
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Ottoman Empire together. Following the 31st of March incident,48 the CUP 
banned the opposition parties and restricted political freedoms. Together with 
other people Bediüzzaman Said Nursi was also imprisoned, because his 
writings on sharia in religious newspapers were considered to be reactionary 
and provocative. He was court martialled with the prosecution seeking death 
penalty, but was acquitted.49 After his acquittal Said Nursi travelled throughout 
eastern Anatolia. In the autumn of 1910, he went to Syria and visited Damascus 
in early 1911. In Damascus he gave his famous Serınon at the Umayyad Mosque 
upon the ulema's insistence. 5o 
He then returned to Istanbul with the intention of reviving his efforts to 
establish the Medresetu'z Zehra. At that time Sultan Mehmed Resad was 
planning a journey to Rumelia. Upon invitation from the Palace, Said Nursi 
joined the Sultan's entourage as the representative of the eastern Anatolia.51 
During this journey, he proposed to Sultan Resad the establishment of the 
Eastern University. The Sultan accepted this suggestion and promised that the 
48 In this incident, the troops of the First Army Corps mutinied, overpowered 
their officers, and marched to the Ayasofya Square, near Parliament, 
demanding the restaration of the sharia. 
49 Tarihçe-I Hayat.53. 
5° Vahide, The Author ofRisale-I Nur. 96. 
51 Sahiner, Bilinmeyen Taraflariyle Bediüzzaman Said Nursi. 154. 
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Eastern University would be founded. However, with the outbreak of World 
W ar I, this project ceased. 
Bediüzzaman returned to Van and formed a militia with his students, and 
fought against the Russians in the Eastern Front. Despite fierce fighting, the 
Ottomans could not prevent the Russian advance. In 1916, Bediüzzaman and 
his three students were captured by the Russians and he was sentas a prisoner 
of war to camp in Kasturma in north-western Russia. In the spring of 1918, Said 
Nursi escaped from Kasturma to Leningrad in the confusion following the 
Bolshevik Revolution. From there he went to Germany and arrived in Istanbul 
on June 1918.52 
After his return to Istanbul, Bediüzzaman was appointed to the Darül-Hikmeti'l-
Islamiye, Islamic Academy, which was set up with the help of the Office of the 
Seyhulislam on 12 August 1918. Bediüzzaman remained as a member of Darül-
Hikmeti'l-Islamiye until its closure in November 1922 when the Sultanate was 
abolished. 
Two years after his arrival in Istanbul, he underwent a spiritual crisis, change, 
as a result of which, the "New Said" was born.53 This erisis compelled him to 
52 Vahide, The Author ofRisale-I Nur. 119-136. 
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isoiate himself from society and he lived in solitude for a while until he 
resolved his crisis. Despite his spiritual state, Bediüzzaman publicly opposed 
the British occupation of Istanbul on 16 March 1920 by writing openly in the 
press. He alsa supported the national mavement in Anatolia by issuing a 
counter fetva to the fetva of Seyhulislam against the W ar of Independence and the 
national mavement in Anatolia.54 
The national leaders in Ankara appreciated the Bediüzzaman' s support and 
invited him to join them. Upon this request, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi went to 
Ankara in 1922. On 9 November 1922, he was given a welcoming, with a 
ceremony held in the National Assembly in Ankara. Despite this warm 
reception, Said Nursi was disappointed because of the indifference of the 
deputies to Islam and religious duties. His aim in coming to Ankara was to 
support the national leaders to establish a form of government based on the 
Qur'an and sharia.55 Because of his disappointment Said Nursi decided to live 
in solitude, and on 17 April1923 he left Ankara for Van. 
In the next two years Bediüzzaman Said Nursi lived ina cave on the mountain 
near Van returning to Van only in winter. "Here he was able to devote himself 
53 Ibid., 164. 
54 Sahiner, Bilinmeyen Taraflariyle Bediüzzaman Said Nursi. 250. 
55 Vahide, The Author ofRisale-I Nur. 177-178. 
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entirely to prayer and contemplation,"S6 while he totally turned away from 
politics and worldly affairs. It can be argued that he conceived his major work, 
Risale-I Nur, in his mountain retreat. Although he turned away from politics, 
the tribal leaders nevertheless would often consult with him and tried to take 
advantage of his influence in eastern Turkey. The tribal leaders wished to enlist 
his support for an uprising against the government. However, Said Nursi 
persuaded them to prevent this uprising. Another rebel chieftain, the Seyh Said, 
also wrote to Said Nursi inviting him to join a rebellion. Bediüzzaman refused 
to do so, but he could not prevent the outbreak of Seyh Said Revolt on 13 
February 1925. 
4.3.2 The New Said 
The Seyh Said Revolt changed the course of Said Nursi's life completely. 
Although he did not support this rebellion, he was nevertheless investigated by 
the authorities along with other influential people in the area. He was brought 
to Istanbul, and then sent to exile first in Burdur and then in January 1926 to 
Barla, a town of Isparta. "So the authorities determined to send Bediüzzaman 
away to some tiny and remote place where he would not attract attention, and 
where deprived of all company and civilization, he would just fade away and 
be forgotten. The place they chose was the village of Barla, a tiny hamlet in the 
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mountains near the north-western shore of Lake Egridir."57 Thus began his 
period of exile which was to last for a period of twenty-five years. 
Said Nursi stayed in Barla for eight anda half years during which he wrote the 
greater part of the Risale-1 Nur. Despite difficult circumstances in Barla, he 
immersed himself in contemplation and worship, engaged in the study of the 
Qur' an, and explored ways of making a connection between the truth of faith 
and the changing conditions of the time. 
Meanwhile the secularization process of the new Turkish Republic had gained 
momentum. The republican elite saw secularization as the most effective way to 
reform the traditional state system and society. Secularization would require 
redefining the hold of Islam on society and removing its influence from the 
political, social, and cultural spheres. Religion had to be confined to matters of 
faith and worship.58 Therefore, the republican elite tried to create a modern, 
rational state with institutions and laws by means of secularization. Hence a 
series of secular reforms were designed to minimize the role of Islam in 
institutional and cultural life: the abalition of the Caliphate in 1924; the 
adoption of the western hat and western style of clothing in 1925; the alphabet 
56 Ibid., 187. 
57 Ibid., 198. 
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reform, that is the change of the alphabet from the Arabic to Latin script in 
1928; the abolition of the office of Seyhulislam and Ministry of Religious Affairs 
and Pious Foundations; the creation in 1924 of the Presideney of Religious 
Affairs; the abolition in 1925 of the tarikats; the abolition of sharia courts and 
the unification of the court system under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Justice in 1924; the unification of education systems by means of the Education 
Act of 1924; the adoption of new civil, criminal, and commercial codes.s9 
Despite the fact that authorities would not allow it, the Risale-I Nur was 
circulated. In the area of Isparta, a wide circle of students of Risale-I Nur, both 
men and women, young and old, dedicated themselves to writing copies of the 
Risale-I Nur, studying as well as circulating it. Those students supported the 
development of Nurculuk by disseminating the Risale-I Nur illegally all around 
Turkey. Manuscripts of the Risale-I Nur were written in the Arabic script until 
1956, thereafter limited print thus were made of the whole collection in the 
Latin alphabet.60 
58 Ali Yasar Saribay, Türkiye'de Modernlesme, Din ve Parti Politikasi: MSP Örnek 
Olayi (Istanbul: Alan Yayincilik, 1985), 72-73. 
59 Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
1981), 40-56. 
60 Vahide, The Author of Risale-I Nur. 219. 
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As the Risale-1 Nur became widespread, the authorities increased pressure on 
Said Nursi.61 He wrote aletter to his students in the summer 1934, stating that 
the situation became worse and unbearable. On 27 April1935, Said Nursi and 
his students were arrested and sent to the Eskisehir prison. Said Nursi and his 
students were charged with organizing a seeret society against the existing 
regime, exploiting religion for political ends, and establishing a tarikat.62 
Bediüzzaman made a defense speech in the Court and he answered all the 
charges against him in this speech.63 The Court sentenced him arbitrarily to 
eleven months imprisonment. After serving this eleven months sentence, he 
was released from prison of Eskisehir and sent to Kastomonu in the Black Sea 
region in the spring of 1936. Said Nursi stayed in Kastamonu for seven and a 
half years under close surveillance. His movements were severely restricted by 
the authorities. In spite of these trying circumstances, he wrote additional 
treatİses to the Risale-1 Nur. There grew around him a wide circle of dedicated 
students and the Risale-1 Nur gained currency in the Black Sea region as it had 
in Isparta. The Risale-1 Nur was circulated in Kastamonu in the same way as it 
had been distributed in Isparta. 
61 Ibid., 223. 
62 Sahiner, Bilinmeyen Taraflariyle Bediüzzaman Said Nursi. 315-320. And Tarihçe-I 
Hayat. 191-198. 
63 W e willlook at the details of this speech below. 
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On September 1943, Bediüzzaman was arrested on similar grounds as his 
previous arrest and sent to prison in Denizli. Those charges included "creating 
a new Sufi tarikat, forming a political society, opposing the reforms, and 
exploiting religious feelings ina way that might disturb public security."64 The 
prosecutor of Denizli decided to form a committee of established scholars to 
examine the Risale-i Nur and all of Said Nursi' s letters as well as those of his 
students. While the case was progressing, on 22 April 1944, the committee of 
experts presented its report to the court. The committee reported that the 
Risale-I Nur was a scholarly work, and that it found nothing in it concerning the 
exploitation of religion, the forming of a seeret society, or establishing a new 
Sufi tarikat.65 On 16 June 1944, Said Nursi and his students were acquitted and 
released from prison. 
Bediüzzaman stayed in Denizli for a month anda half until August 1944 when 
the authorities in Ankara ordered that he be sent to live in Emirdag, the 
province of Afyon, in western Anatolia. He stayed there for three and a half 
years. During this period the number of the Risale-I Nur students continuously 
increased. Despite harassment by officials, Said Nursi returned to his studies. 
Once more on 23 January 1948, Said Nursi and some of his students were 
64 Vahide, The Author ofRisale-I Nur. 281. 
65 Risale-I Nur Hakkinda Beraat Kararlari, Vol.1, p. 130, quoted in Sahiner, 
Bilinmeyen Taraflariyle Bediüzzaman Said Nursi. 342. 
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arrested and sent to prison in Afyon again on charges of forming a seeret 
society, opposing the regime, and mixing religion into politics.66 Said Nursi was 
placed in solitary confinement Prison for twenty months, in a cell that lacked 
heating in winter. He nevertheless continued to write the Risale-I Nur, to 
worship, and contemplate. On 6 December 1948, the Court announced its 
decision to sentence Said Nursi to twenty months imprisonment. However, this 
case was sent to the Court of Appeals in Ankara where the decision of the 
Afyon Court was reversed and Bediüzzaman was released on 20 September 
1949. 
4.3.3 The Third Said 
The emerg€mce of the Third Said occurred concurrently with the Democrat 
Party's victory in the general elections of 1950. After the defeat of the 
Republican People' s Party, the restrictions on Bediüzzaman' s movements were 
lifted and he spent his last ten years in Emirdag and Isparta, occasionally 
visiting other parts of Turkey upon invitations by Risale-I Nur students. 
Although the Democrat Party was in power, the bureaucracy was in the hands 
of the supporters of the Republican People's Party. For this reason, the 
repression of Said Nursi and his students and the court cases against him 
66 Ibid., 365. 
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continued.67 In 1956 the Afyon Court announced a decision that lifted the ban 
on the publication and distribution of the Risale-1 Nur. Upon this decision the 
students of the Risale-1 Nur began printing it in Latin the alphabet in Ankara 
and Istanbul. As a result, the number of the Risale-1 Nur students and readers 
continued to increase and the Risale-1 Nur movement spread all around Turkey. 
There were some significant changes in Bediüzzaman's behavior after 1950. 
One was his increasing involvement with political matters. Although he was 
not actively involved in politics, he supported the Democrat Party and 
provided advice to them. Bediüzzaman supported the Democrats solely to 
prevent the Republican People's Party from coming to power; he called the 
Democrat Party "the lesser of two evils."68 He saw it as a barrier against 
communism and irreligion. That is why he voted for DP in the general election 
of 1957 and advised his students to do the same. Bediüzzaman said he got 
involved in political matters only to serve religion. Moreover, he did not 
approve the Risale-1 Nur students' engagement in active politicallife. 
In this period also several charges were brought against Bediüzzaman and the 
Risale-1 Nur, but he was acquitted in every instance. In the meantime he visited 
several cities ending his trip in Isparta on 20 January 1960. By then he was very 
67 Vahide, The Author ofRisale-1 Nur. 329. 
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ili and wished to go to Urfa. He arrived there accompanied by some of his 
students on 21 March 1960. Two days later he died and was buried in the 
Halilürrahman Dergahi.69 However, after the 27 May 1960 military coup, 
Bediüzzaman's remains were moved to an unknown location in central 
Anatolia.7ü 
Now we will discuss the views of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi on various topics 
such as freedom, constitutionalism, secularism, the notion of state and 
opposition. These topics are chosen since they are related to our subject matter, 
that is civil society. 
4.4 Bediüzzaman Said Nursi's Views on Issues Relevant to the Notion of 
Civil Society 
4.4.1 Bediüzzaman' s Views on Freedam 
Bediüzzaman Said Nursi did not consider freedom asa value organizing only 
social life but also the inner life of an individual. He defined freedom as 
follows: " ... Freedom is this: apart from the law of justice and punishment, no 
68 Ibid., 330. 
69 It is a famous religious tomb where the Prophet Ibrahim lies. 
70 Sahiner, Bilinmeyen Taraflariyle Bediüzzaman Said Nursi. 456-458. 
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one can have damination over anyone else. Everybody's rights are protected. In 
their legitimate actions, everyone is free." 71 This understanding of freedam led 
to the notian that the spiritual life of an individual was not left totally free, but 
it was subject to a form of control.72 
Freedam had a very significant place in Bediüzzaman' s thought and life. He 
placed great importance on freedam by saying that "I can live without bread 
but I cannot live without freedom."73 His special emphasis on freedam is also 
reflected by his statement that" freedamisa steam of life machine."74 
However, he felt that the exercise of freedam ought to be limited in the sense 
that appropriate experience of freedam would be defined by normative codes. 
Freedam would have defined limits for everybody and everybody would be 
71 In order to prevent misinterpretations, quotations from Bediüzzaman Said 
Nursi will be given in Turkish in footnotes in the rest of the chapter. 
" ... Hürriyet budur ki: Kanun-u adalet ve te' dibden baska hiç kimse kimseye 
tahakküm etmesin. Herkesin hukuku mahfuz kalsin, herkes harekat-I 
mesruasinda sahane serbest olsun." Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, Münazarat 
(Istanbul: Yeni Asya Nesriyat, 1996), 57. 
72 Safa Mürsel, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi ve Devlet Felsefesi (Istanbul: Yeni Asya 
Yayinlari, 1995), 273. 
73 "Ben ekmeksiz yasarim, hürriyetsiz yasayamam." Bediüzzaman Said Nursi 
Emirdag Lahikasi, Vol.1, 18, quoted in Mürsel, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi ve Devlet 
Felsefesi. 272. 
74 " ... makine-yi hayatin buhari olan hürriyet ... " Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, 
Divan-I Harb-I Örfi (Istanbul: Yeni Asya Nesriyat, 1993), 59. 
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free to act only within those limits. The limits of freedam that Said Nursi 
referred to appear to be the same as the limits in his view of legitimacy. This 
necessitates to behave in the directian of ethics. For Bediüzzaman, the law of 
justice is not a sufficient condition for the realization of freedom; Freedam is 
also measured and defined according to ethical consideration and social 
norms.75 
Said Nursi argued that unlimited freedam would not be recognized as freedam 
in the true sense of the word.76 He believed that limited and legitimate freedam 
must have an ethical basis; freedam did not mean doing whatever one pleased 
as long as one did not harm others; acting irresponsibly in a way to harm 
oneself also contradicted his notion of freedom. He argued that "delicate 
freedam is instructed and adorned by the good manners of the sharia. Freedam 
to be dissolute and behave scandalously is not freedom. Rather it is brutality, it 
is the tyranny of the Devil. It is to be the slave of the evil-commanding soul. 
General freedam is the product of the portions of individual freedom. The 
characteristic of freedam is that one harms neither oneself, nor others."77 
75 Safa Mürsel, Siyasi Düsünce Tarihi Isiginda Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (Istanbul: 
Yeni Asya Yayinlari, 1989), 104-105. 
76 Isınail Mutlu, Bediüzzaman'in Görüsleri Isiginda Islam ve Hürriyet (Istanbul: 
Mutlu Yayinlari, 1993), 64. 
77 
" ... nazenin hürriyet, adab-I seriada müteeddibe ve mütezeyyine olmak 
lazimdir. Yoksa, sefahat ve rezaletteki hürriyet hayvanliktir, seytanin 
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Limitation of freedom meant equal respect by everybody to one' s own rights as 
well as the other' s rights.78 According to Said Nursi, freedom must be bo und 
by the good manners according to sharia. If uneducated people are given 
unlimited freedom, they would become dissolute and disobedient.79 Since 
general freedom represents the sum of individual's freedoms, refraining from 
causing harm to someone else constitutes the singular basis of freedom.8o 
In addition to determining the limits of the individual's freedom of action, 
Bediüzzaman considered the conditions under which the state could interfere 
in the individual's actions. He argued that the state could not intervene with 
the individual's actions in an arbitrary manner, such interference should be 
within the bounds of the law.8ı He opposed any kind of state intervention on 
the basis of presuppositions. State intervention, he said, was acceptable on the 
basis of proven harmful activity, that is, only upon the proven commitment of a 
misdeed. In this regard, he made the distinction that "the possibility of an event 
istibdadidir, nefs-I emmareye esir olmaktir. Hürriyet-I umumi, efradin zerrat-I 
hürriyatinin muhassalidir. Hürriyetin se'ni odur ki; ne nefsine, ne gayriye 
zarari dokunmasİn." Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, Münazarat, 55. 
78 Mutlu, Bediüzzaman'in Görüsleri Isiginda Islam ve Hürriyet. 66. 
79 Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, Divan-I Harb-I Örfi. 25. 
80 Mutlu, Bediüzzaman'in Görüsleri Isiginda Islam ve Hürriyet. 66-67. 
81 Mürsel, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi ve Devlet Felsefesi. 286. 
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ıs different, the occurrence of an event is something different."82 This 
formulation was consistent with his opposition to state interference during the 
Republican period. 
Bediüzzaman thought despotism was the most important enemy of freedom. 
For him, "despotism is oppression. It is dealing with others in an arbitrary 
fashion. It is compulsion relying on force. It is the opinion of one person. It 
provides extremely favorable ground for exploitation. It is the basis of tyranny. 
It annihilates humanity ... "83 He proposed some measures to prevent the return 
to despotism. First, people must be aware of their rights and must actively 
protect those rights. In order to ensure that, the educational and intellectual 
level of the people must be alleviated and desire for freedom must be 
awakened in them.84 Another measure for preventing despotism was the 
preservation of order in society. He saw disorder as a cause for the elimination 
of freedom. 85 
82 
"Imkanat ayridir, vukuat ayridir." Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, Sualar, 255, 
quoted in ibid. 
83 Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, Münazarat, (Ottoman edition), quoted in Vahide, 
The Author of Risale-I Nur, 60. 
84 Mürsel, Siyasi Düsünce Tarihi Isiginda Bediüzzaman Said Nursi. 127. 
85 Ibid., 129. And Isınail Mutlu, Bediüzzaman'in Görüsleri Isiginda Islam ve 
Hürriyet. 56. 
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He argued that politically constitutionalism and freedom based on sharia must 
be advocated in order toprevent despotism; and legally the rule of law should 
be emphasized. Otherwise, despotism would reign.86 
According to Said Nursi freedom would provide possibilities for progress of 
both the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic world. In his Salonica speech, 
ll Address to Freedom,11 following the proclamation of the Second Constitution, 
he said that 11 ••• The doors of a paradise of progress and civilization, free of 
oppression and exploitation have been opened to us ... The Constitution, which 
is in accordance with the sharia, is the introduction to the sovereignty of the 
nation and invites us to enter like the treasury-guard of Paradise. O my 
oppressed compatriots! Let us go and enter."87 Said Nursi placed special 
emphasis on the necessity of adhering to Islamic morality for achieving true 
progress. He argued that the virtues of civilization be adapted and its evils be 
abandoned. In this respect, he proposed, the Ottomans should imitate the 
Japanese who took the virtues of Western civilization but also preserved their 
national customs. 11We shall ban the sins and evils of civilization from entering 
the bounds of freedom and our civilization by means of the sword of 
sharia ... W e must take the Japanese as a model to ourselves, they preserved 
their national customs which are the most important factors for the 
86 Mürsel, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi ve Devlet Felsefesi. 283. 
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continuation of every nation and took only the virtues of civilization from 
Europe."88 
Therefore, for Bediüzzaman, freedom can be a source of progressif the sharia is 
the basis of it. He declared that "our progress will only occur through the 
progress of Islam, which is our nationality, and through the manifestation of 
the truths of sharia ... "89 
To conclude, it can be said that he was opposed to despotismin any form and 
advocated freedom and constitutionalism based on the sharia in every 
condition. He was opposed to the rule of the Committee of Union and Progress, 
and the constitutionalism the Committee of Union and Progress brought, 
because Said Nursi felt that the regime did not abide by the principle of real 
constitutionalism. For the same reasons he criticized the republican regime, 
which, he thought, did not deal with citizens in a just fashion. 
87 Vahide, The Author ofRisale-I Nur. 57. 
88 //Elhasil: Zünub ve mesavi-I medeniyeti, hudud-u hürriyet ve 
medeniyetimize girmekten seyf-I Seriatla yasak edecegiz ... Kesb-I medeniyette 
Japonlara iktida bize lazİmdir ki; onlar Avrupadan mehasin-I medeniyeti 
almakla beraber, her kavmin maye-I bekasi olan adat-l milliyelerini muhafaza 
ettiler. 1' Bediüzzaman's 1 Address to Freedom,' quoted in Mutlu, Bediüzzaman'in 
Görüsleri Isiginda Islam ve Hürriyet. 187. 
89 ll ... Terakkimiz, ancak milliyetimiz olan Islamiyetİn terakkisiyle ve hakaik-I 
Seriatİn tecellisiyledir." Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, Divan-I Harb-I Örfi. 46. 
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4.4.2 Bediüzzaman's Views on Constitutionalism 
The period in which Bediüzzaman was involved in active political life was the 
period of the Second Constitution. He defined constitutionalism as a sum of 
consultation, justice, and power in law, but connected it fundamentally with 
sharia.90 "Constitutionalism .. .is the consultation enjoined by the sharia. This 
luminous body's life is truth, in place of force. Its heart is knowledge, its 
tongue, love. Its mind is the law, not an individual. Indeed, constitutionalism is 
the sovereignty of the na tion ... "91 
Bediüzzaman was opposed to the view that constitutionalism was contrary to 
the sharia. He proposed that the application of constitutionalism could in fact 
be in accordance with the sharia, and also would only be legitimated by sharia. 
It was possible to deduce the truths of constitutionalism belonging to the works 
of scholars from the Four Schools of Islamic Law, i.e., Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki, and 
Hanbelite. Their works encompassed definitions of the various forms of 
constitutional government based on consultation, freedom, equality, and 
90 Ihsan Isik, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi ve Nurculuk (Istanbul: Ünlem Yayinlari, 
1990), 125. 
91 Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, Münazarat (Ottoman Edition) in Asar-I Bediyye, 407, 
quoted in Vahide, The Author of Risale-I Nur. 60. 
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justice. For this reason, Said Nursi stated that constitutionalism could not be 
opposed either on political or religious grounds.92 
According to Bediüzzaman, public opinion, which forms the basis of 
constitutionalism, also has a significant place in the sharia. In this context, he 
stated that "the cansensus of the community constitutes a certain proof in the 
sharia. The opinion of the mass of the people forms a fundamental principle in 
the sharia. The sharia acknowledges the importance of public opinion."93Said 
Nursi argued that certain concepts and institutions in the Islamic past would 
serve as the basis of democracy ina perfect way. For this reason, we should not 
try to find another intellectual base other than Islam for democracy.94 
Bediüzzaman attempted to give an Islamic form to constitutionalism, that is he 
tried to Islamize the idea of constitutionalism. He argued that he did not 
approve of constitutionalism if it was a way of imitating the West, but he 
approved it on the basis of the sharia. The sharia, for Said Nursi, filtered the 
evils and sins of Western civilization. If anything contradicted the sharia, it 
should not be adopted by Islamic countries. By this way, appropriate and 
92 Mürsel, Siyasi Düsünce Tarihi Isiginda Bediüzzaman Said Nursi. 20. 
93 Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, Münazarat (Ottoman Edition) in Asar-I Bediyye, 417, 
quoted in Vahide, The Author of Risale-I Nur. 60. 
94 Mürsel, Siyasi Düsünce Tarihi Isiginda Bediüzzaman Said Nursi. 39. 
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beneficial aspects of Western civilization, which will result in the progress of 
Islamic world, will be acquired.95 
According to Bediüzzaman, one of the most significant elements of 
constitutionalism is consultation, but this must be also directed by Islam. 
Because of the very nature of constitutionalism, consultation is carried out in all 
areas of the state and society. When constitutionalism is adopted by the 
government, it will diffuse to society and will demonstrate itself as 
consultation, the im portance of public opinion and consensus.96 
Another significant constituent of constitutionalism is the duty and 
consciousness of voting. In this respect, he stated that "since the essence of 
constitutionalism is the sovereignty of the nation, it is necessary to manifest the 
existence of the nation."97 The manifestation of the nation could be done in two 
ways: One was to vote in the elections, while the other is to monitor the results 
of our votes and the performance of the politicians we elected. Bediüzzaman 
approved of constitutionalism, because it allowed people to have control over 
the politicians. 
9s Ibid., 64. 
96 Vahide, The Author ofRisale-I Nur. 61. 
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As a result, it can be argued that Said Nursi accepted constitutionalism as a 
significant principle of the sharia. Following the proclamation of the Second 
Constitution Bediüzzaman advised people to preserve constitutionalism and 
avoid despotism which had harmful effects upon the Ottoman Empire. 
4.4.3 Bediüzzaman's Notian of Secularism 
While explaining his views on the notion of secularism, Bediüzzaman made a 
comparison between Christianity and Islam. He asserted that Christianity did 
not have social and political principles similar to those of Islam. For 
Bediüzzaman, in Islam both this world and the next were organized in a 
detailed fashion according to certain principles and those principles could not 
be changed.98 
Said Nursi emphasized the practice of secularism in Western countries strongly. 
He argued that the way secularism was practiced in a respectful way towards 
religious freedom. In this regard, he opposed the oppression of religious people 
in the name of secularism in Turkey. In his defense in the Eskisehir court, he 
said that "secular republic means the separation of religion from worldly 
97 
"Madem ki mesrutiyette hakimiyet millettedir; mevcudiyet-I milleti 
göstermek lazimdir. " Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, Hutbe-I Samiye (Istanbul: Yeni 
Asya Nesriyat, 1996), 97. 
98 Isik, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi ve Nurculuk. 127-128. 
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affairs. It does not mean the rejection of religion or becoming irreligious. No 
nation could live without a religion. "99 
For Said Nursi, since the secular republic remained impartial and did not 
interfere with irreligious people based on the principle of secularism, it also 
should not interfere with religious people.ıoo So Bediüzzaman did not accept 
that he had opposed secularism, but he opposed the practice of secularism asa 
means of oppression of religious people. 
4.4.4 Bediüzzaman's Notian of Opposition 
Bediüzzaman was a defender of the right of opposition to the government. For 
him, this was an important factor in establishing true justice. However, this 
right must be exercised in accordance with some principles. The most 
important one of these principles is that it must be exercised within legal 
boundaries and should not disturb the public order. In this respect, he stated 
that "there are opponents to the government in every country. Nobody can be 
99 "Hükumetin laik cumhuriyeti, dini dünyadan ayirmak demek oldugunu 
biliyoruz. Yoksa, hiçbir hatira gelmeyen dini reddetmek ve bütün bütün dinsiz 
olmak demek oldugunu, gayet ahmak bir dinsiz kabul eder. Evet, dünyada 
hiçbir millet dinsiz yasayamadigi gibi. .. " Tarihçe-I Hayat. 204. 
100 Ibid., 194. 
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held responsible for their ideas that they have consciously adopted and deeply 
believe in, unless they do cause disorder."101 
Although Bediüzzaman disapproved the negative opposition to the 
government, he did not remain silent in the face of the despotic actions of the 
government as was in the case with the CUP government. For him, opposition 
to such kinci of governments was essential to preserve freedom and public 
order.102 
4.4.5 Bediüzzaman's Views on Political Authority 
According to Said Nursi, the government should be based on the principles of 
justice, consultation and law in order to provide political authority.103 In 
addition to these principles, it should emphasize the principle of equality before 
the law. The adoption of these principles would serve to preservation of 
stability as well as the success of the government.104For him, despotic regimes 
101 
"Her hükümette muhalifler bulunur. Asayise ilismemek sartiyla herkes 
vicdaniyla, kalbiyle kabul ettigi bir metodu, bir fikri ile me' sul olmaz. " 
Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, Emirdag Lahikasi, Vol. 2, 127, quoted in Mutlu, 
Bediüzzaman'in Görüsleri Isiginda Parti ve Siyaset. 195. 
1o2 Mürsel, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi ve Devlet Felsefesi. 268. 
103 Mutlu, Bediüzzaman'in Görüsleri Isiginda Parti ve Siyaset. 185. 
104 Mürsel, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi ve Devlet Felsefesi. 269-270. 
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based on fear, threat, and force could not be long-lived. They would extinguish 
in a short period of time. 
According to Said Nursi, every government should have the support of the 
people. And, people in turn should be acquainted with and uphold the notion 
of ethics, virtue, and good character to support political authority, since it 
would be difficult to rule a people lacking strength of character. Any 
government trying to rule people having bad character would be short-lived. 
Therefore, the government should inculcate in people a strong belief to help 
them attain a good character.1os 
Another significant condition of establishing a strong ruling mechanism is to 
have the support of the public. Without public support, the government could 
not be successful. Also the government should not oppose the social 
movements which have the support of large numbers of people.1°6In Said 
Nursi' s opinion, the government should give people the authority to control the 
activities of the government. He underlined the significance of the public by 
stating that "public opinion is the observer."107 
1os Mutlu, Bediüzzaman'in Görüsleri Isiginda Parti ve Siyaset. 187-188. 
106 Ibid., 188-189. 
107 "Efkar-I umumiye didebandir." Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, Muhakemat, 20, 
quoted in ibid., 189-190. 
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4.4.6 Bediüzzaman's Notian of Education 
As mentioned above, Said Nursi developed his own method of teaching during 
his stay in Van. The importance of this method stems from combining religious 
sciences with modern sciences which had been taught separately. His belief was 
that the modern sciences would strengthen the truths of religion. That is why 
he pursued the project of founding an Eastern University based on this teaching 
method. 
Bediüzzaman treated religion as representing the heart and conscience, and 
science as representing reason; both of which were necessary conditions for true 
progress. He put forth the importance of this as follows: "The religious sciences 
are the light of conscience, and the modern sciences are the light of reason. The 
truth manifests itself by combining of the two. The students' endeavor will take 
flight on these two wings. The separation of the two will lead to bigotry in the 
one, and wiles and skepticism in the other."108 In this teaching method, the 
working of the heart and reason together is impelled.109 
1os Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, Münazarat, 72, quoted in Vahide, The Author of 
Risale-I Nur. 44. 
109 Mürsel, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi ve Devlet Felsefesi. 305. 
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Bediüzzaman opposed the common viewpoint that religion and science are 
contradictory to each other. To him, religion and science went hand in hand to 
prove the existence of God. The development and results of modern sciences 
show that everything in this universe was created by the will of a Creator. In 
this sense, Said Nursi proposed that science and Islam were in harmony. And 
the Qur' an had a place for modern sciences and it always supported their 
development.ııo 
According to Said Nursi, the awakening of a nation depended not only on 
measurements based on law, but also on the educational system involving the 
combination of religious and modern sciences, because scientific education was 
essential for social progress and individual consciousness. The unity of anation 
also could be provided by education.ııı 
The following quotation shows the degree of importance that Bediüzzaman 
gave to education: "Our enemies are ignorance, dispute, and poverty. We will 
fight with these enemies by means of science, unity, and ski11."112 With this 
11o Ibid., 303. 
ııı Ibid., 306. 
112 "Bizim düsmanimiz cehalet, zaruret, ihtilaftir. Bu üç düsmana karsi; san'at, 
marifet, ittifak silahiyle cihad edecegiz." Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, Divan-I 
Harb-I Örfi. 23. 
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statement, he underlined the importance of education for the development of 
the nation as a whole. 
Said Nursi's writings also reflect a concern toprevent the infiHration of Western 
materialism to Islamic culture. During his first phase, that is in the period of 
"Old Said," he took an activist position to redress the balance because, he 
thought, the Ottoman Empire retreated in the face of the West on the one hand, 
and Islam retreated in the face of Christianity on the other. For this reason, he 
proposed improvement of the educational system. 
The second phase of Said Nursi's activities, i.e., the period of "New Said," was 
shaped by his anxiety about the abandonment by the Republican elites of Islam 
as a cornerstone of social organization, which, he believed, paved the way to 
the infiHration of Western materialism and thus to the dissolution of Turkish 
society.113 
113 Serif Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of 
Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (Albany, New York: State University of New York 
Press, 1989), 36. 
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4.5 Assessments of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi and Nurculuk by Social 
Scientists 
Serif Mardin regards Said Nursi as an Islamic specialist who extracted from the 
Qur' an the principles which are the most appropriate to contemporary Muslim 
society.114 He renovated the norms of the Qur'an to make them harmonious 
with the acting style of a traditional Muslim individual within the 
industrialized mass communication society. Mardin argues that Said Nursi's 
influence was based mainly on this philosophical and sociological approach.ııs 
The boundaries of Nurculuk is a complex matter since the Nurcus daim that 
Nurculuk is not based on the classkal tarikat model, but it is a means of diffusing 
the truth of the Qur'an. Everybody who shares the diffusion of the truth is 
regarded as a member of the community. There is no initiation ceremony in 
Nurculuk nor a formal organizational structure. 
According to Mardin, the main reason of the spread of Nurcu movement after 
1950 lies in its ability to deal with the new ideas and tools adopted by and 
integrated into the new culture of Republican Turkey. Another reason for the 
success of the Nurculuk is the failures of the Republican regime to address 
114 Ibid., 18. 
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spiritual issues. "Outstanding among those was the inability of secular 
Republican ideology to replace Islamasa world-view."l16 
However, after the death of Said Nursi, his followers were dispersed. There has 
been no unity among the followers of Said Nursisince 1960. There are two main 
reasons of this disunity. One of them lies in the answer to the question of 
whether or not the followers of Said Nursi should participate in politics. The 
second reason is that Said Nursi was Kurdish. There is no interaction between 
Turkish nationalists and other Kurdish followers of Said Nursi. Consequently, 
there are some independent groups such as "Group of New Asia," "Kirkinci 
Hoca and his supporters," and "Fethullah Gülen and his community." Despite 
this fragmentation of Nurculuk, its sphere of influence has been widened. The 
reason of the success of this movement lies in its flexible discourse.ıı7 
Now we will turn to the question of whether Nurculuk is a tarikat or not. Said 
Nursi and his disciples deny that Nurculuk is a tarikat and they attempt to 
present it as a simple ideologkal school of thought. Contrary to most of the 
ııs Ibid., 13. 
116 Ibid., 25. 
117 Hakan Yavuz, "Yayina Dayali Islami Söylem ve Modernlik: Nur Hareketi," 
in Uluslararasi Bediüzzaman Sempozyumu III (Istanbul: Yeni Asya Yayinlari, 
1996), 664. 
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tarikats, there are no dervish lodges in Nurculuk, no emblems of authority, no 
accessories, and no sheikh. ııs 
Although some people wish to interpret Nurculuk as a new tarikat, many 
scholars agreed on the view that it was not. Cemal Kutay, for instance, argues 
that Nurculuk is neither a mezhep, school of Islam (sect), nor a tarikat. It is a 
movement of tedvin, reinterpretation and codification of Islamic principles 
according to the requirements of the time. 119 
According to Esref Edib, Nurculuk is neither a tarikat nor an association, and not 
a political organization. He acknowledges the existence of a group which does 
not have a political program nor an organization like that of a political party. 120 
The motto of this movement, for Edib, is aloofness from politics. Bediüzzaman 
had not given his students training in tarikat, but instruction to reach the reality. 
He said that "our guide is the Qur'an, and our motto is belief and science."121 In 
ııs Paul Dumont, "Disciples of the Light: The Nurju Movement in Turkey." 
Central Asian Survey 5 (1986): 56. 
119 Cemal Kutay, Cagimizda Bir Asr-I Saadet Müslümani: Bediüzzaman Said Nursi 
(Istanbul: Yeni Asya Yayinlari, 1980), Preface, footnote 1. 
12o Esref Edib, Risale-I Nur Müellifi Bediüzzaman Said Nur: Hayati, Eserleri, Meslegi 
(Istanbul: Asari Ilmiye Kütüphanesi Nesriyati, 1952), 4. 
121 Ibid., 6. 
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this respect, according to Edib, it is appropriate to call Nurculuk a school 
(ecole). 122 
In agreement with Esref Edib, Ahmed Akgündüz also proposes that Nurculuk is 
not a tarikat, not an association, and not a political party. He borrows the 
d etinition of tarikat from Selçuk E raydin who defines it as a way to obtain God' s 
consent and to become closer to God.123 The concept of tarikat has two 
meanings: In general, it means the way to God in the sense that all religions 
have their way to God. In a more specific sense, tarikat means a special 
organization which in addition to having a particular way of systemHazing of 
Sufism has an oral tradition and rituals of its own such as having its members 
dressedina particular fashion.124 For Akgündüz, Nurculuk can be considered as 
a tarikat only in a general sense. Indeed, it is not a tarikat, but the reality 
(hakikat), but it is not against thetarikatsina particular sense.125 
122 Ibid., 7. 
123 Selçuk Eraydin, Tasavvuf ve Tarikatlar (Istanbul, 1981), 172, quoted in Ahmed 
Akgündüz, "Risale-I Nur Hareketi, Tarikat mi, Cemiyet mi, Cemaat mi?" in 
Uluslararasi Bediüzzaman Sempozyumu III (Istanbul: Yeni Asya Yayinlari, 1996), 
152. 
124 Ibid., 152-153. 
125 Ibid., 154. 
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Akgündüz adopts the definition of assodation from Bülent Köprülü who 
defines the assodation as a social organization in the legal sense.126 Nurculuk, 
according to Akgündüz, is not such an assodation in legal sense.127 So what is 
Nurculuk? Bediüzzaman insists that Nurculuk is a community. For Akgündüz, 
community means unity which is organized by Muslimson the principles of an 
Islamic notion of brotherhood.128 Therefore, for him, Nurculuk is not a tarikat, 
not an assoda tion, not a political party but a community. 
Paul Dumont has a different idea that Nurculuk could be an order in the process 
of formation. "The movement has in this respect all the necessary ingredients: a 
saint-founder, a body of disciples, structures allowing the development of a 
communal-life, an oral as well as written tradition, a corpus of doctrine, 
religious ceremonies, anda great number of aspirants and apprentices ready to 
submit to rules and discipline."129 For Dumont, another possibility in that 
matter is that Nurculuk could be a degenerate form of traditional religious 
orders.130 
126 Bülent Köprülü, Medeni Hukuk (Istanbul, 1984), 426, quoted in ibid., 156. 
127 Ibid. 
12s TDV Islam Ansiklopedisi, Vol. VII, 287-288, quoted in ibid., 157-158. 
129 Dumont, "Disciples of the Light: The Nurju Movement in Turkey," 56. 
130 Ibid. 
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As stated earlier, Bediüzzaman denied that Nurculuk is a tarikat. In line with this 
thought, in his defense speech in the Eskisehir court he stated that "as I have 
written in numerous treaties, this is not the time of Sufism; it is the time to sa ve 
the belief. There are many who enter paradise without belonging to a tarikat, 
but none who enter paradise without belief. Therefore, it is time to serve and 
uphold belief."131 Said Nursi underlines this fact by stating that "following an 
order [religious order] has the same use and importance for man as any fruits 
do whereas the truths of faith is the food essential to one' s sp iritual life. One 
cannot live without 'bread' while it is possible to subsist without fruit."132 
In this chapter, first of all we analyzed the social and political factors which 
were significant in the emergence of Nurculuk. Then we examined the views of 
Bediüzzaman Said Nursi on some eritkal themes in exploring the notion of civil 
society. In addition, we indicated that Nurculuk is not a tarikat but a religious 
community. In the following chapter, we will address the question of whether 
or not the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat), which became the most 
influential group among other Nurcu groups after the death of Bediüzzaman 
131 "Hem müteaddit risalelerde yazınisim ki: 'Tarikat zamani degil, belki imani 
kurtarmak zamanidir. Tarikatsiz Cennete giden pekçok; fakat imansiz Cennete 
girecek yok. Onun için, imana çalismak lazimdir." Tarihçe-I Hayat, 198. 
132 Said Nursi, The Letters. (London: Truestar, 1994), 23. 
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Said Nursi, can be considered a part of civil societal organizations in modern 
Turkey or not. 
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CHAPTERV 
THE VIEWS OF FETHDLLAH GÜLEN 
In this chapter, the life and views of Fethullah Gülen, currently the leader of 
one branch of Nurculuk, will be elaborated. After the death of Bediüzzaman 
Said Nursi, Nurculuk was dispersed and three independent groups ("Group of 
New Asia," "Kirkinci Hoca and his supporters," and the "Fethullah Gülen 
Community") were formed. The Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat), which 
is the most influential one will be the case study presented in this chapter. The 
reason is that Nurculuk in general, and Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) 
in particular, are the only communities which have been so far discussed within 
the context of the establishment of civil society and the democratization of 
Turkish political life. 
In the first seetion of this chapter, a short biography of Fethullah Gülen will be 
presented. Then, his views on the issues of tolerance, democracy, consensus, 
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consultation, compromise, the notion of the state, which are relevant to the 
notion of civil society will be discussed. 
In the second seetion of this chapter, the evaluation of Fethullah Gülen and his 
community by some leading social scientists will be reviewed and the following 
questions will be addressed: How has the Fethullah Gülen Community 
(Cemaat) been perceived by scholars? And, how do they define this 
community? After reviewing the assessment of the Fethullah Gülen 
Community (Cemaat), we will consider criticisms directed towards it. 
Since the beginning of 1995 Fethullah Gülen, who was until then only known 
among a small circle of religious people, has become a widely known person all 
over Turkey. He has become a focus of public attention and interest, a person 
discussed, and turned in to an "event" within a short period of time. The 
leading journalists interviewed him and much is known about his ideas on 
current issues and his private life as well. These interviews present a moderate 
figure, who respects his "nation" and "state," admires Picasso' s work, as well as 
the poems of the sodalist poet, Nazim Hikmet. As a result, secularists who 
disapprove of the rise of the Islamic political party, Refah Partisi, appreciated 
Fethullah Gülen.1 They saw in him a moderate person, far removed from the 
1 Ömer Laçiner, "Postmodern Bir Dini Hareket: Fethullah Hoca Cemaati." 
Birikim 76 (Agustos 1995): 7. 
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radical concerns of political Islam. He became popular among the liberals 
concerned to find an example of broad-minded and modern leader among 
Islamist leaders. Following the media campaign that made him a household 
name, he met with the then primeminister Tansu Çiller, leader of the True Path 
Party, thus reinforcing his image as an opinion leader close to political decision 
makers. What was the story behind his passage from humble origins to his 
presence at party headquarters in Ankara? 
5.1 The Biography of Fethullah Gülen 
Fethullah Gülen was bornon November 10, 1938 ina village near Erzurum in 
eastern Turkey. His family migrated to Erzurum from the province of Ahlat of 
Bitlis where Bediüzzaman Said Nursi was born. Fethullah Gülen was from a 
family of Turkish origin. He grew up ina religious family. His father was an 
imam (prayer leader) and preacher. Gülen emphasizes that his family is Sunni.2 
His education started when he was four years old. Fethullah Gülen said that 
"my first teacher was my mother. She told me that she taught me to read the 
Qur' an when I was fo ur years old. I finished the reading of the who le Qur' an in 
2 Latif Erdogan, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi: "Küçük Dünyam" (Istanbul: AD 
Yayincilik, 1995), 25. 
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a month, but I do not remember this."3 He attended secular primary schools of 
the Republican regime for two and a half years. When his family moved to 
anather village, where there was no school, his primary school education came 
to an end. He received a primary school diplama after several years by taking 
an equivalency examination.4 
Until the age of eighteen Fethullah Gülen attended several medreses and he took 
lessons from different Hocas in Erzurum. For example, he was a pupil of Osman 
Bektas Hoca along with Mehmet Kirkinci5 and Cemalettin Kaplan.6 While going 
to medreses, he also visited tekkes. For instance, he visited the tekke of Rasim 
Baba, a Kadiri Seyh. In 1956 or 1957, he became acquainted with Risale-I Nur of 
Bediüzzaman Said Nursi and began studying it.7 
• 3 In order to prevent misinterpretations, direct quotations from Fethullah Gülen 
will be given in Turkish in footnotes in the rest of the chapter. "Benim ilk 
Kur'an hocam Validemdir. Kendi anlattigina göre bana dört yasimda Kur'an 
okumayi ögretmis. Bir ay icinde de hatmettigimi söyler. Ben hatmettigimi 
hatirlamiyorum." Ibid. 
4 
"Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi: Hayati, Fikirleri ve Eserleri," Son Cagri, 2 Mart-
lS Mart 1997. 5 Mart 1997. 
5 Now he is a leader of one branch of Nurculuk, he is knqwn as Kirkinci Hoca. 
He is an ardent supporter of the Turkish state. 
6 Kaplan is known as Kara Ses and he tried to establish a state based on sharia. 
7 Hulusi Turgut, "Bediüzzaman Said Nursi' den Fethullah Hoca'ya Nur 
Hareketi," Sabah 15 Ocak -2 Subat 1997, Dizi Yazi. 27 Ocak 1997. 
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Fethullah Gülen grew up in an environment in which the secular culture of the 
Republican regime and an extensive web of tarikat relationships coexisted.s In 
addition, his Turkish family background also had a strong impact on Fethullah 
Gülen' s views. 
When he was eighteen years old, upon his father' s request, Fethullah Gülen left 
for Edirne where his father had a friend with whom he might stay. In Ankara, 
on his way to Edirne, he inquired about the exam held by the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs for becoming a preacher. In Edirne, Fethullah Gülen began 
workingina mosque asa prayer leader and preacher by the permission of the 
deputy mufti, Ibrahim Efendi. In the meantime he took the exam of the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs. After he passed this exam, he was appointed as 
a prayer leader to Uc Serefeli Mosque in Edirne and became a civil servant. 9 
He stayed in Edirne for three years. On November 1960 he was called to 
perform his military service in Ankara, and was later sent to ıskenderun in 
southern Turkey to complete his military service. He deseribed his experience 
in ıskenderun in relation to his religious growth as follows: "the military circles 
in ıskenderun were positive towards religion. When I learnt about this attitude, 
8 Serif Mardin, "Nurculuk Dosyasi," prepared by Rusen Çakir. Artihaber. 1 
(Aralik 1997). 
9 Erdogan, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi: "Küçük Dünyam." 49. 
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I became relaxed. I met there some people from civilian circles. I preached in 
the Central Mosque of ıskenderun on several occasions."ıo 
When Fethullah Gülen became ili because of malnutrition and was sent to 
Erzurum to rest, he stayed there for four months but he did not refrain from 
giving sermons in several mosques. He recounted one of his sermons in 
Erzurum and its consequences as follows: 
One day I heard that there was a movie to be shown called as "Birth of 
Islam" or something like this. People bought tickets for this film two weeks 
in advance ... I thought that an actress who does not respect religion could 
not represent Hz. Ayse, the Prophet Muhammed' s wife who was the pride 
of human beings. One day during my sermon, I turned to the community in 
the mosque and said it is shame on you: They are making fun of your 
religion and your Prophet and you just sit and listen to me here; they are 
making fun of our ancestors and you stili think that you are Muslims. ll 
Upon this speech, the community rose. He tried to calm them down, but to no 
avail. The community marched to the cinema; they stormed the building and 
beat its owner. 
10 
"Askeri çevre, ekseriyet itibariyle müsbetti. Ben bu durumu ögrenince biraz 
daha rahatladim. Bu arada sivilden bazi kimselerle tanisma imkani oldu. Ve 
yine sivil olarak bir iki cuma, ıskenderun'un merkez camiinde vaaz verdim." 
Ibid., 73. 
ll "Bir gün Islam'in Dogusu veya buna yakin bir isimle bir film oynatilacagini 
duydum. Millet, bir hafta evvelinden biletleri almisti. .. Her haliyle dinden uzak 
bir kadin Hz. Aise gibi insanligin medari iftihari bir kadini canlandiramaz. O 
gün ... cemaata 'Yaziklar olsun size! Sizin dininizle, peygamberinizle alay 
edecekler, sizde kuzu kuzu oturup burada beni dinleyeceksiniz. Onlar 
ecadadimizin aziz ruhlariyla eglenecekler, siz de Müslüman geçineceksiniz'." 
Ibid., 75. 
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M ean w hile he also visited the People' s House in Erzurum. He recalled People' s 
Houses as places in which "people did good things. 'But' People's Houses 
served the ideology of the Republican People's Party when it was in power. 
Later, however, came to be frequented by people who had positive attitudes 
(towards religion) and these institutions carried out useful services after the 
defeat of the Republican People' s Party. The administrators of the People' s 
House in Erzurum were praying except for two of them. Even the worst of 
them were believers."12 Again in this period, together with his friends he 
established an Assodation to Fight Communism.B 
After four months, Gülen returned to ıskenderun to finish his military service. 
He started to preach every Friday in the Central Mosque there. However, 
soldiers were strictly forbidden to preach according to military regulations and 
one day he was arrested by an officer. He was sent to a military prison but he 
was soon released because, he said, the Court came under pressure of the 
12 
"Halk Evine de gidip geliyordum. Güzel çalismalar yapiyorlardi. Halk Partisi 
döneminde o zihniyete hizmet eden bu kuruluslar, müsbet düsünceli insanlarİn 
eline geçince yararli hizmetler yapti. Erzurum Halk Evinin yöneticileri, iki 
kisinin disinda namazli insanlardi. Gerçi, bir kisim tuhafliklarİ vardi ama 
inançlarİ saglamdi. En kötüleri dahi inanirdi." Ibid., 77. 
13 "Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi: Hayati, Fikirleri ve Eserleri." Son Cagri, 12 
Mart 1997. 
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commanders of Ankara favouring him. After his release from prison, he was 
discharged early and sent to Erzurum.14 
Nevertheless, he did not stay long in Erzurum and returned to Edirne. He 
started to teach the Qur'an in Qur'an courses, but because of the negative 
attitudes of the local press towards him and of the administrators of these 
Qur' an courses, he requested and got an appointment as a preacher in 
Kyrklareli, where he continued to preach every Friday. After a year in 
Kirklarelİ, he was appointed as a preacher ın Izmir by the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs and went to Izmir in 1966. Fethullah Gülen started to preach 
in Kestanepazari Mosque and to adıninister Kestanepazari Qur' an courses. He 
stayed there until1971 and preached in several cities in the Aegean region. ıs 
He organized summer camps for students of the Qur'an courses in 1968, 1969, 
and 1970. For Gülen, these camps were the most appropriate places for the 
creation of a future generatian as well disciplined as soldiers. That is why these 
camps should be like barracks, he thought. In addition, these camps should be 
inaccordance with spiritual pleasures, consequently, arranged like tekkes. Gülen 
said that "these camps became like medreses because we had education in 
Arabic and we read many books there. As a result, these camps became places 
14 Erdogan, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi: "Küçük Dünyam." 81-84. 
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in which the discipline of the barracks, the science of medreses, and politeness of 
tekkes were united."16 In addition, he saw these camps as disciplined and 
organized units in the struggle against communism. 
After March 12, 1971 ultimatum, Fethullah Gülen was arrested and imprisoned. 
He was released as a result of amnesty. Then he continued to preach in 
Balikesir, Manisa, and Izmir until the 1980 military intervention. After the 1980 
military intervention he was a fugitive for six years avoiding arrest. He came 
out of hiding in 1986 after the State Security Court announced a decision to 
drop the charges against him. Between 1989 and 1992 he preached in Istanbul 
and Izmir asa result of popular demandP He has written more than twenty 
books. 
15 Ibid., 101. 
16 " ... Kamplarda okunan kitaplar ve Arapça tedrisat, orayi adeta bir medreseye 
çeviriyordu. Durum böyle olunca, kamplarda askeriyenin disiplini, tekkenin 
edebi ve medresenim ilmi bütünlesiyar ... " Ibi d., 122. 
17 Nevval Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti (Istanbul: Sabah 
Kitapcilik San ve Tic. A.S., 1997), 130. 
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5..2 Fethullah Gülen' s Views on the Issues Related to the Notion of Civil 
Society 
5.2.1 Tolerance 
Fethullah Gülen argues that w hile we, asa na tion, are maving to the future, we 
can face a threat of possible separateness, difference and the handicaps 
originating from the absence of consensus. In that case, tolerance will be our 
most effective weapon and strongest shelter anda bastion.18 
He lists the main characteristics of tolerance as follows: to overlook the faults of 
other people, to respect different world-views, to forgive others' faults, not to 
be vindictive about injustices towards us even when our rights are violated, not 
to retaliate in kindin the face of even the crudest ideas and undvii thoughts.19 
According to Gülen, we use tolerance occasionally instead of respect, pity, 
generosity, and indulgence. In this context, tolerance forms both the basis of 
our ethical systems and the spiritual discipline of any mature human being who 
is formed by a spiritual dimension.20 He says it can be suggested that tolerance 
18 Fethullah Gülen, Yeseren Düsünceler: Cag ve Nesil, Vol. 6 (Izmir TÖV Yayinlari, 
1997), 19. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 20. 
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originates in Islam, because it can only be nurtured in ambiance of love, 
affection and zeal. This ambiance was achieved after many trials.2ı 
For Gülen, it is not right to condemn people because of their faults. All our 
relationships should be based on tolerance and lenience. "If we preserve our 
gentle manner towards people who eriticize us severely, I believe that most of 
them will become our good friends ina short period of time."22 If we behave 
like the people who eriticize us harshly because of differences of opinion and 
thought, this will only increase the hostility between them and us. Also this 
type of behavior cannot but harm our community. For this reason, it should be 
underlined that we need to avoid acting with hostility, and we have to dissolve 
the hatreds and hostilities in a climate of moderation and tolerance. If we can 
accomplish this, most of the problems will be solved easily.23 
For Fethullah Gülen, those who do not forgive the faults of other people should 
not be forgiven, those who do not respect other people could not be respected, 
those who do not love other people do not deserve love, those who have not 
2ı Fethullah Gülen, Fasildan Fasila, Vol. 3 (Izmir: Nil Yayinlari, 1997), 102. 
22 "Bugün, bizi tenkit eden ve en agir üslupla elestirenlere karsi, eger biz 
mülayemet eksenli üslubumuzu israrla sürdürürsek- öyle inaniyorum ki-
ekseriyeti itibariyle bunlar, birgün gelecek bizim en samimi dostairimiz 
olacaklardİr." Fethullah Gülen, Fasildan Fasila, Vol. 2 (Izmir: Nil Yayinlari, 
1996), 83. 
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tolerance and indulgence towards other people lose the potential to be forgiven. 
Communism, for Gülen, is a system that does not have tolerance towards other 
systems, and atheism is a world-view which is not tolerant towards other 
views. It is only a deception to expect lenience from atheism, and it is an 
illusion to think that atheism will bring respect for other people.24 
Ina country where there is not tolerance and indulgence among individuals, it 
is impossible to talk about collective consciousness and a collective idea. In such 
a country, a strong freedom of thought and freedom of belief could not be 
established by any means. We cannot even associate the concept of the rule of 
law with such a country. Indeed it is not possible to expect a lively media, 
scientific ideas and cultural activities in a place where there is no place for 
tolerance.25fethullah Gülen is optimistic about the future of tolerance in 
Turkey. He believes that there isa sensitive new generatian being educated in 
Turkey and that this new generatian will create an atmosphere of dialogue and 
tolerance.26 
23 Ibid., 84. 
24 Gülen, Yeseren Düsünceler. 21. 
2s Ibid., 22. 
26 Osman Özsoy, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile Canli Yayinda Gündem (Istanbul: 
Alfa Basim yayim Dagitim, 1998), 63. 
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The people of Turkey, according to Fethullah Gülen, have several common 
characteristics. We should focus on their common values instead of 
highlighting the differences among them so as to call attention to social and 
cultural distances among them. We should not emphasize the differences 
between the Alawi and Sunni people, between the Turkish and Kurdish people, 
and between the right and the left. Instead, we must constantly emphasize the 
common values for enabling the development of a dialogue among our people. 
For Turkey's future progress, we should disregard insignificant problems 
among the Turkish people.27 
Despite all negative conditions, he says, we should engender tolerance in our 
hearts, and then we should act in accordance to this feeling of tolerance. The 
resurgence of the nation depends on the disappearance of hostilities among 
people and the diffusion of tolerance all over the country. Fortunately, this 
process has begun in Turkey. He would wish that it would continue with an 
increasing speed and disseminate all over the world. Nowadays, the Turkish 
people need more love, more respect and more holding each others' hands in 
hand. The world of the future will be based not on hatred, violence, quarrel and 
war buton love, tolerance and acceptance of each other.28 
27 Eyüp Can, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile Ufuk Turu (Istanbul: AD Yayincilik, 
1996), 18. 
28 Gülen, Fasildan Fasila, Vol.3. 104. 
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For Gülen, the Turkish people are informed deeply by the notion of tolerance, 
w hat they haveintheir hearts must be brought out. In this context, all segments 
of society, from artists to scientists, have a special role in bringing out this 
tolerance into the public arena. The media, according to Gülen, has an 
important role in this as well. "I wish that we would declare a holy war for 
nothing but the diffusion of tolerance." Only a mild form of persuasion is 
needed to convince people to adopt good behavior and turn away from evil 
feelings and desires.29 
In this sense, the Journalists' and Writers' Foundation, whose spiritual leader is 
Fethullah Gülen, gave "awards of tolerance" to several businessman, artists, 
politicians, and scientists over the last few years. The aim of these awards is to 
foster tolerance in Turkey. 
For Fethullah Gülen, we can solve the problems of difference among people by 
means of tolerance. If these differences are respected, there will be a chance of 
benefiting from everybody's ideas without discriminating against anyone.30 
Fethullah Gülen maintains that the main obstacle in the way of spreading 
tolerance in Turkey is dogmatism. Even people who are against dogmatism 
29 "Hiçbir seye karsi cihat ilan edilmese de, ama mümkünse hosgörü içincihat 
ilan edilmeli." Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti. 27. 
30 Ibid., 78. 
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themselves create new dogmas. The chief problem of the Turkish society is the 
hostilities created by dogmas. One front of dogmatism fights against the 
another front of dogmatism. All of the dogmas in Turkey are based on rigid and 
radical principles. Despite that, they can stili have influence on the grassroots 
levels of Turkish society. In this respect, moderate people who form the 
majority have a significant role to play. The main responsibility of these people 
is to create a balance between extremes. They can adjust these extremes and by 
playing a reconciling role can help the diffusion of tolerance and dialogue.3ı 
Being tolerant means that one is receptive to others' ideas. If a large divergence 
is created between Turkey and the West, integration with the West will become 
more difficult. If we cannot accomplish this integration, we cannot benefit from 
its advantages. Up until now we have remained deprived of the advantages of 
integration with the West. Tolerance can create a bridge which can provide 
good relationships among people and civilizations.32 
5.2.2.Democracy 
According to Fethullah Gülen, Islam is not in contradiction with democracy and 
it would be unfair to argue that Islam is in opposition to democracy. The first 
31 Can, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile Ufuk Turu. 40. 
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article of the Turkish Constitution states that nobody can interfere with the 
religion of others. The Qur'an says that "your religion is up to you, my religion 
is up to me." The main basis of religion lies in its universal acceptance of 
everybody. Exclusive claims that "Islam is democracy," or "Islam is 
capitalism," or "Islam is socialism" are also incorrect. Everything has been 
created for a special purpose. Therefore, everything should be considered 
within i ts own context.33 
Islam, for Gülen, does not command us to obey despotism. We should not 
submit to despotism. Obedience in an Islamic sense means to complying with 
the rule of a parliament, a leader, an administrator, or law. This is a people's 
responsibility. The duty of administrators is not to use their power to 
subordinate people.34 In this sense, Islam is not in contradiction with the notion 
of democracy. 
In Fethullah Gülen' s views, democracy should address all human beings' 
needs: 
I wish that democracy would organize my life until my death and it would 
solve the problems that I will face after my death as well. I wish that 
democracy would guarantee to solve the problems on judgment day 
(mahser). I do not know how to solve this problem, but good democrats 
32 Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti. 79. 
33 Ibid., 25. 
34 Can, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile Ufuk Turu. 82. 
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who consolidate democracy on a strong base should find a solution to this 
problem. Human beings are not composed only of body, but they also have 
a soul. They have both physical and metaphysical characteristics, have both 
temporal and spiritual needs. Human beings should be taken as a whole ... 
Perfect democracy should provide answers to both the physical and 
metaphysical needs of human beings.35 
To Fethullah Gülen, democracy isa system comprising of freedoms in all fields. 
However, because we should live together despite differences of opinion, our 
freedam ends where the freedam of other people starts. Like Bediüzzaman Said 
Nursi, Fethullah Gülen does not approve of unlimited freedom. For him, 
national values and ethical norms cannot be treated as limitations to one's 
freedoms. To the contrary, these norms should be accepted as measures to 
define the limits of one' s freedoms. Otherwise there will be chaos and anarchy 
and one cannot exercise even one' s basic freedoms ina state of anarchy.36 
35 " ... Demokrasi; insanlarİn bütün ihtiyaçlarini karsilamaya cami bir sistem 
seklinde dizayn edilirse sayet, ben kabre kadar benim hayatimi yasamaya 
yaradigi gibi, kabirden öte benim problemlerime cevap vermesini de çok arzu 
ederim. Mahserde ki problemlerime tekeffül etmesini arzu ederim. Ben bu 
problemin nasil çözülecegini düsünmedim, fakat gelecegin çok iyi 
demokratlasmis, demokrasiyi iyi bir zemine oturtmus insanlarİn düsünmesini 
arzu ederim. Çünkü ben sadece bir bedenden ibaret degilim. Benim bir de ruh 
yanim var. Fizik yanimin yaninda metafizik yanim var, dünyeviligimin 
yaninda uhreviligim var. Bütün yanlarimla ele alindigim zaman ben bir bütün 
olarak ele alinmis olacagim ... Mükemmel bir demokrasi insanlarİn fiziki ve 
metafiziki bütün ihtiyaçlarini da karsilamali diye düsünüyorum." Özsoy, 
Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile Canli Yayinda Gündem. 27-28. 
36 Hulusi Turgut, "Bediüzzaman Said Nursi'den Fethullah Hoca'ya Nur 
Hareketi," Sabah 15 Ocak -2 Subat 1997, Dizi Yazi. 26 Ocak 1997. 
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According to Fethullah Gülen, Turkey's democracy is not a perfect democracy, 
but it is in a process of approaching maturity. There will be no return from the 
process of the consolidation of democracy either in Turkey or in the world, 
unless a system which is better than democracy is formed.37 He maintains that 
the process of democracy resembles Darwin' s theory of evolution. For him, this 
process is a kind of evolution of the soul. The consolidation of democracy 
would take a period of time because it is a process which has to undergo an 
evolution.38 But, nevertheless, Turkey would have a consolidated democracy in 
the near future.39 Nowadays, according to Gülen, Turkey seems to lead the 
whole world in its quest for the development of democracy, human rights and 
freedoms while experiencing a process of growth. Turkey has a chance to 
become a world leader in terms of its experience with the consolidation of 
democracy. 40 
Fethullah Gülen claims that democracy is a matter not only of the development 
of mind, but also of the betterment of the soul. Furthermore, he maintains that 
currently people think that democracy is a sufficient system for providing an 
answer to their needs. Perhaps the next generatian will rethink democracy, and 
37 Can, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile Ufuk Turu. 129. 
38 Ibid., 133. 
39 Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti. 78. 
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reformuiate it differently from today's understanding of it and they will want 
to be governed by this new type of democracy. For this reason, democracy isa 
process and the result of this process does not fully involve us today.4ı 
Even though the Turkish people may have lost some of its valuesin the name of 
democracy and republic, both of these concepts, for Gülen, are vital for the 
future of Turkey. However, we cannot approve of the limitations of human 
rights and freedoms in the name of democracy.42 
Many people, even anti-democratic and anti-republican ones, have been talking 
about the necessity of democracy and republic, but they also feed harmful ideas 
on the fertile grounds of democracy. Despite this, democracy could be 
established in Turkey because of its strength. Thus, those people who love their 
country should use democracy as effectively as possible and should utilize the 
facilities of democracy.43 
Fethullah Gülen states that there is freedom of thought, freedom of writing, 
freedom of speech, and freedom to have private property in Turkey. Believers 
40 Ibid., 115. 
41 Gülen, Fasildan Fasila, Vol.2. 153. 
42 Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti. 33. 
43 Can, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile Ufuk Turu. 130. 
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should also take advantage of the existing facilities of democracy. For Gülen, 
both the believers and secularists should respect each other. It is inappropriate 
to insult people by calling them "secular/' and to underestimate people by 
calling them "anti-secular." To make segments of society hostile to each other is 
an obstacle to development.44 All segments of society should make sacrifices for 
Turkey' s progress. 
In addition, Fethullah Gülen underlines that democratic systems are stronger 
than despotic regimes. For instance, the collapse of the United States will take 
forty years since the destruction of democratic regimes occurs slowly like the 
slowing down of a feather against gravity. However, the downfall of despotic 
regimes like the Soviet Union occurs suddenly likean explosion of gas tanks.45 
5.2.3 Cansensus 
For Fethullah Gülen, the existence of a nationwide consensus depends on the 
application of the rule of reciprocity: People should be accepted as they are. 
Otherwise people hope to get an alliance and call this alliance consensus. On 
the one hand, people will say let's sit and talk and compromise on our common 
44 Turgut, "Bediüzzaman Said Nursi' den Fethullah Hoca'ya Nur Hareketi/' 24 
Ocak 1997. 
45 Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti. 39. 
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values. On the other hand, they will try to reach a cansensus on the importance 
of their own value. This is not a consensus, but an assimHation ina way. As a 
consequence, for Gülen, we should accept the people intheir position, and get 
together araund our common values without taking into consideration our 
disagreemen ts. 46 
5.2.4 Consultation ~\~~ 1fı\·J10\QJv 
Fethullah Gülen states that consultation is an important matter. Muslims and 
supporters of our cause (dava) should not act separately; it will have several 
disadvantages for the future of the cause. He claims that: 
I am consulting with fifty scientists or so before meeting with a statesman, 
since I am not an ordinary person at this point. My destiny is integrated 
with your destiny and the destiny of the cause. Hereafter I cannot make a 
decision by myself and act in accordance with this decision. If I act in this 
manner, this will become a betrayal to the whole nation. The risk of my 
wrong decisions will fall on the whole community.47 
Latif Erdogan, who is a supporter of Fethullah Gülen's community, confirms 
that Fethullah Gülen acts in accordance with the mechanism of consultation. 
Erdogan remarks " ... w e express our thoughts openly. Hocaefendi always 
46 Gülen, Fasildan Fasila, Vol. 2. 155. 
47 
" ... Devlet büyüklerinden birisi ile konusmam-görüsmem bahis mevzuu 
oldugunda, 50 insan ile konusur ve istisare eder, ashab-I ilmin, ashab-I re'yin 
görüslerine basvururm. Neden? Zira ben, artik Ramiz Hocanin oglu degilim. 
Kaderim, sizin kaderinizle, davanin kaderiyle bütünlesmis. Bu safhaclan sonra 
benim münferid kararlar verınem ve o kararlara göre davranınarn açik veya 
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observes the procedures of consultation. Even if he has a definite idea on a 
matter, he listens to different opinions and acts according to the decision of the 
majority."48 As a result, for Gülen, the mechanism of consultation is essential. 
Problems must be solved by means of the mechanism of consultation and 
members of a community should not act independently of one another. 
5.2.5 Compromise 
According to Fethullah Gülen, agreement and compromise are related to reason 
and logic. The unity based on reason and logic can be strong and lasting. On the 
other hand, the unity of our times is based on sentiments and this type of unity 
is inadequate and short-lived. The unity against another group, unity based on 
the feeling of hostility, unity based on the feeling of being attacked are 
examples of types of unity based on sentiments.49 
Therefore, for Gülen, there is need for negotiating common values and need for 
reconsidering unity based on reason and logic. For him, different ideas result 
from differences among individuals. Every human being is different from one 
kapali hizmete, millete ihanet sayilir. Ve verecegim yanlis kararlarİn riski bütün 
bir cemaate raci olur." Gülen, Fasildan Fasila, Vol. 3. 68-69. 
48 Nazli Ilicak and Çoskun Çokyigit, "21. Yuzyila Yeni Bir Ses: Fethullah 
Gülen." Aksam, 12-24 Mart 1998. Dizi Yazi. 13 Mart 1998. 
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another. To think that one's own opinions are right and those of other people 
are wrong and to accuse people on the basis of their opinions, to call a Muslim 
blasphemer are examples of fanaticism and crudeness. If we cannot remove 
this fanaticism and crudeness from our hearts, we cannot reach agreement and 
compromise.50 
People should accept other human beings as they are without emphasizing 
differences of opinions and sentiments on the basis of their common property of 
"being human." For Fethullah Gülen, this outlook can be seen also in Islam. He 
asserts that the concepts of "tolerance and social peace" should be diffused all 
over the world for the happiness of human beings.51 Islam can also be explained 
to those who know nothing about it by means of tolerance and dialogue.52 
5.2.6 State 
According to Fethullah Gülen, if we analyze the state from a comparative 
perspective, we can argue that it has an essential value. The existence of the 
state, and the existence of the rule of laws are definitely valuable assets; it can 
49 Fethullah Gülen, Ölçü veya Yoldaki Isiklar, Vol. 2 (Izmir: TÖV Yayinlari, 1997, 
10. Baski), 5. 
5° Ibid., 6, 8. 
51 Gülen, Fasildan Fasila, Vol.3. 201. 
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be proposed that "if the state is controlled by good people, it will be good. If it 
is controlled by the best people, it will be better than the former alternative." 
However, if good people cannot be had, and the state is simply controlled by 
people who are available, it is stili better to have a state rather than the absence 
of a state.53 
For Gülen, ina country where there is no state, chaos and anarchy will occur. 
For this reason he ardently supports the existence of a strong state in a country. 
A strong state is a means for helping people to achieve what they dream for the 
future.54 It is the absence of the state which causes a clash between groups 
holding different world-views. Gülen states that: 
If there is no state in Turkey, ... different religious sects will attack one 
another ... In these days we observe people creating provocation by taking 
advantage of democracy. In this context we are facing a dilemma between 
choosing the absence or the existence of the state. So we choose the 
existence of the state which has an essential value. That means we are not 
dealing with the qualities of state officials; we do not admire those people.55 
52 Özsoy, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile Canli Yayinda Gündem. 138. 
53 
"Devlet ... iyi insanlar tarafindan idare edilirse iyi olur. Çok daha iyi idare 
edilirse çok daha iyi olur." Can, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile Ufuk Turu. 134-
135. 
54 Özsoy, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile Canli Yayinda Gündem. 64. 
55 
"Muvakkaten Türkiye' de bir devlet yoklugunu düsünün ... degisik tarikatlar 
birbirine girerler ... Sirndi demokrasinin yumusak havasindan istifade ederek 
sokaklarda gezip provokasyon yapan insaniari görüyorsunuz. Sirndi bu açidan 
devletsizlik mi devlet mi tercihini yapma mecburiyetindeyiz. Böyle bir 
durumda, iki sekiiden birini tercih etme mecburiyetinde kalinca biz, yine zati 
bir degeri olan devlet diyoruz. Yoksa devleti idare eden insanlarin evsafiyla, 
zirvedeki insanlarİn evsafiyla, her seye ragmen onlari benimseme, basimiza taç 
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In this context, he answers his erihes who accuse him of sanctifying the state. 
For him, without the state religion cannot be protected nor could one' s honor, 
one's dignity, one's property, or the foundations of law. If the foundations of 
law are lost, one cannot eventalk about one' s absence or presence. It is thus not 
logical to assert that it is better to have nothing instead of a less than perfect 
state.56 If this approach is taken tomean by his critics as proof of his sanctifying 
the state, then, he retorts, he is indeed sanctifying it. 
Fethullah Gülen claims " I prefer even the most anti-democratic state to the 
nonexistence of a state. In this regard, I am opposed to the notion of erosion of 
the state."57 In addition, Fethullah Gülen asserts that one cannot approve 
statism that subordinates the individual for the sake of the state. He is against 
this type of statism which does not respect individual freedoms and the rule of 
law. Each nation has a state and the destruction of the state isa disaster for the 
continuation of this nation.5s It can thus be said that for Gülen the notion of 
yapma gibi bir mesele söz konusu degildir." Can, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile 
Ufuk Turu. 135. 
56 Ibid., 136. 
57 " ... en anti demokratik devletleri dahi devletsizlige tercih ettigimi 
söyleyebilirim. Bu açidan da devlet manasinin yipratilmasina, gözden 
düsürülmesine karsiyim." Oral Çalislar, "Fethullah Gülen'in Serüveni." 
Cumhuriyet 20-23 Agustos 1995. Interview with Fethullah Gülen. 21 Agustos 
1995. 
58 Ali Aslan, Zaman. 4 Eylul 1997, quoted from the speech of Fethullah Gülen in 
a Press Conference. 
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state rather than state officials or political leaders has a significant value, and 
the notion of state must be appreciated by the people. 
5.2. 7 Community and Association 
Contrary to the position taken by other religious sects in Turkey, Fethullah 
Gülen advocates the development of the individual (bireyin çiçek açmasi). He 
argues that people need to have trust in something, to have the shelter of a 
community rather than individual development. Since individual development 
necessitates more effort, people generally have a tendeney to rely on 
membership of a group which is easier than facing life alone. He states: "we 
encourage individual development ... but in the first instance it seemed that the 
notion of community was contradictory to that of individual development. I 
thought that promoting individual development might cause a cleavage in our 
community."59 For Gülen, freedom of thought and individual identity are very 
important factors. Individual development should not be feared. Rather a 
balance must be found between community and individual, because Islam and 
the Qur'an also recognize the individual. In Islam each individual is regarded 
as a sui generis species relative to other individuals. Each individual has a 
59 
"Bireysel çiçek açma çok zor bir is ... Ve genel de bizde tercih edilen de 
o ... Fakat bir yandan da çeliski gibi görünüyor bu bana, ilk bakista öyleymis 
gibi görünüyor. Bireysel olani tesvik etmek cemaatte ayrilik çikarmaz mi diye 
düsünüyor insan." Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti. 74. 
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particular thought, mentality, anda definite mind of his or her own. Yet he or 
she will also realize that human beings have to live together like trees in a 
forest. Living together with other people also implies that one should not harm 
others.60 
According to Gülen, there are two types of communities. The first type is 
defined as follows: the formatian of this type of community is like the natural 
formatian of a society. People come together around shared feelings, similar 
opinions, and common values. This type of community does not have a 
negative effect on individual development. However, in the second type of 
community, people come together for a special purpose from the very 
beginning. In this type, there occurs an open or latent hegemony, a static 
thought. In this second type of community, the talents of individuals cannot 
develop; asa result, there is no individual development.61 
In anather text of his, Fethullah Gülen compares the meaning of community 
and association. There are some differences between the meanings of 
community and association. These differences can be summarizedas follows: 62 
60 Ibid., 75. 
61 Ibid., 76-77. 
62 Gülen, Fasildan Fasila, Vol.2. 243-244. 
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1) Community is composed of people who share the same feelings and 
thoughts. This meaning of community is very important also for Islam. For 
instance, Muslims share the same feelings by performing the ritual prayer 
five times aday. 
2) To join a community occurs voluntarily on the basis of instincts. However, 
unity in an assodation occurs by means of a disdpline and a definite 
program, and the members of an assodation are not obliged to share the 
same feelings and thoughts. While there isa unity of ideal ina community, 
there isa unity of interest in an association. 
3) There is no hierarchy in a community but hierarchy is the basis of an 
association. 
4) Communities are long-lasting because their formations are based on such 
features as love, tolerance, altruism. However, assodations are not long-
lasting because they are based on a definite program and regulations. 
Fethullah Gülen argues that an assodation is not long-lasting because it is 
composed of discontented people who get together for a special purpose. These 
people do not necessarily share the same thoughts and feelings. These people 
can be said to constitute a mass formed solely for pursuing their own interests. 
They can be dissolved as easily as they united. A community, on the contrary, 
can disintegrate only by severe differences among its members since these 
people share the same thoughts and feelings. Although they disagree on certain 
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things, the members of a community can come to an agreement on critical 
matters.63 
5.2.8 Integration to the West 
For Fethullah Gülen, the Turkish environment has similar characteristics with 
both the Western world and the Muslim world. If Turkey wishes to become the 
leader of the Muslim world, its integration with Europe will make it easier to 
achieve that aim.64 On the other hand, Asia is also very important for Turkey. 
Integration with Europe is very important but Turkey' s involvement in Asia is 
inevitable. For Turkish businessman that involvement will serve a bridge to the 
rest of the world, and it will make it easier for the Turkish businessman to 
compete in the global market. 65 
Although Fethullah Gülen insists on the need of integration with the West, he 
also maintains that Turkey should preserve its national values. Turkish values, 
he claims, have been degenerated since the period of Tanzimat; these values 
were ignored while the nation exercised democracy and established a republic. 
Fortunately, there appears a resurrection of true values today; the Turks have a 
63 Can, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile Ufuk Turu. 23. 
64 Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti. 24. 
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deep feeling for those values. Turkish society is regenerating itself both 
materially and spiritually. For this reason, it should be extremely cautious in 
adapting anything alien. It should consider whether these values are 
appropriate or not. Turks have some special characteristics. If they do not 
preserve those characteristics, they will be alienated from their past.66 
Fethullah Gülen argues that Turks should not adapt their national values and 
thoughts to the changing conditions of time. For him, the preservation of one' s 
national identity and the essence of one's spirit is necessary. In the meantime, 
the nation has to produce new international policies in line with the conditions 
of globalization. Turkish society ought to be open to modern science and 
technology, and should be ready to adopt innovations in science and 
technology.67 
According to Fethullah Gülen, it is not harmful to adopt Western ideason some 
eritkal matters. This type of integration is inevitable. If Turks have a strong 
national identity, they can adopt the positive sides of Western civilization 
without losing their character. In this regard, he does not have any objection to 
the supporters of westernization. For Gülen, if Turkey has hostility to the 
65 Ibid., 32. 
66 Ibid., 33. 
67 Can, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile Ufuk Turu. 41-42. 
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Western world in an absolute manner, it will lag behind the modern world. It 
would not be able to adapt to the changing conditions of the times.6s 
With regard to Turkey's relations with the Western world, Fethullah Gülen 
refers, for example, to the arms embargo imposed by the United States, which, 
he claims, acts indifferently towards Turkey's problems. In addition, Western 
countries in general treat Turkey as Third-World country. This kind of behavior 
by Western countries, for Fethullah Gülen, is the continuation of the spirit of 
the Crusaders. This feeling of hatred neither began during the Crusades nor 
ended by the completion of the Crusades but it stili exists among Western 
countries.69 In fact, Fethullah Gülen conceives the notion of integration with the 
West from the point of "the lesser of the two evils." He argues that the United 
Sates can have a feeling of hostility towards us, but we can undergo the 
pressure of being on good terms with our enemies in order to keep world 
peace.7° 
He supports involvement with the Western world by means of fostering 
dialogue and tolerance on behalf of world peace. International involvement, he 
says, had been introduced in the name of progress. One hopes to meet and 
68 Ibid., 43. 
69 Gülen, Ölçü veya Yoldaki Isiklar, Vol. 2. 12-13. 
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enter into dialogue with those people who will be one's neighbors in the near 
future due to globalization. All people in the world will share the same space 
by means of improved telecommunication and transportation systems. He met 
with the Patriarch Barthelomeos of the Great Orthodox Church in April 1996 
and with the Pop e with a view towards engaging in "a dialogue between 
religions" in February 1998. Many journalists, scientists and artists appreciated 
his attempts to form of a dialogue among religions.n 
In a globalizing world, Turkey is bound to face troubles and challenges coming 
from countries which have economic, military, or political power. For Gülen, 
for this reason, everybody who loves his/her country should work harder in 
order to be powerful among other countries and to handie those kinds of 
troubles.72 
5.2.9 Educational Mavement 
Fethullah Gülen has started an educational mavement in Turkey and in 
different parts of the world in the 1990s. Gülen's supporters have established 
more than two thousand schools in fifty-two countries in five continents with 
70 Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti. 41. 
n See for details of these meetings Aksiyon, 71 (Nisan 1996), and 167 (Subat 
1998). 
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his encouragement. There are one-hundred and twenty-five schools in 
Turkey.73 He ardently supports this educational movement. He says he answers 
those people who ask his opinion about building of new mosques as follows: "I 
do not say anything about your intention to build a new mosque. However, if 
you have enough resources, it is better to build a new school than a new 
mosque. At least it is necessary to establish a school while building a 
mosque."74 
Fethullah Gülen and his circle chose Central Asia as a starting point for this 
educational movement. Fethullah Gülen supports his choice of Central Asia by 
stating firstly that it was necessary to fill the vacuum there which occurred after 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s. The Turkish 
nation had to go to Central Asia to pay the debt of loyalty to people of Central 
Asia because Central Asian were dominated by atheism for seventy years 
because of their religion.7s 
72 Gülen, Fasildan Fasila, Vol.3. 207. 
73 Hulusi Turgut, "Fethullah Gülen ve Okullari," Yeni Yüzyil 15 Ocak-3 Subat 
1998. Dizi Yazi, 15 Ocak 1998. 
74 
"Cami yapma niyetine birsey diyemem. Fakat, imkan varsa, en güzeli okul 
yapmaktir. Hiç olmazsa bir camiye karsilik, birde okul yapmak lazim." Turgut, 
"Bediüzzaman Said Nursi' den Fethullah Hoca'ya Nur Hareketi," 29 Ocak 1997. 
75 Gülen, Fasildan Fasila, Vol. 3. 5. 
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He said that if he and his group could not support the people of Central Asia by 
means of education and cultural activities, they would fall prey to people 
coming from other parts of the world, and would be exploited by them. In fact, 
there is still the danger of Central Asian people being exploited.76 If Turkey 
does not support them, Turkey could lose Central Asia again. That is why he 
says they had to be quick in bringing both educational facilities, and industrial 
and commercial activities to Central Asia. It was also necessary to fill the social, 
political and cultural vacuum. It is with these considerations that educational 
and commercial activities had been initiated in Central Asia by the Fethullah 
Gülen Community.77 
The second reason for choosing Central Asia was that Turkey has a democracy 
ina process of consolidation. There were some Muslim countries, for example, 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, who see themselves as "better Muslims" than Turks 
therefore they despise Turkey. Instead of dreaming of unity with these 
countries, it was better to turn to Central Asian countries which have been 
subordinated for several decades and have similar characteristics with the 
Turks. He believed that Central Asia would become an "attractive place" in the 
76 Özsoy, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile Canli Yayinda Gündem. 46-47. 
77 Gülen, Fasildan Fasila, Vol. 3. 5. 
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near future for other countries, and hisinitiativesin the fields of education and 
commerce would succeed.78 
Thirdly, the growth of Turkey depended on its integration with Central Asia. 
Gülen says that "as I have mentioned several times, Central Asia will be a 
breath for Turkish economy."79 Turkish people will revive themselves as a 
result of integration with Central Asia. Even though Turkey is close to the 
Western world, it will not get enormously wealthy. If the Western world were 
to realize that Turkey would become rich as a result of integration with the 
Western world, the West will reject this integration.80 
One w ay of "conquering" these large Central Asian steppes was to consider this 
place to be a new market for the Turkish economy. The development of Turkey 
depended on this new market. Besides uniting with those countries having a 
similar outlook, Turkey also depended on these areas as its new market 
opportunity. 81 
78 Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti. 16. 
79 "Defaatle çesitli meclislerde zikrettim. Asya, Türk ekonomisindeki sikisma 
için bir nefes, bir soluktur." Can, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile Ufuk Turu. 58. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
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Fethullah Gülen does not deny the support of the Turkish state for these 
activities in Central Asia. He claims that if he and his community did not share 
the same goals and ideas with the Turkish nation, government, Foreign 
Ministry, intelligence organization, he could not have accomplished anything in 
Central Asia. He maintains that in order to undertake successful initiatives, at 
least there should not be any major impediments put on their way by the 
Turkish government.82 All these developments, he claims, prove that the 
Turkish state is ina process of evolution. He says he could not be successful in 
providing educational and cultural services to Central Asian countries by 
contradicting the Turkish state.83 Gülen thinks that the accommodation of a 
state and a nation is a significant factor at this moment because there is a 
reawakening of nations, even a resurrection of human beings, and a 
transformatian of images all over the world. One cannot be in agreement with 
the state in all matters; there can be differences of opinion between the state and 
people regarding national values. However, there are also similar points of 
view and one can provide mo re services by un derlining these common values. 84 
As far as Fethullah Gülen is concerned, the reason why the Fethullah Gülen 
Community (Cemaat) went to Central Asia is not for their national interests, 
82 Can, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile Ufuk Turu. 27. 
83 Ibid., 28. 
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hegemony, having authority over those people, or conquering those lands. On 
the contrary, he states they went there with a message, to signal the way for the 
future progress of human beings. They were presenting a "Muhammedi spirit" 
(Muhammedi ruh).85 
Some statistics will gıve the reader an idea about the magnitude of this 
educational mavement in Central Asia. For instance, the Fethullah Gülen 
Community (Cemaat) established one university, twenty-eight secondary 
schools, and one primary school in Kazakhstan alone. There are 4803 students 
enrolled in these schools which employ 525 faculty members.86 In Uzbekistan, 
there were eighteen secondary schools established with 3500 students and 200 
teachers. 87 
Students in these schools receive an education in English, Turkish and in their 
native language. In addition, they have computer-based educational facilities, 
modern science laboratories with up to date equipment. Many of their students 
have successfully competed in The International Science Olympics.88 Students 
84 Ibid., 29-30. 
85 Ibid., 30. 
86 Turgut, "Fethullah Gülen ve Okullari," Yeni Yüzyil. 18 Ocak 1998. 
87 Ibid., 25 Ocak 1998. 
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educated in schools established in Turkey by the Fethullah Gülen Community 
(Cemaat) are also successful in national and international science competitions. 
Similarly, students who attend schools and private courses (dershane) of the 
Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) usually score very high in the national 
university entrance examination.s9 
Although Fethullah Gülen supported the establishment of these schools, he 
denies the existence of an "organic" relationship between him and these 
institutions. He says he would be ashamed to take credit for these schools in 
Central Asia which were built and being run by other people. He denies that he 
is the person who directs these schools.90 
Gülen claims that the financial resources for the establishment of these schools 
are provided by business enterprises. In fact, both commercial and educational 
activities go hand in hand in Central Asian countries. The buildings of these 
schools are assigned to the Community' s use by the governments of the home 
countries. Also a small amount of money is collected from the students. The rest 
88 See Ibid., 31 Ocak 1998 and 1 Subat 1998 for list of the awards which are got 
in International Science Olympics. 
89 Ibid., 2 Subat 1998. 
90 Özsoy, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile Canli Yayinda Gündem. 48. 
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of the expenses are provided by Turkish businessmen having interests in those 
countries.9ı 
5.2.10 Turkish Identity 
Fethullah Gülen proposes that Turkey should reexamine its history, historical 
monuments as well as oral traditions together with the Turkic world. Only after 
this happens can the real identity of the Turkish people be defined. In this 
context, Islam is a very im portant factor in defining the Turkish people' s 
identity. 
Gülen maintains that these days everybody is seeking a religion, belief, and 
identity. For this reason, Turks should consider Islam as a component of their 
identity. Turkey should not have hostility towards either the United States or 
Europe; on the contrary, it should adopt Western thought inaccordance with 
the demands of the modern world. In addition, the Turkic world must respect 
the values of other people and must support efforts to achieve world peace. 
This notion of the Turkic world as a new formation will welcome people from 
all around the world.92 
91 Artihaber, 24 (30 Mayis-S Haziran 1998), 24. 
92 Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti. 57. 
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5.3 Assessment of the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) by 
Contemporary Social Scientists 
How is the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) perceived by contemporary 
social scientists or critics? Ahmet Insel, a scholar on Turkish history, defines the 
Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) as a modernİst movement. Fethullah 
Gülen and his supporters are reconciling nationalist, centralist, and etatist 
values with a type of elitism. They transfer these ideas and values to daily life 
by adapting a mission of religious transmission.93 
On the other hand, Ömer Laçiner deseribes this community as a type of 
postmodern religious movement. This movement, according to Laciner, 
combines Turkish nationalism, aspects of traditional political Islam, the 
spiritual pride of Sufi tarikats, with aneo-liberal thesis with an elitist project for 
a strong state/nation. Each of these components are taken out of its histarical 
context and are assigned new, special meanings in this combination effectively 
form a peculiar postmodern 'creation.'94 
93 Ahmet Insel, "Altin Nesil, Yeni Muhafazakarlik ve Fethullah Gülen." Birikim 
99 (Temmuz 1997): 68. 
94 Laçiner, "Postmodern Bir Dini Hareket: Fethullah Hoca Cemaati," ll. 
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Laçiner also underlines the elitist character of the Fethullah Gülen Community 
(Cemaat). Contrary to the Refah Partisi, whose supporters are chiefly from the 
lower stratum of the Turkish society, this community acidresses the upper 
stratum, that is the economic, political, and cultural elites. Gülen tries to assist 
those elites who are seeking to find "the meaning of life" intheir task.95 
Similarly, traces of elitism can be detected in the Fethullah Gülen Community's 
educational movement. For Insel, the aim of this educational movement is not 
to help the children of poor people, but to create an elite cadre in these schools. 
The students of these schools are chosen by means of a difficult talent test. 
These schools aim to create a "golden generation."96 
According to Laçiner, Fethullah Gülen' s main aim is to become powerful rather 
than making the Islamic way of life dominant.97 Likewise, Insel states that "the 
undedining features of Fethullah Gülen's modernism ... are craving for power 
and an imperial desire. Gülen' s strategy for becoming powerful depends on a 
strong state and a strong cadre in this state apparatus."98 So Fethullah Gülen's 
95 ümer Laçiner, "Seçkinci Bir Gelenek ve Fethullah Hoca Cemaati." Birikim 77 
(Eylul 1995): 6. 
96 Insel, "Altin Nesil, Yeni Muhafazakarlik ve Fethullah Gülen," 70-71. 
97 Laçiner, "Postmodern Bir Dini Hareket: Fethullah Hoca Cemaati," 9. 
98 Insel, "Altin Nesil, Yeni Muhafazakarlik ve Fethullah Gülen," 71. 
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objective is to become powerful in society in order to become powerful within 
the state apparatus. His leadership of a community foreshadows a desire for 
being aleader of Turkey.99 
For Insel, the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) is a movement organized 
like a Masonic lodge and which has a similar relationship as a Masonic lodge to 
society. They stand aloof from politics, they do not want to be identified with 
any political movement or political party. Instead they prefer the existence of 
the lodge members everywhere so that they can enlarge their sphere of 
influence. Insel disagrees with some observers who daim that Fethullah Gülen 
is not involved with politics or that he is above politics. Contrary to this view, 
he argues that Fethullah Gülen acidresses the requirements of a long-term 
political project.ıoo 
Can Kozanoglu, a sociologist and he is an author of Cilali Imaj Devri, illustrates 
the rise of the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) as a well-timed "by-pass 
operation" to rescue Turkey from a stalemate. Fethullah Gülen is a new-age 
wise man and his community is the most effective new-age community in 
Turkey. 101 
99 Ibid., 75. 
ıoo Ibid., 73. 
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Hakan Yavuz, a scholar on Turkish politics, depicts the Fethullah Gülen 
Community (Cemaat) asa Neo-Nurcu mavement whose main characteristic is 
to dissolve Said Nursi's individualist and civil doctrine in an etatist and 
na tionalist pot.102 
5.4 Criticisms Directedat Fethullah Gülen 
There are several categories of criticism levelled against Fethullah Gülen. One 
of the main criticisms against Fethullah Gülen is his excessive emphasis on 
etatism and nationalism. Ina world view in which etatism and nationalism are 
dominant ideologies, Islam' s place isa functional one. Islamisa transmitter of a 
tradition in which state and nation have a significant place. In this context, 
Islam is domesticated and functionalised. That means Fethullah Gülen adopts 
the discourse of an official ideology, and he lays daim to etatism and 
nationalism. The discourse of etatism and nationalism are transmitters of 
tradition. Therefore, Fethullah Gülen, who emphasizes the importance of 
tradition, cannot escape from a dilemma which is the problem of all Islamic 
movements in Turkey. While Fethullah Gülen supports cultural continuity, he 
does not consider that the main obstacle to cultural continuity, as it is 
101 Can Kozanoglu, " 'Türkiye Liderini Ariyor,' Fethullah Gülen Cemaati 
Geliyor!: Devletçi, Projeci 'Yeni Çag' Bilgesi," Birikim 95 (Mart 1997): 49. 
102 Hakan Yavuz, "Fethullah Gülen Hoca ile Söylesi," Milliyet 11-13 Agustos 
1997, ll Agustos 1997. 
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emphasized by Ali Bayramoglu, a scholar on Turkish politics and also a 
columnist in the daily, Yeni Yüzyil, is ideologkal continuity, manifested in 
etatism and nationalism,lü3 
According to Yavuz, Fethullah Gülen attempts to sanctify the nation and the 
state. With nation and the state coming into the farefront in Gülen's thought, 
Islam appears to be appropriated by the state: what Yavuz calls the 
"statization" (devletlestirme) and Kemalistlestirme of Islam. In this sense, this 
Neo-Nurcu mavement is not Islamist but conservative. And it is not possible to 
call this mavement "civil."I04 
Anather criticism directed at Fethullah Gülen is about his daim to be aloof from 
politics. In addition to those who, as stated earlier, argue that Fethullah Gülen 
fulfills the necessities of a long-term political project, there are others who see 
Gülen as a long-term political manipulator. 
One such eritic belongs to the Nurcu community. Mehmet Kutlular, leader of 
one branch of Nurculuk, maintains that "Hocaefendi, who criticized us for being 
over-politicized, had close relationships with Turgut Özal and ANAP in 1983. 
Hemade important contributions to ANAP during its foundation period, and 
103 Insel, "Altin Nesil, Yeni Muhafazakarlik ve Fethullah Gülen," 69. 
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his friends took a role in the administration of the party ... His support of the 
military regime after the 1980 intervention shows not his aloofness from 
politics, but from democracy."1os 
Another criticism about the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) concerns the 
absence of inner-democracy and self-criticism within the community. There is 
no self-criticism in Neo-Nurcu movement; Said Nursi's desire to encourage 
criticism is being neglected. The people around Fethullah Gülen are thinking 
according to given "formulations," and like bees ina "beehive" while fulfilling 
their duties. The neo-Nurcu movement produces a "beehive" spirit of obeying 
Hocaefendi and the state.106 
It is obvious that there is an absolute obedience to Fethullah Gülen; his words 
and opinions are not questioned within the community. There is a structural 
authoritarian mentality within the community. This is not a suitable ground for 
the blossoming of individualism and pluralism.I07 
104 Yavuz, "Fethullah Gülen Hoca ile Söylesi," ll Agustos 1997 
105 Çalislar, "Fethullah Gülen'in Seruveni," 23 Agustos 1995 
106 Yavuz, "Fethullah Gülen Hoca ile Söylesi," ll Agustos 1997. 
107 Kozanoglu, " 'Türkiye Liderini Ariyor,' Fethullah Gülen Cemaati Geliyor!: 
Devletçi, Projeci 'Yeni Çag' Bilgesi," 48. 
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Another criticism about Fethullah Gülen is related to his claims of being a 
democrat and a tolerant person. Although he is seen as an ardent supporter of 
the diffusion of tolerance and dialogue first within Turkey and then all over the 
world, he has no tolerance towards atheism and communism.ıos In addition, 
Insel asserts, by making reference to his memories in Küçük Dünyam, that 
Fethullah Gülen is not interested in democracy. In this book Fethullah Gülen 
says that "there was a demonstration with banners depicting Marx and nobody 
interfered with this demonstration. My blood ran cold in the face of this 
demonstration. I asked myself where is the military? Where is the police?"109 
Fethullah Gülen was also criticized for his desire to make people adopt an 
Islamic way of life in Turkey. He is accused by some critics for trying to help 
inculcate Muslim values in Turkey as a first step towards establishing a new 
state based on the sharia. For this purpose his objective is to infiltrate slowly 
into state institutions. Gülen and his supporters try to capture the state from the 
top down. For this reason they are said to be giving "awards of tolerance" for 
the last few years.ııo Moreover, his meeting with the Pope has been criticized 
on the basis of the following daim that: "the Pope is presented as the leader of 
108 Faik Bulut, Kim Bu Fethullah Gülen: Dünü, Bugünü, Hedefi (Istanbul: Ozan 
Yayincilik, 1998), 163. 
109 Insel, "Altin Nesil, Yeni Muhafazakarlik ve Fethullah Gülen," 70. 
no "Fethullah Gülen Dosyasi," Cumhuriyet 14-19 Mart 1998, 14 Mart 1998. 
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Christianity; and Fethullah Gülen is presented as the leader of the Muslim 
World by means of this meeting."ııı 
It is asserted that the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) has tried to 
infiltrate into the Turkish Armed Forces and Police Organization to make the 
formation of a state based on the sharia easier. For this reason, this community 
supports the entrance of students from their community to the schools of the 
Armed Forces and Colleges of Police Organization.ıı2 
The schools of the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) abroad also came 
under suspicion since some people thought that the aim of these schools was to 
train future leaders for Central Asian states who would, in turn, be sympathetic 
towards an Islamic state to be formed in Turkey. In this way Fethullah Gülen 
would get international support for the Islamic state in Turkey.113 
Finally, it is claimed that, like other Islamist groups in Turkey, the Fethullah 
Gülen Community (Cemaat) aims at establishing a state based on the sharia by 
eliminating Atatürkİst principles and by capturing critical posts in the state 
ııı Ibid., 15 Mart 1998. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid., 16 Mart 1998. 
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apparatus. Following the formation of this kind of state in Turkey, they would 
try to realize the Turkish-Islamic unity all over the world,114 
In this chapter, a short biography of Fethullah Gülen has been presented. We 
have discussed his views on the issues of tolerance, democracy, consensus, 
consultation, compromise, the notion of the state, and education which are 
relevant to the main concern of this thesis. In the second seetion of this chapter, 
we have reviewed the evaluation of the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) 
by leading contemporary social scientists. Also included in this seetion is the 
summary of criticisms directed towards the Fethullah Gülen Community 
(Cemaat). The question of whether or not the Fethullah Gülen Community 
(Cemaat) can be considered as part of civil societal organization in Turkey will 
be acidressed in the final chapter. In the following chapter, we will address the 
question about which factors made a contribution to the emergence of the 
Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) as an important figure of the social and 
political life in the 1990s. These factors are the transformatian of state ideology, 
globalization process in economic and cultural realms, and the debate on civil 
society in Turkey during the post-1980 period. 
114 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE NATURE OF THE POST-1980 TURKISH POLITICS 
As mentioned in the previous chapter Fethullah Gülen has become a well 
known person all over Turkey since 1995. He emerged asa social phenomenon 
within a short period of time. The leading journals published the story of 
Fethullah Gülen so that everybody learned his main ideas on religious, social 
and political subjects. 
Fethullah Gülen has been supported by many academicians, politicians, 
journalists and artists. They have proposed that he advocates a "moderate 
Islam" which guarantees that they will stay within the boundaries of the secular 
regime.1 In this sense, many secular intellectuals have considered Fethullah 
Gülen as a safety valve against the "political Islam" of Refah Partisi.2 On the 
1 Yeni Yüzyil, ll Kasim 1996. 
zAt that time the rise of Islam had been considered as a threat to the secular 
republican regime of Turkey. 
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other hand, some intellectuals underiine that this is only one side of the coin. 
For them the other side of the coin is that there is a. long-term possibility of 
getting power behind these messages of diffusion of tolerance.3 
Fethullah Gülen has become known not only in Turkey but also internationally. 
His supporters have founded more than two thousand schools in fifty-two 
countries in five continents of the world. In addition, in February 1998 he met 
with the Pope in the name of a "dialogue between religions." His fame has 
spread in the West. The Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) has formed an 
international chain consisting, in addition to schools, dershanes, student 
dormitories, a web of communication such as newspapers, journals, television 
and radio channels, companies and finance institutions. In a sense the Fethullah 
Gülen Community (Cemaat) has started to appropriate the mission of some 
state institutions. They fulfill the functions of state institutions first in the realm 
of education, then in the realm of cultural and commercial interaction with 
other countries.4 
In this chapter the following questions will be answered: In which context has 
Fethullah Gülen emerged as an important figure? How has he increased his 
power to this large scale? 
3 Gazete Pazar, 13 Nisan 1997. 
4 Nokta, 15-21 Subat 1998. 
•• 
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There are several factors contributing to the emergence of Fethullah Gülen as an 
important figure of Turkish social and political life. One of them is the 
transformatian of state ideology. Although the Turkish state had radical 
secularist policies until the 1980 coup, following the 1980 coup the military as 
part of the state elite formulated Islam as an important factor in creating social 
and political stability in Turkey. In this respect Fethullah Gülen has been 
encouraged by some of the state elites as an alternative to political Islam. 
Fethullah Gülen received state support especially in the field of education. He 
underlines that both Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel, during their 
presidency, helped his community to solve some problems while establishing 
schools in Central Asian countries. 
Another important factor is the globalization process in economic and cultural 
realms. In the last two decades there has been a neo-liberal restructuring 
process all over the world. This process means a radical transfer of the power of 
the state in the economic sphere to market-oriented forces. Turkey also has been 
influenced by this process. Asa result of liberalization of the Turkish economy, 
the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) has increased its activities in the 
economic realm. 
211 
The Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) has used their profits from 
commercial activities in the field of education. They started an educational 
movement on a global scale. 
Another factor contributing to the emergence of Fethullah Gülen was the 
debate concerning civil society in Turkey during the post-1980 period. Some 
scholars have argued that in the last two decades civil societal elements are 
gaining importance and religious pluralism has been treated as part of these 
civil societal elements. They supported the Fethullah Gülen Community 
(Cemaat) as part of civil society, and as one which contributed to the 
consolidation of democracy. 
After this brief introduction, it is necessary to examine these factors in detail. 
This inquiry helps us understand the context in which Fethullah Gülen 
emerged asa significant figure in Turkish social and political life. 
Although the Turkish state has a strict secularist stance, Islam has occupied a 
significant place in Turkish political life since the post-1980 period. Birtek and 
Toprak treat this paradox from a different perspective: "How is it in the last 
decade, while the reconstruction of Turkish modernization took important 
strides forward, the economy was radically liberalized, and a smooth transition 
to a post-coup democratic regime was almost thoroughly accomplished, Islam 
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also emerged as an important political variable in Turkish politics?"S The aim of 
this chapter is to answer the following question: why has Islam gained 
importance in Turkish political life especially during the post-1980 period 
despite the radical secularist stance of the Turkish state? 
6.1 Transformation of State Ideology 
Some scholars of Turkish politics argue that one of the important factors in 
explaining the increasing importance of Islam in Turkish politics was a major 
change in the Turkish state's attitudes towards Islam. For instance, Ziya Önis 
proposes that, following the 1980 coup, the military as part of the Republican 
elite formulated Islam as an important factor for social and political stability. 
Accordingly, they encouraged a new Constitution based on "Turkish-Islamic 
synthesis" which isa combination of nationalism and Islam, and was conceived 
as a restraint on the causes of political chaos. "Hence, rather surprisingly, Islam 
was employed by the military as an instrument for consolidating and 
institutionalizing the post-1980 regime."6 For this purpose, firstly, religious 
education in primary schools became compulsory, and secondly, the power of 
5 Faruk Birtek and Binnaz Toprak, "The Conflictual Agendas of Neo-Liberal 
Reconstruction and the Rise of Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Hazards of 
Rewriting Modernity." Praxis International13 (July 1993): 192. 
6 Ziya Önis, 'The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: the Rise of 
the W elfare Party in Perspective." Third World Quarterly 18 (1997): 750. 
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the Directorate of Religious Affairs was increased by means of increasing its 
financial resources. 7 
Similarly, Birtek and Toprak maintain that the foundation of the increasing 
importance of Islam in the last decade lay in the transformatian of state 
ideology. They formuiate this transformatian in a following manner: "Radical 
secularism as state policy, which had been a fundamental aspect of the 
republican ethos in Turkey, was replaced in the 1980s by what we shall call neo-
republicanism."B 
In the early republican period, a radical formulation of laicism was introduced 
as part of the official ideology. It was radical in so far as this formulation 
preferred state control over religious institutions rather than introducing the 
original formulation of laicism based on the separation of religious institutions 
and the state. By doing so, the Republican elite hoped to transfer religion from 
the public sphere to the private sphere, and to make religion a matter of 
individual conscience.9 
7 Ibid. 
8 Birtek and Toprak, "The Conflictual Agendas of Neo-Liberal Reconstruction," 
194. 
9 Ibid., 195. 
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The aim of the 1980 coup was to depoliticize the society so that the military elite 
could establish national unity, ideological conformity, and political stability. 
These were to be achieved by "traditionalism, religious accommodation, a sense 
of moral community."10 Birtek and Toprak call this state ideology neo-
republican ideology. Similar to Önis, they state that this neo-republican 
ideology was based on a "Turkish-Islamic synthesis." In addition, the main 
ingredient of the neo-republican ideology was the appropriation of Islamic 
discourse to state ideology. So the appropriation would tie the individual and 
the state and unite the different dasses and strata.11 
Correspondingly, Ümit Cizre Sakallioglu underlines the importance of the state 
policy towards Islam in explaining the role of Islam in Turkish political life. 
However, for Sakallioglu, the determining role of the state on Islam cannot be 
confined only to the post-1980 period. In this context, she suggests:" .. .it is the 
Turkish state, not the initiative and self-sustenance of grassroots Islam, that has 
been the most important determinant of the political role of Islam and its 
relevance in politics throughout the republic."12 
ıo Ibid., 195-196. 
ıı Ibid., 196. 
ı2 Ümit Cizre Sakallioglu, "Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction 
in Republican Turkey." International Journal of Middle East Studies 28 (1996), 231. 
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According to Sakallioglu, the Turkish state uses a double discourse towards 
Islam: ithasa rigid segregation between Islam and politics on the one hand and 
incorporates Islam into the political arena in several ways on the other.B 
During the post-1980 period, Islamic elements have been incorporated into 
official discourse. In concrete terms, religious education in primary and 
secondary schools was made compulsory in the 1982 Constitution. In addition, 
the Sufi tarikats became very influential in all fields; "their members have now 
penetrated all ranks of political society, including the parties, government, civil 
service, intelligentsia, and the business and banking worlds."14 
Consequently, she suggests that the development of the Islamist mavement 
during the post-1980 period is related to a cantext in which the state-society 
relationship has been controlled by the state. Therefore, the Islamist mavement 
has developed both to satisfy the demands of the masses and as a consequence 
of the policies of the state.ıs 
Thus we can draw the conclusion from the above discussion that the increasing 
importance of Islam in Turkish political life can be clarified by means of a 
radical change in the policies of the Turkish state towards Islam. This change 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 244. 
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can be summarized as the incorporation of Islamic elements into official 
ideology as a unifying force of the Turkish nation. The meeting of Fethullah 
Gülen, who is an influential religious leader, with leading politicians especially 
in the 1990s may be considered asa good example of the change in the State's 
attitudes towards Islam. 
6.2 Globalization 
6.2.1 Globalization Process in the Economic Realm 
Nevertheless, during the post-1980 period there have been other factors 
influencing the development of Islamist movements. Turkey, like other 
developing nations, has been affected by the globalization process both in the 
economic and cultural realm. Firstly, we will deal with the globalization process 
in the economic realm. In the last two decades, we have witnessed a process of 
neo-liberal economic restructuring all over the world. This process denotes a 
radical transfer of the significant role of the state in the economic field to 
market-oriented forces. As a result of this neo-liberal economic restructuring 
process, unemployment and inequality in ineome distribution has increased, 
but the nation-state has been incapable of providing for the needs of the people 
from the lower stratum. This has caused a vacuum in the political arena. This 
( 
15 Ibid., 245. 
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vacuum has opened a way to the emergence of political movements based on 
extreme nationalism or religious fundamentalism.16 
This general picture of the globalization process in the economic realm has been 
observed also in Turkey. In January 1980, with the help of the World Bank and 
IMF Turkey decided to adopt a new economic model based ona shift from a 
state-dominated to a market-oriented economy. This date is a turning point in 
Turkey's economy. Önis deseribes the success of this neo-liberal restructuring 
as follows: 
An average of 5%-6% real GNP growth per annum, if not outstanding, was 
high by international standards. The ability to shift from a highly inward-
oriented economy to a significant exporter of manufactures was also quite 
striking. A rosy picture can thus be drawn highlighting economic 
dynamism, rising entrepreneurship and the growing power of private 
capital, as the economy became steadily integrated into international 
markets.17 
Nonetheless, as in other countries, this neo-liberal restructuring process led to 
rising unemployment and inequality in ineome distribution, which have been 
intensified due to high inflation ratesin Turkey. Then, the failure of the nation-
state in solving these problems led to the increase in ideologkal commitment to 
religion or ethnicity. "In this way, the rise of the market-oriented competitive 
16 Önis, 'The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey," 746. 
17 Ibid., 751. 
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individualism contributed to the ideologkal appeal of Islam."18 As a result, 
because of the fragmentation in Turkish politics and the incapability of both 
center-right and center-left parties to provide solutions to the negative 
consequences of neo-liberal restructuring process, the Refah Partisi, an Islamic 
party, gained the majority of the votes in the 1995 elections. So Islamic politics 
has been incorporated into the Turkish political life during the 1990s. 
In this context, the role of the Islamic brotherhoods (tarikats) must be 
considered. The Islamic brotherhood organizations gained a significant place in 
the economic field by using the facilities of a market-oriented economic model. 
These organizations are involved in investment activity and have become one 
of the major actors in the economic field.19 
On the other hand, by means of the Islamic brotherhood networks, people from 
the lower socio-economic stratum have gained access to upward social 
mobility. Birtek and Toprak reveal the extent of these networks as follows: 
"This dimension of tarikat connections has become increasingly important in 
1s Haldun Gülalp, "A Postmodern Reaction to Dependent Modernization: The 
Social and Historical Roots of Islamic Radicalism," New Perspectives on Turkey 8 
(Fall 1992): 20. 
19 Önis, 'The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey," 758. 
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recent years for getting scholarships, establishing new businesses, holding 
positions of political power, and, for a few, building financial empires."20 
Like other Islamic brotherhood organizations, the Fethullah Gülen Community 
(Cemaat) used the facilities of market-oriented economic model and got an 
enormous power in the economic realm. The investments of the Fethullah 
Gülen Community (Cemaat) can be traced in a broad spectrum from the 
banking sector to the insurance sector. In addition, the facilities of the 
globalization process in the economic realm were also used as a means for 
integration with Central Asia. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Central 
Asian countries became independent and new markets emerged there. The 
Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) tried to capture this market and 
industrial and commercial activities were initiated there. Fethullah Gülen treats 
Central Asia as a "breath for the Turkish economy." 
Indeed the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) initiated commercial 
activities and educational facilities simultaneously in Central Asia. Therefore, as 
mentioned above, they transferred some parts of the profits they got from 
commercial activities to the educational field. 
2o Birtek and Toprak, "The Conflictual Agendas of Neo-Liberal Reconstruction," 
199-200. 
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Moreover, Fethullah Gülen underlines the significance of integration with the 
West. For him, Turkey could adopt the positive aspects of Western civilization. 
If Turkey does not integrate into the West, it willlag behind the modern times. 
However, he supports integration with the West on the condition of preserving 
Turkish national values: Turkey should adopt only the scientific and 
technologic innovations of the West. 
Gülen states that his community supported increased involvement with the 
outside world by means of inihating dialogue and a spirit of tolerance on behalf 
of world peace. This involvement has been introduced in the name of human 
progress. The Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) hope to meet with those 
people who will be Turkey's neighbours in the near future due to the 
globalizing process of the world. All the people in the world will become 
people sharing the same space by means of improved telecommunication and 
transportation systems. For this reason, the Fethullah Gülen Community 
(Cemaat) started an educational movement all over the world in the 1990s. 
Gülen' s supporters have established mo re than two thousand schools in fifty-
two countries in five continents by his encouragement. 
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6.2.2 Globalization Process in the Cultural Realm 
What was the outcome of the globalization process with respect to the cultural 
realm in Turkey? The process of globalization in the cultural realm has a 
paradoxical nature. Arjun Appadurai underlines this paradoxical nature of the 
globalization process in the following manner: "The central problem of today' s 
global interactions is the tension between cultural homogenization and cultural 
heterogenization."21 The process of globalization implies two images of culture. 
The first image is the diffusion of a particular culture all around the world, and 
other heterogeneous cultures becoming integrated into a dominant culture. 
Stuart Hall calls this dominant culture "global mass culture." The most 
important characteristics of global mass culture is its homogenizing nature, it 
absorbs everything.22 In this first image of culture, the world turns into a single 
space where there is a dominant common culture. 
The second image entails the interaction of different cultures which were 
hitherto apart. Although there are cultural integration processes throughout the 
2ı Arjun Appadurai, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural 
Economy," in Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity, ed. Mike 
Featherstone (London: Sage Publications, 1990), 295. 
22 Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity," in 
Culture, Globalization and the World-System, ed. Anthony D. King (London: 
Macmillan, 1991), 28. 
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world, pluralism becomes the determining feature of the world.23 "The 
emergence of new subjects, new genders, new ethnicities, new regions, new 
communities, hitherto excluded from the major forms of cultural 
representation, unable to locate themselves except as de-centered or subaltern, 
have acquired through struggle, sometimes in a very marginalized ways, the 
means to speak for themselves for the first time."24 Therefore, we have become 
aware of the diversity and many-sidedness of culture. That means the global 
and the local are two sides of the same coin of the globalization process. 
This same tension between cultural homogenization and cultural 
heterogenization of the globalization process can be traced in Turkey. Fuat 
Keyman puts it clearly when he says that there is a serious clash between the 
secular national identity as a source of cultural homogenization effort and the 
rise of Islam, Kurdish nationalism and the feminist movement as sources of 
pluralism (cultural heterogenization).25 According to Sakallioglu, the 
homogenizing nature of secularization can be seenin i ts definition of the na tion 
23 Mike Featherstone, Undoing Culture: Globalization Postmodernism and Identity 
(London: Sage Publications, 1995), 13. 
24 Hall, "The Local and the Global," 34. 
2s Fuat Keyman, "On the Relation Between Global Modernity and Nationalism: 
the Crisis of Hegemony and the Rise of (Islamic) Identity in Turkey." New 
Perspectives on Turkey 13 (fall 1995): 94-5. 
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"as a homogeneous, uni-ethnic (Turkish), uni-linguistic (Turkish), and uni-
sectarian (Sunni) entity."26 
As a result of the globalization process in the economic and cultural realm, the 
nation-state in both developed and developing countries has a erisis of 
governance and legitimacy. The Turkish nation-state got its share from this 
general trend. Keyman underlines this erisis as follows: " ... the post-1980 coup 
period and the neo-liberal reconstruction of the Turkish politico-economic life 
mark the increasing inability of Turkish nationalism to reproduce itself as a 
hegemonic discourse ... "27 Hence, he explains the rise of Islamic identity by 
means of the erisis of Turkish nationalism. 
As mentioned earlier, after the 1980 coup Islamic discourse was integrated into 
official ideology as a unifying force of the Turkish nation. As a consequence, 
Islamic organizations gained power both at the state and societal level. 
Although the 1980 coup had secular nationalist connotations, it created a space 
for the "marginalized and silenced identity" to declare their demands against 
the secular nationalism of the Turkish state.28 
26 Sakallioglu, "Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction," 234. 
27 Keyman, "On the Relation Between Global Modernity and Nationalism," 96. 
28 Ibid., 112-3. 
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In this context, it can be proposed that paradoxically the state elite and political 
elite during the post-1980 period created a space for the rise of the Islamic 
identity. The Turkish state has damaged one of its own foundation stones w hile 
trying to solve its legitimacy crisis. 
6.3 The Nature of Secularism in Turkey 
Although the ideal meaning of secularism is the separation of religion and the 
state, in practice we cannot see its applications in an ideal sense. In many 
countries, secularism has been applied notasa separation of religion and state 
but as a control of the religion by the state. According to Nikki R. Keddie, this 
type of application of secularism as a control of religion by state can be clearly 
seen in some non-western countries such as Turkey, the Pahlavi period of Iran, 
Tunisia, and Egypt.29 For instance, in Ataturk's Turkey, religion was putunder 
state control by controlling and limiting religious education, by outlawing 
tarikats, changing religious laws with secular laws.3° Furthermore, the Turkish 
state does not behave equally towards all religious groups since Sunni Islam is 
regarded as a state religion, and other groups are suppressed by the state. The 
Turkish version of secularism is similar to the ideal type of secularism only in 
29 Nikki R. Keddie, "Secularism and the State: Towards Clarity and Global 
Comparison." New Left Review 226 (1997): 25. 
30 Ibid., 32. 
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the sense that it removes religion from the public sphere.3ı Moreover, in all 
these countries secularism was linked to nationalism, to the modernization 
process, and the centralization of state power.32 
Keddie argues that western scholars on secularism believe that secularism is a 
product of intellectual and social movements. However, for Keddie, the 
secularization experience of Middle Eastern countries showsus that secularism 
isa phenomenon related to state and politics rather than intellectual and social 
movements.33 That means the states rather than intellectuals were the main 
initiators of secularism in Middle Eastern countries. This point is underlined by 
Nilufer Göle as follows: " Social engineering, seen asa corollary to positivism, 
became the reformist elite's model for a rational reconstruction of Turkish 
society ... Secularization itself became part of that process of social engineering 
rather than an outcome of the process of modernization and societal 
development."34 
31 Nilüfer Göle, "Secularism andIslamismin Turkey: The Making of Elites and 
Counter-Elites." Middle East Journal51 (Winter 1997): 49. 
32 Keddie, "Secularism and the State," 35. 
33 Ibid., 30. 
34 Göle, "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey," 48. 
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By means of radical secularist policies such as the closure of tarikats, the 
Kemalist elite tried to destroy the lloppressive" community structure and 
elimina te the repressive effects of community on individuals. The Kemalist elite 
as part of the "social engineering" project wanted to create a new order but old 
cultural codes and behavior patters continued to exist. This is apparent 
especially in three domains and these are, for Saribay, the reasons for the 
malfunctioning of democracy in Turkey: First, the assodation which replaced 
the community structure stili functioned as a community; second, the state 
played a significant role as the top and active unit of this community; finally, 
the mentality of the 11 social engineering" project, characteristic of the Ottoman 
reformists, continuedin the minds of the Kemalist elite.35 
The first and second points will be discussed below. Here we will deal with the 
third po int in detail. The Ottoman reformists adopted a 11 social engineering" 
project in order to westernize the Ottoman Empire and save it from decline. 
This outlook, inherited by the Kemalist elite, was used to construct a republican 
regime in place of a monarchical one. If we do not have a viable democracy 
today, it is related, according to Saribay, to Kemalist elite's treatment of 
republic as a criterion of progress.36 
35 Ali Yasar Saribay, Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve Islam (Istanbul: Iletisim 
Yayinlari, 1994), 178-9. 
36 Ibid., 169. 
227 
Those Kemalist elitelike Ottoman reformists saw the state as an arenain which 
only the elite can play a role. This led to the alienation of the state from society, 
and the establishment of unquestioned authority of the elite in social and 
political life. The republican state urged basic principles for general harmony 
for society; it was transformed by elites into the most sacred and exalted value. 
Asa consequence of the "social engineering" project, the Kemalist elite began to 
analyze everything from the point of view of i ts compatibility with the state.37 
However, this type of secularization was not necessarily liberal and democratic. 
In Middle Eastern countries, not all liberal intellectuals were secularist. For 
instance, in the Ottoman Empire, the first group of intellectuals, i. e., Young 
Ottomans, criticized the over-centralization of the state and demanded more 
democratic and decentralized structures, but they were not true secularists.38 In 
Republican Turkey secularism is conceived as a prerequisite of the 
westernization process rather than democratization. Secularism becomes a tool 
for control of the public sphere by the state in Turkey. This control was rigid in 
the early republican period but it has softened since 1950.39 This attitude of 
abandoning democracy in the name of secularism stili continues in Turkey. 
Today secularism implies a particular belief rather than a neutral principle, 
37 Ibid., 169-170. 
38 Keddie, "Secularism and the State,", 30. 
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defense of a way of life rather than a way of government. It is defined as 
independent from democracy. Even secularism is usedas preparing a ground 
for making concessions from democracy.4o 
However, contrary to the Turkish version of secularism, secularism can be 
defined as a prerequisite of democracy. Secularism makes politics free from 
religion, and makes politics an autonomous sphere. In addition, secularism 
forms the basis of intellectual pluralism. An administration mentality should 
not be based on any transcendent authority, and should not be limited by 
human will so that different political ideologies and movements can emerge. 
For this reason, there is a direct relationship between secularism and 
democracy. However, in Muslim countries, there is a relationship between 
secularism and democracy in an opposite manner: Secularism becomes a 
practice of modernist but authoritarian regimes.41 
The basis of totalitarian regimes is the monist ideology which claims that it 
represents the absolute truth. Secularism, not based on people's sovereignty, 
39 Göle, "Secularism andIslamismin Turkey," 49. 
40 Nilüfer Göle, "Islami Dokunulmazlar, Laikler ve Radikal Demokratlar," 
Türkiye Günlügü 27 (Mart-Nisan 1994): 15. 
41 Ibid. 
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treats itself as the absolute truth so that it emerges as an alternative religion. 
This is the case existing in Turkey.42 
6.4 Debate on Civil Society During the 1990s 
During the last two decades in Turkey, there are both optimistic views and 
pessimistic views on the development of democracy and civil society. One of 
the leading figures on the optimistic side is Nilufer Göle. She argues that 
democracy has been consolidated in Turkey; "it has been internalizedas aset of 
shared values by Turks and has become the norm of political behavior."43 In the 
last two decades, civil societal organizations have gained importance in Turkey 
due to the introduction of market-oriented economy and privatization of the 
mass media. As a result, religious and ethnic identity, national unity, 
secularism, and pluralism have become publicly debated topics.44 So the post-
1980s signifies a period in which the development and autonomization of civil 
society from the state have been debated frequently. 
Göle lists the basic dimensions of autonomization of civil society as follows: the 
expansion of liberal, Muslim, and leftist movements. By means of liberal 
42 Ibid., 16. 
43 Göle, "Secularism andIslamismin Turkey," 47. 
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discourse the political and economic spheres are separated. Although there is 
not a genuine market-oriented economy, people have an entrepreneurial spirit 
so that they try to create an economic space independent from the state. This 
makes explicit the need for decentralization of state power.45 
Another element of a developing civil society, according to Göle, are the 
Islamicist movements. She states that we would be mistaken, if we consider 
'-
Islamicist movements as exclusively anti-modernist. They have created a space 
for political participation by new social groups who remained marginal and 
silenced until the 1980s. For Göle, the liberal movement represents the 
economic dimension of the developing civil society, the Islamicist movements 
designate the cultural dimension.46 
The leftist movements in the last two decades, for Göle, represent another 
dimension of developing civil society in the sense that their world-views are 
less u topian and their protests are pragmatic. Likewise, "other social 
movements-such as those of the ecologists and the feminists as well as 
44 Ibid. 
45 Nilüfer Göle, "Toward an Autonomization of Politics and Civil Society in 
Turkey," in Politics in the Third Turkish Republic, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet 
Evin (Boulder, San Fransisco, Oxfrod: Westview Press, 1994), 218. 
46 Ibid. 
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homosexuals and transsexuals-are similar in nature and further contributed to 
the emergence of truly diverse identities in civil society."47 
According t.o Göle, therefore, the post-1980 periodisa turning point in Turkish 
political life. As a result of increasing autonomization of civil societal 
organizations, an autonomous societal sphere has developed and the main unit 
has become society rather than the state.48 
Similar to Göle, Kevin Robins also has an optimistic point of view on the 
development of civil society during the post-1980 period in Turkey. He argues 
that although the Ottoman Empire had a mosaic like cultural structure, 
characterized by ethnic, linguistic, and religious pluralism, the Turkish state 
during its formative years was opposed to such pluralism of identity. The 
diversity of identities was considered as an impediment to the establishment of 
a national community and cansensus by republican elites in the early 
republican period. So the new government of the republican regime attempted 
to create cultural homogenization.49 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 221-2. 
49 Kevin Robins, "Interrupting Identities: Turkey /Europe," in Questions of 
Cultural Identity, ed. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (London: Sage Publications, 
1996), 69. 
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As part of this cultural homogenization project religious attachment was also 
treated as a hazard to modernization and the nationalization process initiated 
by the republican elites in Turkey. However, the new civil world view could 
not fulfill the vacuum created by attacking religious symbolism and meaning. 
In this context, Richard Tapper argues that Kemalist ideology "was no 
alternative to Islam in providing identity and organizing principles of life. At 
the public level, it was no substitute for the divine laws of Islam; at the 
individual level, it could not meet intellectual needs for an ethics and an 
eschatology, and its ideology and values were inadequate, shallow and thin."SO 
During the formative years of the republican regime there was no place for 
ethnic, religious, social and political differences which are necessary conditions 
of a democratic regime. 
Nevertheless, after the 1980 military coup Islamic discourse has been used by 
state elites to create a national unity. However, there have been some changes 
in societal level during the last two decades. W e have witnessed the increase in 
Islamic publications, the realization of ethnic heterogeneity, and references to 
the Ottoman Empire which are expressing themselves against official ideology. 
In this regard, Robins maintains that " we may see these developments in terms 
of the return of the elements that were repressed in the Kemalist culture 
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(religion, ethnic diversity, the imperial heritage) ... The 'other' Turkey is making 
its declaration of independence, making its reality felt, manifesting the 
complexity of i ts social being ... "51 
For Robins, there are both internal and external factors contributing to the 
development of civil society in Turkey during the post-1980 period. The 
external factors can be listed as follows: the globalization of market economy, 
the growth of global media and communications, the mobility of people across 
the world due to tourism and migration, and finally the end of the Cold W ar. 
An important internal factor is the neo-liberal restructuring of Turkish economy 
after the 1980 coup. Therefore, all these developments have loosened the 
rigidities of cultural and political identity, and make apparent the realities of 
Turkey which encouraged the development of civil society.52 
During the post-1980 period, there occurred rising demands from religious 
groups and recognition for ethnic differences. Ethnic differences have been 
recognized by many people. In addition, Islam has emerged as an important 
element in Turkish cultural life and its importance as being an element of 
50 Richard Tapper, "Introduction," in Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics 
and Literature ina SeeuZar State, ed. Richard Tapper (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), 
7, quoted in Robins, "Interrupting Identities," 69-70. 
51 Robins, "Interrupting Identities," 72. 
52 Ibid., 73-4. 
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Turkish culture has been recognized. Social and cultural divisions have been 
explicit in Turkish life. Robins puts this matter in a following manner:" The real 
Turkey made its presence felt. These people built their sprawling and illegal 
squatter settlements (gecekondu), constructed their mosques, and developed a 
culture which sustained their village customs and way of life."53 
As a result, Robins maintains that we have witnessed the development of civil 
society in Turkey during the post-1980 period. This has occurred by means of 
the "return of the repressed" elements of Turkish culture. So Turkish society 
has been aware of the different identities. Now it is necessary to develop the 
feelings of mutual recognition. 
Some scholars are not so optimistic as Göle and Robins on the notion of 
consolidation of democracy and development of civil society during the post-
1980 period. Yael Navaro-Yasin argues that civil society became a discourse 
rather than a subject in the 1980s. Following the 1980 coup, it was apparent that 
the state could no longer survive by only repressive measures. There was a 
need for a new place which seems independent of the state and the notion of 
"civil society" was the most appropriate form of this image.54It should be 
53 Ibid., 75. 
54 Yael Navaro-Yasin, "Bir Iktidar Söylemi Olarak 'Sivil Toplum'," Birikim 105-
106 (Ocak-Subat 1998): 58-9. 
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demonstrated that society supports "freely" the official ideology. According to 
Navaro-Yasin, there was not a development in the field of civil society but 
rather in the state's adoption of a civil image in the 1980s. Hereafter, official 
ideology was to be produced in the field of "civil society" and this was to be 
called "democracy."55 
Navaro-Yasin maintains that scholars who support the thesis that civil society 
was developed in Turkey during the 1980s, call only some of the social 
organizations "civil society": feminist movements, movements demanding the 
rights of Kurdish minority, arabesk culture of squatter housing, 
environmentalists, supporters of human rights, and expressian of different 
sexual preferences. Those scholars deal with and theorized only about social 
organizations developed in the last two decades. Navaro-Yasin wonders 
whether there are some identity expressions which could not have been voiced 
in this plural environment.56 
Asa result Navaro-Yasin argues that in the 1980s the societal sphere turned into 
a sphere in which statism was produced. It is not clear where the lines of 
"society" ends and where the lines of "state" starts. The relationship between 
55 Ibid., 59. 
56 Ibid., 60. 
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"state" and "society" become intertwined, there is even no need of the two 
analytical concepts.57 
Ersin Kalaycioglu, like Navaro-Yasin, is pessimistic about the development of 
civil society in Turkey during the post-1980 period. Kalaycioglu accepts the 
definition of civil society by Ilkay Sunar, who defines civil society as an 
intermediate domain between the state and the individual- a domain in which 
deliberation and assodation take place without constraint and coercion.ss 
Public bureaucracy in Turkey operated on the basis of political loyalty, orders 
became more important than written rule during the post-1980 period. 
Traditional orientations have become dominant in modern political structures. 
Appointments and promotions are made on the basis of tarikat and hemsehrilik 
networks and nepotism. This period is a period of religiousness- Islamization; 
tarikats are accepted and diffused on a wider scale. During the last two decades 
religious organizations and publications, providing political legitimacy, have 
become dominant in Turkish cultural and political discourse.59 
57 Ibid. 
58 Taken from Ilkay Sunar, "Civil Society and Islam," ('Civil Society' adli Isveç 
Arastirma Enstitüsü'nce 28-30 Ekim 1996' da düzenlenen konferansin tebligi), 1 
in Ersin Kalaycioglu, "Sivil Toplum ve Neopatrimonyal Siyaset," in 
Küresellesme, Sivil Toplum ve Islam, ed. Fuat Keyman and Ali Yasar Saribay 
(Ankara: Vadi Yayinlari, 1998), 112. 
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Kalaycioglu defines the way of government of the post-1980 period as neo-
patrimonialism, which means the superiority of traditional and primordial 
values in modern political structures. This type of neo-patrimonialism could be 
developed only in a setting where the civil society is weak, and the state has 
unlimited power.60 
Then Kalaycioglu looks at the rate of membership in associations in Turkey as 
an indicator of the development of civil society. He finds that only 10% of the 
population above eighteen years old are members of any voluntary 
associations. If we take the ra te of membership in voluntary associations, and if 
we compare this rate with the rate of membership in associations in developed 
countries, we can surmise that Turkey has a weak civil society.61 
Another indicator of strong civil society, for Kalaycioglu, is the existence of the 
rule of law and independent judiciary. W e can not speak about the existence of 
an independent and effective judiciary in Turkey. This also proves the existence 
of a weak civil society in Turkey.6z 
59 Ibid., 120-1. 
60 Ibid., 121-2. 
61 Ibid., 127. 
62 Ibid., 130-1. 
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As a result, according to Kalaycioglu, neo-patrimonial political culture is a main 
impediment to the development of a civil society in Turkey. In this cultural 
context, community membership can increase but individual development 
cannot be supported. Neo-patrimonial culture will tend to create a weak civil 
society anda powerful state as long as constitutional and legal designs permit.63 
Ali Y asar Saribay is also not so optimistic about the development of civil society 
and about the relationship between democracy and civil society in Turkey. He 
adopts the definition of civil society from Larry Diamond. Accordingly, civil 
society is defined as organized social life between the state and private sphere 
that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from 
the state. These organizations are based on legal order and shared values which 
are the guarantor of freedoms and autonomies. This both limits the state power 
and legitimates it since it is based on legal order. Therefore, civil society 
necessitates autonomy from the state, but does not necessitate alienation from 
it. 64 
63 Ibid., 133. 
64 Qouted from Larry Diamond, "Toward Democratic Consolidation," Journal of 
Democracy. Vol.S, no.3, 1994, 5, in Ali Yasar Saribay, "Turkiye'de Demokrasi ve 
Sivil Toplum," in Kuresellesme, Sivil Toplum ve Islam, ed. Fuat Keyman and Ali 
Yasar Saribay (Ankara: Vadi Yayinlari, 1998), 90. 
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In this sense, civil society has a link with the state but it does not try to capture 
the power of the state. Hence, the establishment of a democratic relationship 
between civil society and the state depends on the condition that any segment 
of society does not ineline to become the dominant power. In civil society no 
single group has the right to represent the interests of all the groups. This is the 
guarantee of protecting the individuals from suppression by the community in 
the name of nation, class or a group. Accordingly, the relative political 
freedoms of plural structures of civil society are based on conflict, not on 
harmony. The sine qua non of this is that political freedoms must be formed not 
on the basis of community, but on the basis of the individual because 
community, seeking for harmony in its structure, tends towards acting in the 
name of the whole. Contrarily, the individual gives primacy to freedom, and 
tries to experience freedom by refusing every type of harmony. For this reason, 
civil society can contribute to the consolidation of democracy when political 
freedoms are provided on the individual basis; in the end, civil society must 
oppose the communities which reject differences and plurality.65 
Then, Saribay explains the post-1980 period with reference to the notion of civil 
society. The aim of the 1980 coup was to depoliticize Turkish society. For this 
reason, the state controlled every field of society in a totalHarian manner. 
However, following the 1983 general elections, the role of the state was 
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discussed by the main political trends. The result of this discussion was that: the 
main problem of non-western countries is the absence of structures and 
mechanisms which can protect the individual from the oppression of the state, 
i.e., the absence of civil society. 
Thus, the main political trends supposed that the reestablishment of democracy 
in Turkey can be possible by the creation of civil society. "Therefore, almost 
every political trend either 'leftist' or 'rightist,' which is faced with unjust 
treatments of the military regime, becomes an ardent supporter of civil society, 
and are attached to the notion of civil society in a magical fashion."66 As a 
result, the notion of civil society itself gained importance rather than the 
social/political reality depicted by it and there emerged a new political attitude 
which we can call "sivil toplumculuk." Nonetheless, this attitude was made 
even harder by the rigid relationship between civil society and the state; 
democracy was identified with "society," and it turned into a panacea for all 
problems.67 
During the post-1980 period, some social movements were considered as a 
signal of civil society. The most important of these movements are the Islamİst 
65 Saribay, "Türkiye' de Demokrasi ve Sivil Toplum," 90-3. 
66 Ibid., 95. 
67 Ibid., 95-6. 
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movements and Kurdish nationalism. At first glance this perception seems true 
since both Islamist movements and Kurdish nationalism may fit the axis of 
state-community contradiction which has been the dominant social structure in 
Ottoman-Turkey. However, when we analyze this carefully, we can argue that 
they are contradictory to the notion of civil society despite their refusal of 
hegemonic state structure.68 
When we look at Islamist movements closely, it is seen that they treat Islam as a 
way of life surraunding all spheres of life. This comprehensive nature of Islam 
is related to the notion of ümmet. In this structure everybody, connected to each 
other by means of religious bonds, is equal, and is a member of a group which 
is not based on rank differences. In this regard, Islam based on the monolithic 
community structure, on the one hand, symbolizes a resistance to the 
hegemonic state; on the other hand, it defines the basis of an alternative sacred 
state by means of this type of community structure. In the last instance, Islam 
tries to establish an alternative state hegemony by denying individual 
autonomy.69 
68 Saribay, Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve Islam. 131. 
69 Ibid., 131-2. 
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Saribay showsus the results of empirical research on political culture in Turkey. 
70 When Turkey is compared with other countries, it is found that there is a 
serious intolerant setting; the level of trust between individuals is very low; 
there is no confidence in social and political institutions; only the level of 
interest in politics functions as contributing to the functioning of democracy in 
Turkey.71 Connected with these results, Saribay argues that the existence or 
non-existence of tolerant behavior towards others is vital for civil society since 
civil society implies a tolerant attitude towards others. Therefore, to treat, 
according to Saribay, civil society as the sum of institutions comprising civil 
society means undermining its normative level. The important thing is the 
existence of a cultural setting formed by definite attitudes and values, not the 
existence of those institutions comprising civil society.n 
One important characteristic of political culture in Turkey is the insignificance 
of the individual. The most significant factor determining the existence of the 
individual is membership ina community. Community is an entity which binds 
individuals by means of a bond of belongingness and sets the actions of the 
70 This research was heldin 44 countries between 1990 and 1991 by Michigan 
University. 
71 The reuslts of this research are taken from Ersin Kalaycioglu, "Türkiye' de 
Siyasal Kültür ve Demokrasi," in Türkiye' de Demokratik Siyasal Kültür (Ankara: 
Türk Demokrasi Vakfi, 1995), in Saribay, "Türkiye'de Demokrasi ve Sivil 
Toplum," 97-8. 
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individual by its moral obligations on individuals. For this reason, it is very 
difficult for an individual to have autonomy and personality independent of a 
community. So the community suppresses the development of personal 
morality by individuals. In Turkey there are two sources which define the 
moral obligations of individuals towards other people; these are state and 
Islam. Neither state nor Islam encourages the development of personality, 
autonomy, and personal morality by individuals because their aim is to 
establish a harmony and tevhid denying autonomy of individual, differences, 
and personal morality.73 
When we observe Turkey from this standpoint, we see that the main element of 
Turkish culture is Islam which is considered an obstacle to the development of 
civil society. As it was mentioned above, the main characteristic of civil society 
is its tolerance of differences but in Islam society is a reflection of divine unity, 
i.e., tevhid. The focus in Islam is on ümmet which gathers all believers in an 
egalitarian manner. Ümmet is above all differences; and rejects all social classes, 
national, ethnic and tribal differences.74 
72 Saribay, "Türkiye' de Demokrasi ve Sivil Toplum," 100. 
73 Saribay, Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve Islam. 154. 
74 Ibid.,11. 
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Anather impediment to the development of civil society and democratic 
political culture is the existence of a "strong state tradition." As the Ottoman 
state had been estranged from society, a cyclical tradition emerged: As the state 
became estranged from society it became sacred, and as the state became sacred 
it became estranged from society.75 
Saribay explains this situation by giving reference to the Gemeinschaft 
(community)/Gesellschaft (association) distinction of Tonnies. The difference 
between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (association) is that 
"community is an entity remaining united despite all divisive factors, an 
assodation is an entity remaining divided in spite of all uniting factors." In 
addition, the moralside of the community is very strong; love, loyalty, honor, 
and friendship are defining features of community. Hence, community implies 
personal closeness, deep emotionalism, moral devotion, social cohesion, and 
continuity in time.76 
Therefore, we can refer to the defining features of community when analyzing 
the state structure in Turkey. In Turkey people love the state, people become 
75 Ibid., 157. 
76 R. A. Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition (London, 1980), 75-7, quoted in Saribay, 
Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve Islam. 158-9. 
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loyal to the state, people give much more emphasis to the honor of the state, 
some people become hostile to the state.77 
This gemeinschaftlich nature of the Ottoman state has continued during the 
republican era. In this context, this gemeinschaftlich nature of the state in Turkey 
is an obstacle to the consolidation of democracy. In order to have a viable 
democracy we should have a state as an institution rather than as a community. 
The institution of a state indicates a structure consisting of established shared 
values determined on the basis of defined organizations and methods. The law 
frames this structure, limits the power of the state, determines the sanction of 
abusing state power, and guarantees alternative power centers. Thus, the state 
will be based on legitimate ground. 
Nonetheless, because the community of state rises on the ground of unity 
(tevhid), it defines the relationship between its members and it asa relationship 
based on the existence of a moral authority and of disciples subjected to this 
authority. Therefore, it demands insistently the moral personal affinity of its 
members; it gets this affinity by means of its power so that it legitimates itself. 
The democratization process, argues Saribay, consists of the transition from the 
community of state to the institution of state.78 
77 Saribay, Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve Islam. 159. 
246 
Then, Saribay delineates the relationship and the tension between 
postmodernity, civil society and Islam. Postmodernity implies the 
differentiation and fragmentation in the domains of values. This characteristic 
of postmodernity, for Saribay, invites us to make a connection between 
postmodernity, civil society and Islam. First of all, the sine qua non of civil 
society is differentiation and fragmentation, and so the division of power. In 
this sense, civil society embraces the defining features of postmodernity. 
Secondly, the basis of civil society lies in the struggle for religious freedom. This 
shows us that civil society comprises all religious freedoms, including the 
Islamic one. Saribay demonstrates the relationship between postmodernity, 
civil society and Islam as follows: "everybody has the right to make their life 
style a culture (postmodernity), this willingly or unwillingly makes necessary a 
pluralist structure (civil society); like other life style religion (Islam specifically) 
as part of this plurality and as having right to make its life style a culture 
legitimizes itself in civil society."79 
According to Saribay, postmodernity and civil society are harmonious with 
each other in the sense that they deny the deminance of mÖnism, and so justify 
pluralism and differentiation. However, their relationship with Islam is not the 
same in nature: Although Islam finds a place in both postmodernity and civil 
78 Ibid., 162-3. 
79 Saribay, Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve Islam. ll. 
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society due to their plural character, it will use this place, in the last instance, to 
eliminate those pluralities since it founded on tevhid. In this sense, the process 
evolving from mÖnism to pluralism turns into an opposite directian by 
emphasizing mÖnism (tevhid). Consequently, Islam presents itself as an 
alternative to postmodernity and civil society which legitimizes it as a way of 
life.8o 
Saribay manifests the fault of postmodernity in its treatment of Islam. The main 
feature of postmodernity is that it enables it to "return to religion". The urban 
postmodern life style has led to the de-centering of the subject. The most 
important result of this process is the generation of communal feeling. This 
phenomenon of community makes religion functional for postmodernity. Like 
religion, postmodernity also gives special emphasis to the notian of 
community. However, the community emphasized by religion is not an 
"imagined community" as the postmodern communities. The religious 
communities have a cultural structure, outstanding historical, hierarchical 
symbols and values. 81 
The modernization thesis suggested the decline of religious belief and practices 
by means of the secularization process. However, despite its refusal of this 
80 Ibid. 
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modernization thesis, postmodernizm does not regard the "religious revival" as 
a process of reversal of the secularization process. Rather postmodernism 
regards religion as a symbolic element of a collage-like unifying factor of a 
fragmented cultural structure. Nonetheless, here postmodernity misses a point 
that religion isitselfa culture; it isa culture which does not need a collage-like 
unifying factor. In the last instance, religion will tend to present itself as an 
alternative to postmodernism.82 
Civil society should be understood as autonomization of plural societal 
structures from the state, and in this sense as a creation of unity based on a 
division of power. In this regard civil society signifies a dialectkal unity 
comprising contrasts rather than an absolute reality.83 However, being a part of 
civil society does not mean by itself being a democrat, and being an alternative 
to state authority, but it means a power center similar to the state.84 Therefore, 
these autonomous structures within civil society can use their power against 
each otherina despotic manner as well as ina democratic way.85 
81 Ibid., 90-2. 
82 Ibid., 93-4. 
83 Ibid., 16. 
84 Ibid., 127. 
85 Ibid., 16. 
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Saribay proposes some measures to prevent the authoritarian tendendes of civil 
societal organizations. He lists the elements of civil society as plurality, 
publicity, privacy, and legality. For Saribay, the possibility of establishing a 
democratic relationship between civil society and state depends on not being a 
dominant power of any societal strata; there should be no need for guidance by 
any dominant ideology. On the other hand, democracy can be accepted as 
"good" by everybody only by means of establishment of a sociality without a 
dominant ideology.86 In this context, for civil societal organizations; plurality 
defines autonomy against each other; publicity defines responsibility against 
each other; privacy defines individualism against each other; legality 
determines the general framework in which they will be controlledP 
As a result, if the establishment of civil society is based on differences, it is 
inevitable to deny the dominance of any ideology. This is not only the sine qua 
non of democracy, it also determines the line of responsibility of the state 
towards civil society and responsibilities of civil societal organizations towards 
each other. The ethic of democracy appears paraHel to the manifestation· of this 
line. The blurring of this line will lead to the rise of despotism.88 
86 Saribay, "Türkiye'de Demokrasi ve Sivil Toplum," 108. 
87 Saribay, Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve Islam. 141. 
88 lbid., 143. 
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According to Fuat Keyman, in order to base the relationship between civil 
society and the state on a democratic organizational basis, we should have a 
democratic political culture. This type of political culture should have two main 
features . First of all, political culture should not consider democracy as a 
description of a system; instead it should be regarded as a process. There is not 
an end point to the democratization process. By means of this feature 
democracy is differentiated from both authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. 
Secondly, the relationship between identity and difference should be 
recognized. 89 
Saribay tries to indicate the relationship between Islam and civil society with 
respect to the notion of democracy by using the distinction between elitist and 
populist Islam.90 Elitist Islam has been an affair of urban scholars. These 
scholars are picked up mainly among trade bourgeoisie and they combine 
science and trade. They have middle class values. Elitist Islam is scriptualist. 
However, populist Islam is not bound by rules, rather it is sentimental. Populist 
Islam does not give primacy to knowledge based on books, rather it gives 
89 E. Fuat Keyman, "Globallesme ve Türkiye: Radikal Demokrasi Olasiligi," in 
Küresellesme, Sivil Toplum ve Islam, ed. E. Fuat Keyman and Ali Yasar Saribay 
(Ankara: Vadi Yayinlari, 1998), 53. 
90 Saribay maintains that this distinction was made as the distinction between 
high Islam and low Islam firstly by Ernest Geliner in Postmodernism, Reason and 
Religion. (London, 1992). Saribay, Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve Islam. 190. 
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special emphasis to cults and so membership in a tarikat gains much more 
importance in populist Islam.91 
For Saribay, this distinction of elitist and populist Islam can be incorporated in 
another distinction in Turkey. The Islamists in Turkey can be grouped in two 
categories: 1) those who are members of a political formation, and 2) those who 
prefer organizing outside any political formation. The first group can be 
defined as elitist Islam, and second group can be defined as populist Islam.92 
The examples of first group are religious political parties such as the Refah 
Partisi.93 Some social movements, regarding Islam as a culture and trying to 
reconstruct everyday life, can be considered as examples of the second group, 
i.e., populist Islam. The difference between political Islam and Islamasa social 
movement is that political Islam tries to get state power while Islamasa social 
movement aims at autonomization from the state. In this sense populist Islam is 
more functional for the establishment of civil society since it does not try to 
capture state power.94 
91 Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion, ll, quoted in 
Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve Islam. 190. 
92 Saribay, Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve Islam. 191. 
Saribay, 
93 The Refah Partisi was closed down on the ground that it was trying to 
establish an Islamic state by the Constitutional Court on January 1998. And the 
Virtue (Fazilet) Party was established immediately as a continuation of the 
W elfare Party. 
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Jenny B. White has a different perspective on the notion of civil society in 
Turkey. She argues that there exists a civil society in Turkey but ina different 
sense of the notion: "In urban Turkey, voluntary associations, grass-roots 
protest actions and other forms of civic activities often are organized on the 
basis of mutual trust and interpersonal obligation, rather than on an individual, 
contractual membership basis."95 In this sense, mutual trust and reciprocity are 
the characterizing features of the community life in Turkey. 
In its ideal form, civil society should not be based on religious ethics, on kin or 
dan relationship, nor on regional identities. According to the ideal definition of 
civil society, there must be political rights and property rights in order to have a 
genuine civil society. In this sense, the ideal definition of civil society cannot 
explain societies in which the social and economic order is based on religion, 
tribe, ethnicity, or community. So the notion of civil society has not the 
explaining force for non-western countries.96 
For White, some of the associations in Turkey do not fit to the ideal definition of 
civil society. "In Turkey, a wide array of popular movements can be found in 
94 Saribay, Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve Islam. 191-3. 
95 Jenny B. White, "Civic Culture and Islam in Urban Turkey/' in Civil Society: 
Challenging Western Models, ed. Chriss Hann and Elizabeth Dunn (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1996), 143. 
96 Ibid., 147. 
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working-class communities. Some, like regional self-help and community 
charity groups, are officially registered and long- standing; others seem more 
ephemeral and oriented toward specific goals; for instance, motivating the local 
municipal governments to carry out infrastructural improvements."97 
These voluntary activities and associations are successful in reaching their 
goals. White explains the reason for their success by their being informal 
organizations, based on already existing mutual trust and reciprocity. For 
White these informal activities are very important inthesense that people are 
learning citizenship skills through these activities.9B "Despite their short life 
span and limited goals, such associations have a strong foundation in the 
community ties from which they blossom and they may form a basis for 
further, more formally organized, political action."99 
According to White, civil society should not be defined only on the basis of the 
existence of formal organizations. Voluntary associations can be formed on the 
basis of shared experience, trust and reciprocity, and they can mobilize political 
action among friends and neighbors as in the case of Turkey. Therefore, 
democracy, which is considered as the product of Western culture and history, 
97 Ibid., 148. 
98 Ibid., 148-151. 
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can be established in non-western countries if there exists a demecratic political 
culture.100 This means that we should deal with the substance rather than the 
form. 
As a result, it can be argued that there is a lack of demecratic political culture in 
Turkey. Perhaps it is the lack of demecratic political culture that anticipates the 
conclusion of this thesis. The following chapter will take into account the lack of 
demecratic political culture in answering the question of whether the Fethullah 
Gülen Community (Cemaat) may be considered as part of civil societal 
organization. 
99 Ibid., 152. 
100 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
During the last two decades, we have witnessed a global trend towards 
democratization as well as the revival of the terms of "democracy" and "civil 
society" throughout the world, ranging from the most developed countries to 
developing ones. In developed countries, the ways of improving the existing 
conditions of democracy have always been at stake where the development of 
civil society was taken into account as a precondition for democratization. Like 
wise, civil society was also viewed in developing countries as a panacea for all 
problems of the transition from absolutist to democratic regimes. For instance, in 
Eastern Europe after the collapse of sodalist regimes, both social scientists and 
politicians began to investigate the ways of establishing civil society as a 
necessary condition for the consolidation of democracy in their countries. In 
Southeast Asian countries, after the rapid economic development under 
authoritarian regimes, transition to democracy has become a core concept among 
leading social scientists and politicians. Also in Middle Eastern countries, 
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political leaders and leading social scientists have begun to address the matter of 
transition to democracy. 
In this context, social scientists have investigated the compatibility of Islam and 
democracy. They have also tried to answer the question of whether civil society 
can exist in Muslim countries and proposed that Muslim religious groups may be 
defined as civil societal organizations. 
During the last two decades, these questions have been frequently addressed 
also in Turkey. Although Turkey has been treated by social scientists as the only 
Muslim country with democratic credentials, there has been a discussion of 
compatibility of Islam and democracy in Turkey. Some scholars insisted on the 
fact that Islam and democracy can coexist. However, "the justifiable concern of 
both the secular elites and the western world is the possible hidden agenda of 
Islamist politics, that they might use democracy for their own ends to implement 
an Islamic state and thus hijack democracy."1 For this reason, it is necessary to 
examine whether religious communities can be considered as civil societal 
organizations and whether they are functional for the consolidation of 
democracy in Turkey. These questions have not been acidressed fully in 
1 Nilüfer Göle, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of 
Turkey," in Civil Society in the Middle East, Vol. 2, ed. Augustus Richard Norton 
(Leiden, New York and Koln: E.J. Brill, 1996), 18. 
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academic circles. In addition, there is no consensus on the definition or notion of 
civil society in Turkey. 
The main objective of this thesis has been to explore the relationship between 
religious communities and civil society. In doing so, following questions were 
posed: To what extent do the activities of religious communities contribute to the 
pluralism of civil society and the democratization attempts of Turkey? And what 
is the distinctive feature in Turkey of the relationship between the state, on the 
one hand, and religious sects and communities, on the other? 
In the second chapter, firstly, the Hegelian notion of civil society and then the 
contemporary debates on civil society were analyzed. In that context, different 
definitions of civil societal organizations have been presented. As a result, it has 
been observed that religious groups are considered as civil societal organizations 
according to the various definitions of civil society reviewed. The central 
question of this thesis, whether religious communities in Turkey can be 
considered as part of civil society, has been investigated by examining, as a case 
study, the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat), a branch of Nurculuk and, at 
the same time, the most influential community of modern Turkey. 
The cultural and historical background influencing political culture as well as the 
pattern of social organization was considered an important part of the problem 
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under investigation. In the third chapter, therefore, the patrimonial nature of the 
Ottoman state was discusses with a view to shedding light on the question of 
whether civil societal elements existed in the Ottoman Empire. Secondly, the 
issue of which organizations within the Ottoman system resembled civil societal 
ones was taken. In this context, the nature of the guilds and Ahilik were 
explained as were the characteristics of tarikats and the nature of the relationship 
between tarikats and the Ottoman state. A brief description of the establishment 
of the Ottoman state was introduced to provide information on the origins and 
background of social organization in the Ottoman Empire. After examining these 
organizations, it was concluded that there were no civil societal organizations in 
the real sense of the word in the Ottoman Empire. As demonstrated throughout 
the third chapter, none of the guilds, Ahi organizations and tarikats had full 
autonomy from state authority. The elected leaders of both the guilds and Ahi 
organizations had to be approved by the Ottoman state. On the other hand, the 
relationship between tarikats and the Ottoman state was not a stable and static 
one, but a dynamic relationship. Moreover, the attitude of the Ottoman state 
towards tarikats changed in accordance with the changing political and social 
conditions. The Ottoman statesmen did not even refrain from executing tarikat 
leaders when they thought these leaders acted in contradiction to the interests of 
the state. In conclusion, it can be proposed that although there existed some 
organizations between state and society in the Ottoman Empire, they could not 
be defined as civil societal organizations in the ideal sense. 
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The fourth chapter examined the social and political context in which 
Bediüzzaman Said Nursi and Nurculuk flourished. The first issue was the 
Ottoman state elites' modernization attempts to save the Empire from decline. 
Then the basic premises of the Islamist movements that appeared in the 
nineteenth century as a reaction to the unsuccessful modernization attempts of 
Ottoman statesman were presented. The nature of Islamist movements was 
deseribed since Islamism constituted the background of the views of 
Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, the founder of Nurculuk. Second, the biographical 
information about him was presented, since that would give the reader an idea 
about his educational formatian and ideologkal appeal. After presenting his 
biography, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi's views on freedom, constitutionalism, 
secularism, the notion of state and opposition were examined because of their 
relevance to the main concern of this thesis. In sum, Nurculuk was evaluated not 
asa tarikat, but a religious community. 
In the fifth chapter, a short biography of Fethullah Gülen was presented. Then 
his views that are relevant to the notion of civil society were presented, with a 
particular emphasis on the issues of tolerance, democracy, consensus, 
consultation, compromise, the notian of the state, and education. In the second 
seetion of this chapter, evaluations of the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) 
by leading social scientists were reviewed. Also included in the fifth chapter is 
the summary of criticisms directed towards the Fethullah Gülen Community 
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(Cemaat). The question of whether or not the Fethullah Gülen Community 
(Cemaat) can be considered as part of civil societal organizations in Turkey was 
addressed in this concluding chapter. 
In the sixth chapter, the question addressed regarding factors which contributed 
to the emergence of the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) as an important 
figure in social and political life in 1990s. These factors are the transformation of 
state ideology, globalization process in economic and cultural realms, and the 
debate on civil society in Turkey during the post-1980 period. 
As for the question of whether the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) can be 
considered to be civil societal organization; Fethullah Gülen Community 
(Cemaat) will be assessed by adapting Larry Diamond's definition of civil society 
as "the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) 
self-supporting, autonomoUs from the state, and bound by a legal order or a set 
of shared rules."2 Although this community appears to be a voluntary 
organization, one that is self-generating, self-supporting, and autonomous from 
the state, it is not a formally organized one. Rather, the Fethullah Gülen 
Community (Cemaat) lacks an institutional basis. In this respect, it is argued that 
one cannot regard it as a civil societal organization in the real sense of the term 
2 Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation," 
Journal of Democracy 5 (July 1994): 5. 
261 
because an organization must be institutionalized in order to be treated asa civil 
societal organization. 
Indeed, the existence of institutions is necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
the well functioning of civil society. The functioning of civil society depends not 
only on these institutions but also on actors who are acting in these institutions. 
Hence, one should take into account the role of the actors while answering the 
question of whether an organization is a civil societal organization. As 
mentioned in Chapter II, Shils maintains that actors should have the virtue of 
civility so that these civil societal organizations could function. Therefore, in 
order to assess the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) in relation to the 
notion of civil society, it is necessary to determine whether Fethullah Gülen, as 
an important actor in this community, himself has the virtue of civility or in 
other words a democratic political culture. As mentioned in Chapter VI, the most 
important characteristics of democratic political culture are listed as follows: 
individuals should have tolerance towards others; individuals should have 
commitment to democratic values; and individuals rights should be appreciated 
by all segments of society. Therefore, one has to address the question to what 
extent Fethullah Gülen is a tolerant and democratic person. As mentioned in the 
fifth chapter, Fethullah Gülen emphasizes the importance of tolerance and even 
maintains that "I wish that we will declare a holy war for nothing but diffusion 
of tolerance." For him we should have tolerance towards Alawis, Kurdish 
262 
people, even the believers of other religions. Nevertheless, he has no tolerance 
towards communism and atheism. He accuses communism of being a system 
that does not have tolerance towards other systems, and atheism asa world-view 
which is not tolerant towards other views. In addition, his non-tolerant 
tendendes towards Marxİst can be seen in his memoirs about the demonstration 
of Marxists. He said he wished military interference to prevent this 
demonstration. 
Related to his undemocratic tendencies, anather piece of memoir of Fethullah 
Gülen is about a film called "Birth of Islam" which was mentioned above. After 
his sermon, in which he criticized this film as making fun of Islam and the 
Prophet, the community rose with anger. He claims he tried to calm them down, 
but to no avail. The community marched to the cinema; they stormed the 
building and beat its owner. 
In addition, undemocratic attitudes of Fethullah Gülen can be seen in his 
memoirs of the 12 March 1971 Ultimatum. For him, only the leftist movements 
were responsible for precipitating this Ultimatum. He accuses some members of 
the police organization because of their attempts to play a referee role trying to 
dampen the clash between the leftist and rightist movements. In fact, according 
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to Gülen, it was the leftist movements which tried to destroy the state and there 
was only a weak response from rightists.3 
He also has an elitist approach which is not compatible with democratic political 
culture. The traces of this elitist vision can also be seen in Fethullah Gülen's 
definition of an association. As mentioned above, he argues that an assodation is 
not long-lasting. The members of an assodation do not necessarily share the 
same thoughts and feelings. These people can be said to constitute a mass which 
came together to pursue their own interests. They can be dissolved easily as they 
unite easily. For him, it is not logical to unite the discontented, i.e. the lower 
stratum of society, since they will act destructively rather than constructively. 
Moreover, although Fethullah Gülen supports individual development 
rhetorically, in practice we could not notice his actions in this direction. He states 
that "we encourage individual development, but in the first instance it seemed 
that the notion of community was contradictory to that of individual 
development. I thought that promoting individual development might cause a 
cleavage in our community."4 For Gülen, freedam of thought and individual 
3 Erdogan, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi: "Küçük Dünyam." 131. 
4 "Bireysel çiçek açma çok zor bir is ... Ve genel de bizde tercih edilen de o ... Fakat 
bir yandan da çeliski gibi görünüyor bu bana, ilk bakista öyleymis gibi 
görünüyor. Bireysel olani tesvik etmek cemaatte ayrilik çikarmaz mi diye 
düsünüyor insan." Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti. 74. 
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identity are very important factors. Individual development should not be 
feared. Each individual has a particular thought, mentality, anda definite mind 
of his or her own. Y et he or sh e will also realize that human beings have to li ve 
together like trees in a forest. Living together with other people also implies that 
one should not harm others. In his sense of community, people who have same 
feelings and same opinions, come together. For this reason, Gülen thinks that 
individual development and the notion of community are not contradictory. 
However, he does not say anything when there are people who have different 
opinions in a community. 
In that respect, some social scientists who have criticized the Fethullah Gülen 
Community (Cemaat) on the basis of that there is no inner-democracy and self-
criticism within the community have a point. Hakan Yavuz, for instance, argues 
that there is no self-criticism in Neo-Nurcu movement; Said Nursi's desires for 
criticism and being criticized are neglected. The people around Fethullah Gülen 
are thinking according to given "formulations," and like bees in a "beehive" 
while fulfilling their duties. The neo-Nurcu movement produces a "beehive" 
spirit of obeying Hocaefendi and the state.s 
ParaHel to this argument, Can Kozanoglu maintains that it is obvious that there 
is an absolute obedience to Fethullah Gülen; his words and opinions are not 
265 
questioned within the community. There is a structural authoritarian mentality 
within the community. This is not a suitable ground for the blossoming of 
individualism and pluralism.6 In this regard, as we all know that an organization 
should have an inner democracy and must allow individual autonomy in order 
to be a civil societal organization in the real sense of the term. In this sense, the 
Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaa~) cannot be considered as part of civil 
societal organizations. 
In addition, it is necessary to present Fethullah Gulen's notion of the state. In the 
second chapter, it was underlined that, according to the "pluralist approach to 
civil society," state and civil society should coexist and the former determines the 
boundaries of the latter by means of the rule of law. However, in this approach 
the democratic state is necessary to set the rule of law to safeguard the 
individuals' autonomy. Similarly Fethullah Gülen supports the existence of the 
state and he asserts that the absence of a state ina country means chaos, disorder, 
and instability. The absence of the state causes a clash between different world-
views. For him without the state religion cannot be protected nor could one' s 
honor, one' s dignity, one' s property, or the foundations of law. If the foundations 
of law are lost, one cannot eventalk about one' s absence or presence. However, 
s Yavuz, "Fethullah Gülen Hoca ile Söylesi," ll Agustos 1997. 
6 Kozanoglu, " 'Türkiye Liderini Ariyor,' Fethullah Gülen Cemaati Geliyor!: 
Devletçi, Projeci 'Yeni Çag' Bilgesi," 48. 
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his notion of the state is not democratic at all. He claims that 11 I prefer even the 
most anti-democratic state to the absence of a state. In this regard, I am opposing 
the erosion of the notion of the state."7 
Another factor that prevents us considering the Fethullah Gülen Community 
(Cemaat) asa civil societal organization is his excessive emphasis on etatism and 
nationalism. Fethullah Gülen proposes that Turkey should reexamine its history, 
historical monuments as well as oral traditions together with the Turkic world. 
Only after this happens can the real identity of the Turkish people be defined. In 
this context, Islam is a very important factor in defining the Turkish people's 
identity. For Gülen, these days everybody in the world is seeking a religion, 
belief, and identity. For this reason, one should consider Islam a component of 
one' s identity. As Ali Bayramoglu pointed out, in a world-view in which etatism 
and nationalism are dominant ideologies, Islam' s place isa functional one. Islam 
is a transmitter of a tradition in which state and nation have a significant place. 
That means Fethullah Gülen adopts the discourse of official ideology, and he lays 
daim to etatism and nationalism.8 This heavy stresson etatism and nationalism 
7 
" ... en anti demokratik devletleri dahi devletsizlige tercih ettigimi 
söyleyebilirim. Bu açidan da devlet manasinin yipratilmasina, gözden 
düsürülmesine karsiyim." Oral Çalislar, 11Fethullah Gülen'in Serüveni," in 
Cumhuriyet. 20-23 Agustos 1995. Interview with Fethullah Gülen. 21 Agustos 
1995. 
8 Insel, ll Altin Nesil, Yeni Muhafazakarlik ve Fethullah Gülen," 69. 
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prevents us from considering Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) part of civil 
societal organizations. 
Likewise, Gülen has suspicions about the Western world, although he has 
supported integration with the Western world. If the Western world were to 
realize that Turkey would become richasa result of integration with the Western 
world, the West will reject this integration. On the other hand, even though he 
taıKs about the maintenance of world peace, he underlines that spirit of the 
Crusaders is stili continuing. Fethullah Gülen refers, for example, to the arms 
embargo imposed by the United States, which, he claims, acts indifferently 
towards Turkey's problems. In addition, Western countries in general treat 
Turkey as Third-World country. This kind of behavior by Western countries, for 
Fethullah Gülen, is the continuation of the spirit of the Crusaders. This feeling of 
hatred neither began during the Crusades nor ended by the completion of the 
Crusades but it stili exists among Western countries.9 In fact, Fethullah Gülen 
conceives the notion of integration with the West from the point of "the lesser of 
the two evils." He argues that the United Sates can have a feeling of hostility 
towards us, but we can undergo the pressure of being on good terms with our 
enemies in ord er to keep world peace. 10 Similarly, when he explains the reason 
why Central Asia was an important place for initiation of educational 
9 Gülen, Ölçü veya Yoldaki Isiklar 2. 12-13. 
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movements remains ambiguous, except his argument that he and the schools of 
the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) represent "Muhammedi spirit," even 
though they are modern and secular-based institution. For him, they went to 
Central Asia not for their national interests, hegemony, having authority over 
those people, or conquering those lands. On the contrary, they went there with a 
message, to signal the way for the future progress of human beings. They were 
presenting a "Muhammedi spirit." 
All these points indicate that the Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) cannot 
be considered as a societal organization , if the question of democracy has 
recently become the central issue in the debate on civil society. In Fethullah 
Gülen' s discourse there is a call for both civil societal elemen ts and the 
im portance of civil societal organization based upon "secularism," and Islam as 
the highest principle for the regulation of societal affairs. This double-gesture 
Fethullah Gülen employs in his discourse, that is, his use of civil societal 
elements in his call for pluralism and secularism and Islam as the basis of the 
organization of societal affairs, is the main reason for his ambiguous position on 
the relationship between religious communities and civil society within the 
context of democratization. 
10 Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti. 41. 
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As is demonstrated throughout the thesis, Nurculuk in general and its recent 
revival with the discourse of Fethullah Gülen, have always acted, not in relation 
to democracy, but ina close connection with the state. Moreover, this discourse 
has always functioned for the legitimization of the need for "ord er" and the 
maintenance of "status quo," rather than the democratization of societal affairs, 
and also for the legitimization of anti-democratic actions of the Turkish state in 
the name of the preservation of "order." 
In this way, as chapters IV and V demonstrated, Nurculuk, in general, and the 
Fethullah Gülen Community (Cemaat) in particular, has always tried to locate 
itself closer to the state both practically and discursively. In this sense, their call 
for civil society, in general, and Fethullah Gülen's appeal to tolerance, in 
particular, should be considered, not in terms of the question of democracy, but 
with reference to the s ta te/ society relations and the role of Islam in it. For this 
reason, the question of religious communities and their role in civil society will 
remain open to social hesitations and anxieties, ambiguities, mixed-feelings, and 
political polarization among societal actors, unless the democratization of 
state/ society relations is achieved on the basis of "secular" organization of civil 
society and the democratic regulations of societal affairs by the Turkish state. 
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